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Abstract 
This thesis is a historical study of a socio-political movement that has been important 
in the recent history of Eritrea: the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF (1960-
1981) was the first, and largely Muslim-based, armed resistance movement that 
emerged to contest Ethiopian rule over Eritrea. Formed in 1960, the ELF carried out 
political and military activities for the subsequent twenty years in the country, aiming 
at independence. The movement later lost the battle for supremacy to the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), another broad-based insurgent movement, which 
took over the state power in 1991, and still rules the country under the name of 
‘People’s Front for Democracy and Justice’. This has led to a historical and social and 
prolonged side-lining of the ELF, its history and its members, whereby they are 
almost seen as enemies. For this reason, the history of the ELF today remains one of 
the poorly researched areas of the Eritrean history. This thesis examines empirically 
the events and forces that gave rise to the emergence, development, and downfall of 
the ELF covering the period from 1960 to 1981. The outcome of the study reveals that 
the ELF despite the fact that it was the first armed resistance movement with the 
aspirations of the Eritrean people in face of the disappointments caused by the 
revoked federation, and Ethiopian repression, a number of internal and external 
reasons contributed for the eclipse of the ELF in the long term. The data for this study 
was collected over a period of six months from extensive archival resources hosted in 
the archives of government institutions, mainly in Asmara, and additional interviews 
with key informants. The objective of this thesis is, therefore, to fill a gap in Eritrean 
historiography and to make a contribution towards understanding of the developments 
leading to Eritrea’s recent history and independence. 
  
  
 
 
Introduction 
Introduction 
In the second half of the twentieth century, Eritrea was an arena of uninterrupted 
armed conflict that went on for about three decades. The conflict was basically rooted 
in history and geography. But it was also aggravated by outside intervention for many 
years. Ethiopia being supported first by the US, Israel, and latter on by the USSR, and 
the Eritrean nationalists by socialist oriented Middle Eastern and Asian countries and 
organizations turned Eritrea into a proxy battle field between opposing forces during 
the Cold War era. 
The protracted Eritrean war of independence started in 1961 under the auspices of the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF (1960-1981) was the first, and largely 
Muslim-based, armed resistance movement that emerged to contest Ethiopian rule 
over Eritrea. Formed in 1960, the ELF carried out political and military activities for 
the subsequent twenty years in an attempt to gain independence. This armed 
resistance movement was, however, unable to accomplish its stated goals of achieving 
independence. Rather, the task of achieving de facto independence was realized by its 
offspring organization in 1991. This study is, therefore, an attempt to reconstruct the 
history of a socio-political movement that has been important in the recent history of 
Eritrea: the Eritrean Liberation Front. In the following sections an attempt is made to 
outline the fundamental research problem and the motivation for my interest in 
undertaking the intended study, research questions, scope of the study, theoretical 
framework, methodology, relevance of the study, and organization of the thesis. 
Problem Statement and Rationale 
In 1950, the UN passed a resolution that federated Eritrea with Ethiopia, without any 
form of plebiscite. Within few years, Ethiopia dismantled the pillars of the federation 
that guaranteed Eritrea’s limited autonomy one by one without hesitation. Throughout 
the federal period, Eritreans protested against Ethiopia’s violations of the Eritrean 
autonomy. As it became quite difficult to organize and agitate inside Eritrea, the task 
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of organizing a movement to promote the Eritrean cause fell on the Diaspora. 
Frustrated with the system, a new breed of Eritrean nationalists founded the 
underground Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM)
1
 in Port Sudan in 1958. The ELM 
sought to terminate Ethiopian rule through a coup d’état. But before the ELM could 
attempt a coup, the war for independence was launched in 1961 under the auspices of 
the ELF.
2
 After that the country lapsed into a cycle of political disorder, violent 
conflict and human suffering in the three decades that followed. 
The founders of the ELF were Eritrean political exiles and students in Cairo, Egypt, 
who drew inspiration from the Algerian revolution.
3
 The initial ELF leaders, who 
were living abroad, came mainly from Muslim backgrounds and this had a profound 
impact on the membership and mobilization of the ELF. Consequently, during the 
early years of the first decade of its history, the movement favoured Muslims over 
Christians.
4
  
In the 1960s, the movement nevertheless grew steadily as it started to attract support 
from diverse segments of the population and from the Diasporas. The fighters (also 
called Tegadelti in Tigrinya, one of the most widely spoken languages in Eritrea) 
were individuals who came from diverse economic, social, educational, gender, and 
age backgrounds and came to be marked by their devotion to the success of the 
struggle. Some of the early fighters received training in Syria, China, Cuba, and Iraq; 
whilst the rest were trained in the liberated areas. Within the next ten years, the ELF 
became a serious threat to the Ethiopian rule in Eritrea. The impact of its existence 
was felt beyond the boundaries of Ethiopia, especially when Ethiopian planes were 
subjected to subversive activities. In 1970, there was a major breakaway from the 
initial movement. Three splinter groups emerged and latter coalesced to form the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which became a strong rival to the parent 
Front. The ELF remained a viable organization for the next ten years, but in the 1970s 
a series of armed clashes between the two dominant movements occurred. These 
                                                 
1
 Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism, 1941-1993 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 98-101; see also Dan Connel and Tom Killion. 
Historical Dictionary of Eritrea (2
nd
 ed.) (Lanham, Toronto and Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 
Inc., 2011), Connel and Killion, 218-20. 
2
 Ruth, 103; see also Redie Bereketeab, “Eritrea: The Making of a Nation 1890-1991” (PhD. diss., 
Uppsala University, 2000), 183-184. 
3
 John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 113. 
4
 Redie, 185. 
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clashes were typically exemplified by a struggle for dominance. Finally, in 1982, the 
EPLF superseded the ELF and other smaller groups as the most effective armed 
resistance to the Ethiopian forces, and defeated the ELF in the process. The ELF 
fighters fled to Sudan, and many went on to Europe and North America, while some 
members opted to return to Eritrea and join the rival nationalist movement, the EPLF. 
In May 1991, the EPLF took control of the whole country from Ethiopia and Eritrea 
achieved its de jure independence in 1993 after holding a UN observed referendum, in 
which 99.8 percent of Eritreans voted for sovereignty. The EPLF transformed itself 
into the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in 1994 and has been 
leading the country since its independence. 
The ELF, emerging years before its rival the EPLF, and having been in a position of 
prominence in military terms with regard to the latter, nevertheless was superseded 
and destroyed in a relatively short period of time. This calls for investigation into the 
reasons why one movement, from the outside looking stronger, so spectacularly failed 
not only to achieve its aims but even to maintain itself as an organization, while a 
seemingly weaker front, the EPLF, not only managed to outflank and supersede its 
rival but also went on to occupy the whole of Eritrea. The Eritrean example, in this 
manner, offers a unique comparative example of two movements with different 
strategies and with very different fortunes. Although it is beyond the scope of the 
study to address the ELF from a comparative dimension, it is important to at least note 
that the Eritrean example may hold general lessons on the variables that affect the 
viability and strength of national-revolutionary movements. 
In my previous career as a junior researcher and archivist at the Research and 
Documentation Centre (RDC), the acting national archive of Eritrea, from 2004 to 
2012, I was confronted with a large amount of archival materials concerning the 
movement in question. Despite the availability of such bulky serviceable source 
materials, the history of the Eritrean struggle for independence remained by and large 
incomplete and undeveloped.
5
 This absence of well researched publications and 
analysis poses a challenge in developing a broader understanding of the dynamics of 
the Eritrean politics prior to the independence of the country. This experience instilled 
in me the desire to study the nature and development of the ELF using the idea of 
                                                 
5
 Bairu Tafla, “Interdependence through Independence: The Challenges of Eritrean Historiography,” in 
New Trends in Ethiopian Studies, ed. Harold G. Marcus. (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1994), 500. 
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writing history from the stand point of those former ELF fighters. In this study, 
special attention has been given to its origin, development, and demise of the 
movement, and the how and why questions have also been investigated thoroughly. 
Research Questions and Scope of the Study 
In light of the above mentioned problem statement, the project strives to answer the 
following research questions: 
i. How did the ELF as a movement emerge and develop? 
ii. Why did the movement undergo continuous internal splits within two decades 
of its formation? Why it could not forge unity and efficiency as a movement? 
iii. Why and how the ELF finally collapsed? 
The study focuses on the period from 1960 to 1981 since this period marked the birth 
and collapse of the ELF. Following the delimitation of the scope, the period prior to 
the birth of the ELF has also been examined in order to provide a historical setting. 
Theoretical Considerations 
According to Natalino Ronzitti a war of national liberation is defined as an “armed 
struggle waged by a people through its liberation movement against the established 
government to reach self-determination.”6 From a different perspective these wars are 
often called insurgencies or rebellions.
7
 The definition of application of “wars of 
national liberation” is further elaborated by Abi-Saab who outlined the different types 
of armed conflict to which the term has been applied. According to him the concept of 
“wars of national liberation” applies to the following wars: 
(1) Historically, those struggles of peoples fighting a foreign invader or 
occupant;  
                                                 
6
 Natalino Ronzitti, “Resort to Force in Wars of National Liberation,” in Antonio Cassese, ed., Current 
Problems of International Law: Essays on UN, Law and on the Law of the Armed Conflict (Milan: 
Dott. A. Guiﬀre Edittore, 1975), 321. 
7
 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy (NJ., USA: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
p. 80. 
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(2) Those that have evolved within the United Nations and identified from 
the practice of States and international organizations, namely colonial and 
alien domination (or rule or government) and racist regimes ... are armed 
struggles aimed at resisting the forcible imposition or maintenance of such 
situations to allow people subjected to them to exercise its right of self-
determination.  
(3) Dissident movements in several countries which take up arms with a view 
to overthrowing the government and the social order it stands for. Their 
members may consider themselves as a “liberation movement” waging a 
“war of national liberation” against a regime or government which masks or 
represents “alien domination” but such conflicts do not oppose different 
“peoples” and the traditional consensus is to consider them as purely 
internal…  
(4) Armed struggle of certain dissident movements representing a component 
people within a plural State which aims at seceding and creating a new State 
on part of the territory of the existing one...
 8
 
On the other hand, Pangalangan and Aguiling in their paper tilted The Privileged 
Status of National Liberation Movements under International Law, provide a different 
perspective on the types of armed conflicts. In their expression:   
Parties to an armed conflict, other than states, are legally classified – “along a 
continuum of ascending intensity” – as (1) rebels, (2) insurgents or (3) 
belligerents. Rebellion consists of sporadic challenge to the established 
government but which remains “susceptible to rapid suppression by normal 
procedures of internal security”; it is within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
state. Insurgency is a “half-way house between essentially ephemeral, 
spasmodic or unorganized civil disorders and the conduct of an organized 
war between contending factions within a State.” The material conditions for 
a condition of belligerency are (1) the existence of an armed conflict of a 
general character; (2) occupation by the insurgents of a substantial portion of 
the national territory; (3) an internal organization capable and willing to 
                                                 
8
 Cited in Edre U Olalia, The Status in International Law of National Liberation Movements and their 
Use of Armed Force. International Association of People’s Lawyers, ND, 2. 
http://www.iadllaw.org/files/THE%20STATUS%20IN%20INTERNATIONAL%20LAW%20OF%20
NATIONAL%20LIBERATION%20MOVEMENTS%20AND%20THEIR%20USE%20OF%20ARME
D%20FORCE%20by%20Edre%20Olalia.pdf (Accessed 12/05/2013).  
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enforce the laws of war; and (4) circumstances which make it necessary for 
outside states to define their attitude by means of recognition of 
belligerency.
9
 
In such sort of categorization one can observe the application of geo-military criteria 
as the basis for the characterization of armed conflicts. Having laid down some 
clarification on the meaning and representation of the term ‘war of national 
liberation’, let us have a look into some relevant approaches for understanding and 
explaining the cause(s) behind political violence.  
What is it that mobilizes people to participate in a radical and high-risk strategic 
protest? Why did the Eritrean people eventually resort to take up arms and carryout 
the bloody war that went on for three decades? Several scholars have ventured to 
comprehend and find adequate scientific explanations behind this kind of political 
violence; yet, according to Foran, “no comprehensive theory of any aspect of 
revolution... has stood the test of time and comparative research.”10 
The above question can be approached through the Relative Deprivation Theory 
(RDT). Gurr defines RDT in psychosocial terms as: “a perceived discrepancy between 
men’s value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the 
goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value 
capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining and 
maintaining...”11 Gurr emphasizes the primacy of grievance and discontent in 
explaining political violence. He argues that “[d]iscontent arising from the perception 
of relative depravation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective 
violence.”12 From this explanation one can observe that people may take up arms and 
launch a national liberation war particularly when they experience a sense of relative 
deprivation and frustration with the system they live in. In connection with a strategy 
for revolutionaries, Gurr further states that “[i]f discontent is intense and widespread 
in a society, revolutionary task are simplified; if not, there are means by which it can 
be increased. Ideological appeals offer the best means, to the extent that their content 
                                                 
9
 Raul C Pangalangan and Elizabeth Aguiling, “The Privileged Status of National Liberation 
Movements under International Law,” Philippine Law Journal, 58 (1983): 51. 
10
 John Foran, ed., Theorizing Revolutions (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 7. 
11
 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel? (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 13. 
12
 Ibid. 
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is designed to justify new aspirations and specify means toward their attainment. Any 
relatively disadvantaged group is a potential audience for such appeals.”13  
Gurr and Goldstone in their comparative studies on revolutions assert that a 
widespread grievance among the general population is “a necessary condition for 
counter elites who seek to mobilize a mass following.”14 In my view, grievances do 
not come out of a blue moon. The role of the state’s policies and practices, whether it 
is intentional or unintentional, is highly important factor in generating popular 
grievances. Grievance could be expressed in different forms, either covertly or 
overtly, depending on the kind of the political system and culture exists; but the way 
the state or the power holder react seems to result counterproductive. Regarding to 
this, the study made by Gurr and Goldstone shows that in the past “[i]n virtually every 
instance, threatened governments used force and violence in ways that increased 
popular resentment and active support for revolutionary movements.”15 This analysis 
helps us understand to what extent the brutality of successive Ethiopian regimes 
created a favourable ground for their adversaries, the liberation movements, to grow 
numerically and justify their claim as a legitimate act on behalf of the subjugated 
people. Using the same logic, an argument is made that revolutionary movements, 
too, might face the same counterproductive resentment and create favourable 
condition for factionalism when they apply force and violence to quell any form of 
opposition or perceived threat from within. This logic becomes substantially true to 
the history of the ELF. None of the brutal measures undertaken by the ELF leadership 
throughout the period against any form of opposition prevented factionalism. 
Repressive measures often tend to cement the ‘we’ vs. ‘them ‘dichotomy, and may 
easily lead to the disintegration of a movement, like the ELF, emerging from regional, 
ethnic and religious diversity. 
The question that comes here is that do grievances always give rise to rebellion? My 
intuitive answer is almost certainly and emphatically negative; because it becomes a 
dangerous excessive generalization to assume that whenever widespread grievances 
exist, people would resort to take up arms against the central government. In contrary, 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 353. 
14
 Ted Robert Gurr and Jack A. Goldstone, “Comparisons and Policy Implications,” in Revolutions of 
the Late Twentieth Century, ed. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri. (Boulder 
CO: Westview Press, 1991), 334. 
15
 Ibid. 
8 
 
 
 
past studies on insurgencies have, however, shown that revolutionary movements 
derive basically from collective grievances, and as Clapham noted, “…from blocked 
political aspirations, and in some cases also from reactive desperation.”16 
Tilly identifies mobilization as an important component of collective action. 
Mobilization, according to him, is defined as a “process by which a group acquires 
collective control over the resources needed for action.”17 The resources may be of 
human, material or financial kind. Through this process “a group goes from being a 
passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.”18 Furthermore, 
Tilly provides three ways in which mobilization can occur. These are defensive, 
offensive and, preparatory. Defensive mobilization happens when people organize 
their resource in response to a threat from outside, which is referred to be a bottom-up 
type of mobilization. In the offensive mobilization, “a group pools resources in 
response to opportunities to realize its interests;” while in the preparatory case, “the 
group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities and threats.”19 Both 
offensive and preparatory mobilizations are often carried out top-down. 
In this thesis, I argued that the ELF despite it was the first armed resistance movement 
of the aspirations of the Eritrean people in face of the disappointments of the revoked 
federation, and Ethiopian arrogance and brutality, a number of internal and external 
reasons worked against ELF in the long term, such as: its inability to break out from 
being perceived as a Muslim movements, power struggle, disunity among the 
leadership, the infighting of the ELF, the rise of the EPLF and the taking over of the 
mantle of progress and secularity by this organization. This thesis examines 
empirically the events and forces that gave rise to the emergence and downfall of the 
ELF.  
Methodology  
The material that forms the basis of this study was collected from a variety of sources 
consisting of both primary and secondary accounts. Since the literature on the subject 
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in question is very scanty, the researcher was compelled to focus essentially on three 
types of qualitative data collection approaches, namely, archival research, interviews, 
as well as library and internet research for fragmented published and unpublished 
materials. 
 Archival materials are important source of information for developing an 
understanding of a particular episode. They are first-hand accounts. They serve as 
evidence not only in developing an interpretation but also in building an argument to 
endorse that interpretation.
20
 Realizing this, archival materials such as organizational 
programs and structures, statements, declarations and communiqués, correspondence, 
political manuals, military intelligence and diplomatic reports, newspapers, journals, 
audio-visual materials etc. produced within the time period in question by the ELF, 
EPLF and successive regimes in Addis Ababa were consulted extensively and 
analyzed thoroughly.  
A substantial proportion of the data was gathered over a period of six months (August 
2013-January 2014) by going through enormous bulk of archival resources hosted by 
Eritrea’s Research and Documentation Centre (RDC), the country’s de facto National 
Archive. The RDC hosts a large and diverse collection of documents covering both 
the colonial and post-colonial periods. Their records can be classified into four main 
groups: (i) published and unpublished written materials; (ii) analogue and digital 
audio and video records; (iii) photographs; and (iv) cartographic collections. Many of 
these records were collected in the field during the war of independence in the form of 
interviews and as oral narratives and other relevant materials were gathered from 
diverse sources both in Eritrea and abroad. There are large quantities of unexploited 
Ethiopian intelligence records and military operations that were collected after the end 
of the war in 1991 but they are by no means complete. Nowadays, almost all the 
records in the Centre are registered in a database and are easily accessible. Since 
Eritrea is a young nation, one cannot expect a high degree of knowledge when it 
comes to the preservation of records. Surprisingly, there is, however, widespread 
awareness about the documentation and preservation of the country’s national 
heritage. This is undoubtedly crucial in developing and reconstructing Eritrea’s 
history. In addition to the RDC, I also visited the archives of the Eritrean Police Force 
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in Asmara where I was able to consult huge dusty but essential documents, mostly 
intelligence reports, of the Ethiopian governments created prior to 1991. 
To supplement the information obtained from archival records the researcher made 
use of fragmented second-hand accounts and interviews. Various books, journals, 
newspapers, unpublished dissertations were consulted when needed. The researcher 
conducted interviews with former ELF members and benefited from both formal and 
informal discussions. As Turner put it “[i]nterviews provide in-depth information 
pertaining to participants’ experiences and viewpoints of a particular topic. Often, 
interviews are coupled with other forms of data collection in order to provide the 
researcher with a well-rounded collection of information for analyses.”21 Hence, the 
researcher conducted face-to-face interviews involving standardized, open-ended 
questions. Open-ended interviews was applied because it “allows the participants to 
contribute as much detailed information as they desire and it also allows the 
researcher to ask probing questions as a means of follow-up.”22 Thus, aiming at 
eliciting views and opinions, the questions were structured and tailored to specific 
respondents, depending on the time the respondent joined the armed struggle and the 
place in which one had in the power hierarchy in the organization. Based on 
purposive sampling technique qualified candidates were chosen for interview. It must 
be confessed that, due to time constraint and unavailability of credible informants, 
only four extended interviews were conducted by the researcher. Majority of the early 
ELF leaders are not alive today. But thanks to the remarkable work done by Gunter 
Schröder, who conducted interviews with tens of key ELF military and political 
leaders since early 1980s, the study benefited immensely and this no doubt 
complemented the information gap particularly during the first ten years of the armed 
struggle. A document consisting of over two hundred pages of English transcribed 
interviews by Gunter Schröder is available at the RDC. In addition, interviews 
formerly carried out by Zemheret Yohannes, Ahferom Tewolde, Alemseghed Tesfai 
and his staff members with key ex-ELF members, that are also available in cassettes 
at the RDC, were equally important in complementing and elaborating essential 
episodes in the history of the ELF. At last, it goes without saying that the fieldwork 
included the use of different sources on the web regarding the case in point. In many 
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ways, most of the available information in various Eritrean websites suffers from lack 
of objectivity, particularly in dealing with certain contentious issues in the history of 
the Eritrean armed struggle. Thus, I have tried to the best of my level to avoid 
politically-laden information and concentrated with great care on the information 
relevant to the study. 
Relevance of the Study 
In part due to the protracted warfare that Eritrea went through until 1991 and due to 
political sensitivities, the history of the Eritrean armed struggle in general and that of 
the ELF in particular is poorly researched. Those few works that have already been 
published lay emphasis on the victorious movement, the EPLF. Furthermore, the 
existing official national narrative gives little attention to the history of the ELF, 
simultaneously suffering a lot from biased treatment. Hence, to this time the ELF 
failed to receive the level of analytical attention that remotely corresponds to its 
importance. As far as I am aware, the ELF has so far not received enough empirically-
based scholarship. Thus, with this background in mind, the researcher embarked on a 
six-month fieldwork study in order to thoroughly look into the subject and make use 
of new archival resources in Eritrea as well as interviews with former members of the 
movement. Having done so, it is the hope and conviction of the researcher that this 
study will play its part in filling a gap in Eritrean historiography and to make a partial 
contribution towards understanding the developments leading to Eritrea’s recent 
history and independence. 
Organization 
For the purpose of organization, the thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one, 
Historical Background to the Eritrean War for Independence, is intended to serve as a 
backdrop of the study. It attempts to examine the origins of the political development 
in Eritrea following the collapse of Italian colonial rule, and the process through 
which the disposal of Eritrea was tackled at the United Nations. Furthermore, it 
analyzes and provides an account of the Federal period, and the simmering political 
movements that gave rise to the break out of the armed resistance in 1961. Before 
12 
 
 
 
doing so, the chapter provides an overview of the various groups of Eritrean 
population, the geography, religion, economy and ethno-linguistic composition, 
relevant for understanding ethnic and national mobilization in the Eritrean context. 
Chapter two, Ethiopian Domination and Emergence of the Eritrean Liberation Front, 
1960-63, explores the formative period of the ELF and the beginning of the Eritrean 
armed struggle for independence. The role of key forces behind initiating the war, and 
brief history of Hamid Idris Awate and the reasons for his rebellion, and military 
engagements undertaken before and after his death are discussed in this chapter. The 
overall development aspect of the ELF during the first decade of its time is addressed 
in Chapter three, under Broadening the war: Organizational and Political 
Developments, 1964-1969. The chapter deals with the role of the ELF’s leadership 
abroad, the expansion and organization of the ELF army, the internal squabbles, 
disputes and rivalries that were tearing apart the ELF in 1970. Major clandestine 
commando operations undertaken in 1969 are also discussed. Chapter four, 
Fragmentation and Civil War: 1970-1974, examines the proliferation of different 
independent politico-military organizations from the ELF and the subsequent civil 
war that went on for over two years and the underlying reasons that brought it to a 
halt. In the final chapter, The ELF: From Territorial Expansion to Historical 
Expulsion, 1975-1981, an attempt is made to trace important historical developments 
that shaped the course of ELF history from 1975 to 1981. These developments include 
both military and political aspects that characterized the internal and external 
dynamics of the movement. In examining these issues, special attention will be given 
to finding answers as to why the ELF could not forge the set of aims of unity and 
efficiency as a movement, and why and how it finally collapsed. Last but not least, the 
final conclusions wrap up the entire thesis. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter One: Historical Background to the Eritrean War for 
Independence 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the historical setting of the Eritrean independence war. In order 
to understand the causes of the armed conflict (1961-91), it is important to examine 
the origins of the political development within Eritrea following the demise of Italian 
colonial rule, and the process through which the disposal of Eritrea was tackled at the 
United Nations. Thus, the chapter attempts to analyze and provide an account of what 
happened, why it happened and the effects it had in the subsequent political arena of 
Eritrea. In retrospect to the political development in the colonial period and the war 
for independence, the chapter starts by presenting an overview of the various groups 
of Eritrean population, the geography, religion, economy and ethno-linguistic 
composition, relevant for understanding ethnic and national mobilization.  
A Sketch of Eritrea’s Land and People 
Eritrea, a former Italian colony (1890-1941), is bordered by Sudan in the West, 
Ethiopia in the South, the Red Sea in the Northeast and East, and Djibouti in the 
Southeast. The country has a total surface area of 117,600 square kilometres and 
about 1070 km coastline along the Red Sea.
1
 The country is approximately the size of 
North Korea or slightly more than a collective landmass of the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Belgium.   
The territory is inhabited by at least nine linguistically defined nationalities: Tigrinya, 
Tigre, Bilen, Rashaida, Hidareb, Kunama, Saho, Nara, and Afar.
2
 Although there is no 
up-to-date dependable demographic data of the different ethno-linguistic groups, the 
Tigrinya as well as Tigre speakers make-up the majority of the Eritrean population. In 
terms of religion, the population is almost equally divided between Christianity 
(mostly Eritrean Orthodox with smaller number of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and 
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other Christians) and Islam. In terms of economy and geography, the Tigrinya are 
predominantly Christians and mostly sedentary agriculturalists dwelling in the central 
plateau while the Tigre are partly Christian and partly Muslim semi-nomadic 
pastoralists inhabiting in the western, northern and eastern lowlands as well as the 
Dahlak Islands of Eritrea.
3
 
Map  2. Language Map of Eritrea 
 
Source: Redie, 65. 
                                                 
3
 Abbebe Kifleyesus. “Folk-fairs and festivals: Cultural Conservation and National Identity Formation 
in Eritrea.” Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, XLVII (2) 186 (2007), 249; Christine Matzke, “Engendering 
Theatre in Eritrea: The Roles and Representations of Women in the Performing Arts” (PhD. Diss., 
University of Leeds, 2003), 9. 
15 
 
 
 
The Afar who are predominantly Muslims and semi-nomadic pastoralists practice 
fishing and trading and inhabit the south-eastern region of Eritrea along the Red Sea 
coastal lands. While the Saho, a predominantly Muslim who engage in nomadic 
pastoralism inhabit the coastal lands and the southern highland of Eritrea; the 
Rashaida, an Arabic speaking Muslim migrants of the 19
th
 Century, who practice 
nomadic pastoralism and engage in trade and commerce occupy the north-eastern part 
of Eritrea. In the south-central Eritrea, the Keren region from Hal-Hal to Halib 
Mentai, are the Bilin, consisting of Christian and Muslim agriculturalists.
4
  
In the western and south-western part of Eritrea bordering Ethiopia, we find the 
Kunama and Nara (formerly called Baria), predominantly Christians and Muslims 
respectively with small numbers of ancestral believers found among the Kunama. 
These ethno-linguistic groups practice both cattle rearing and hoe-based farming in 
the fertile area between the rivers Gash and Setit. Whereas, the broad plains to the 
north of the western lowlands bordering Sudan, called Barka after the river, is 
inhibited mainly by the two Bejas, the Hadendowa and Beni Amer, a predominantly 
Muslim pastoralists, who have cultural and tribal relations with the Beja nomads in 
neighbouring Sudan. The Hadendowa have retained use of the Beja language, To-
Bedawi, also known as Hedareb. The vast majority of the Beni Amer, however, speak 
Tigre while few speak the Beja language.
5
 The Beni Amer contributed a lot to the 
beginning of the Eritrean armed struggle. It was among the Beni Amer that the ELF, 
the first armed resistance movement against Ethiopia, formed its clandestine networks 
and guerrilla bases in the early 1960s
6
 (this is recounted in the following chapters). 
The census conducted by the British in the early 1950s shows that the Muslims were 
predominant in the lowlands, while the Christians were the majority in the Central 
highlands. The Central plateau is the more urbanised and industrialized region 
compared to the western lowlands and Northern highlands, which throughout the past 
century have been distant from the centre of economic development, with the 
exception of Massawa. By the early 1950s Eritrea had an estimated population of 
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1,038,000 people, 81.7 percent of whom were rural peasants and nomadic or semi-
nomadic pastoralists.
7
  
Table 1. Eritrean Population by Language and Religion (1950) 
Religion/ Language Central Plateau Lowlands/ North Total 
Muslim 104,000 420,000 524,000 
Christian 470,000 36,000 506,000 
Animist [Ancestral beliefs] -- 8,000 8,000 
 Rural Population  
Tigrinya 387,000 9,000 396,000 
Tigre -- 272,000 272,000 
Saho 63,000 7,000 70,000 
Bilin -- 37,000 37,000 
Afar -- 28,000 28,000 
Other* -- 45,000 45,000 
 Urban Population  
Muslim 31,000 58,000 89,000 
Christian 93,000 8,000 101,000 
Source: UN General Assembly (1950) Session 5, Supplement 8 (A/1285), 10-11. Cited in Tom Killion, 
282-283. 
*The word “Other” refers to the remaining ethno-linguistic groups such as the Nara, the Kunama, the 
Rashaida and the Hidareb. 
Early History: A synopsis  
During the pre-colonial era the territory that constitute Eritrea today was contested by 
different powers. The Funj Empire of Sudan controlled western lowlands of Eritrea; 
whilst the Ottoman Turks established themselves in the northern Eritrean shorelines, 
including the port of Massawa, and remained there for some 300 years until they were 
replaced by the Egyptians who also established themselves along the Red Sea and 
Somalian coasts in 1865.
8
 The Dankalia region was ruled by the local aristocratic 
rulers of the Afar, along with the rest of the Afar homeland. The central Eritrean 
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region, also known as Medri Bahri
9
, had been a fighting ground for the Tigriyan 
(northern Ethiopia) warlords for centuries. In 1885 Italy, supported by Britain, took 
control of Massawa.
10
 On 1 January 1890 Italy proclaimed the formation of its first 
colony by integrating the various ethno-linguistic groups under a single centralized 
government within the territory, naming it Eritrea after the Greek name of the Red 
Sea.
11
 
Italy’s entry into World War II in 1940, however, brought the collapse of its half 
century old African empire. An assault by British-led forces concluded the occupation 
of Eritrea in April 1941. During the war Britain, as part of its war strategy, dropped 
leaflets that promised the realization of freedom and self-governance to the Eritrean 
people, if the Ascaris would desert from the Italians. One leaflet from the British 
government read: 
Eritreans at Keren listen! We the English government address you as one warrior 
does another. The Italians have now ruled you for 50 years. …Though you belong to 
a race as noble as any in the world, you have not even a flag of your own to fight for.  
Eritreans! You deserve to have a flag! This is the honourable life for the Eritrean: to 
have the guts to call his people a Nation; to cease to be the slave of the Italian; to 
command battalions; to drive tanks; to pilot aircraft…12 
Another leaflet dropped by the British also said: “Eritrean Soldiers, listen! Desert 
from the Italians and join us. …you will receive your full reward. You people who 
wish to …have your own flag, we give you our word, you shall be allowed to choose 
what government you desire.”13 These leaflets produced positive results and 
consequently there was a massive defection of Ascaris, native colonial soldiers, who 
took side with Britain against Italy. In February 1941 alone about 1000 Askaris 
deserted from their Italian commanders, and a majority of them followed in the 
succeeding months, and this facilitated the collapse of Italian colonial authority in 
Eritrea. Thus, the British were initially welcomed by Eritreans as “liberators” from 
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Italian fascist rule. Their victory that culminated in the occupation of Asmara, the 
capital, was welcomed and the people celebrated it cheerfully, hoping this would 
bring an end to domination and discrimination.
14
  
In April 1941, the British replaced the Italians as the new masters of Eritrea. But it 
should be noted that British rule had never assumed the status of colonial rule like that 
of its predecessor. Rather, as victorious power, Britain from the onset assumed the 
status of ‘care taker’ of an occupied enemy territory until the fate of that colony could 
be decided after the end of the war. Thus Eritrea was used as an area of military 
operation in the war against the Axis Powers
15
 until Italy signed the terms of an 
armistice in 25 July 1943, a treaty where Italy surrendered all its former possessions 
in Africa.
16
 In any case, Britain set out its administration of Eritrea from the 1941 up 
until the execution of the UN-sponsored Federal resolution in 1952.  
British Military Administration and the Growth of Eritrean National 
Politics 
After the demise of Italian rule in Eritrea, Britain took the necessary steps to establish 
a provisional British Military Administration (BMA)
17
 in Eritrea. Headquartered in 
Nairobi, Kenya, the administration was defined by its military nature, since authority 
to govern was vested in the hands of the Commander-in-chief of the occupied 
territory.
18
  
As Jordan notes: “the principal aim of the BMA was … to make the former state 
structure of the “Occupied Enemy Territory” inoperative, to dissolve the indigenous 
power structure, and to replace it with the British institutional and administrative state 
apparatus.”19 Nevertheless, during the first three years, the British faced a shortage of 
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British administrative officers who could run the country. Hence for political 
convenience the BMA kept the existing Fascist administrative structure as well as 
former Italian authorities in Eritrea intact. Not only this, but also the previous 
traditional power structures continued to function. To maintain law and order in the 
country Sudanese forces were brought in. Gradually, however, the British started to 
alter the existing Italian and traditional administrative structures and traditional rulers 
were completely replaced with British appointees almost throughout the country.
20
  
The measures undertaken by the British resulted in widespread discontent among the 
general population. Some concerned groups covertly started to meet and discuss, 
which eventually led to the formation of the first nationalist association, Mahber 
Feqri Hager Ertra (Association for the Love of the Country of Eritrea) in May 1941. 
This secret society elected a twelve-man leadership, consisting of six Christians and 
six Muslims, intended to represent the entire Eritrean society. The Association was 
meant to serve as a “forum of discussion with the intention to participate in ongoing 
dialogue with the British concerning the day-to-day practical issues.”21 Subsequently, 
a massive demonstration, organized by the Association, took place in front of the 
Government Palace in Asmara, and approached Brigadier Kennedy-Cooke, the newly 
appointed head of the BMA in Eritrea. A delegation led by Abdel-Kadir Kebire, a 
prominent Eritrean nationalist, presented their request for the realization of Eritrea’s 
self-determination, in line with the promise the British had made in the pamphlets 
before. But the British seldom honoured their promises. The authorities turned deaf 
ears to the demands of the population. More to the disappointment of the people, the 
British authorities passed a law that banned virtually all forms of street 
demonstrations and protests. In effect, Eritreans had to face severe punishment with 
heavy fines for peaceful demonstrations. The situation continued until the ban on the 
formation of political parties was lifted in 1947, after World War II.  
The end of the Second World War brought about a steady decline of Eritrean 
economic growth. The deterioration was caused by three important reasons. First, 
Eritrean industries failed to compete with the post-war European economy which 
began to supply the markets in the Middle East that had been supplied by the Eritrean 
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industries during the war period.  Secondly, the cessation of the World War II ended 
the demand brought about by the war. Thirdly, Britain was reluctant to promote 
investment in Eritrea during the post war period. When the issue of the future of the 
three former Italian colonies, i.e. Eritrea, Libya and Somalia, was brought before the 
four victorious powers (as we shall see in the next section) who assumed the authority 
to determine the future of these colonies in 1945, Britain, despite its promise to grant 
self-determination, presented their scheme for a partition of Eritrea between Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan and Ethiopia. One of the arguments put forward in support for their 
plan was that Eritrea would be economically unviable once it gained independence; to 
substantiate their argument, therefore, they started to destroy any indication that was 
thought to demonstrate the economic viability of Eritrea. A great number of industrial 
plants and infrastructures were dismantled and then sold or transferred to other British 
colonies.
22
 Silvia Pankhurst who visited Eritrea during the process of dismantlement 
reports that a cement factory capable of producing 1000 tons of cement daily, a potash 
factory, twenty radio stations, one hospital, an airdrome and quarters of the aviation 
personnel, floating docks with cranes, dynamos and motors of ships, sixteen large 
boats, 300 railway wagons, 500 oil reservoirs, 400 Zula luxurious houses, and some 
75 buildings were dismantled in Eritrea.
23
 As Trevaskis, the then political advisor of 
the BMA, clearly observed:  
The British had requisitioned the plant and equipment essential for development; 
they had crippled the skilled labour force by shipping thousands of Italians overseas; 
they had deprived Eritrea of its most valuable agricultural asset by abandoning cotton 
production; they had paralyzed the one industry which might have revolutionized the 
territory’s economy by restricting for gold; and they have made any large-scale 
development impossible by restricting the freedom of the banks to issue loans.
24 
The deteriorating economy aggravated the social conditions of the country. Rising 
unemployment and massive inflation became a symptom of such economic decline. 
According to Killion, “[b]etween 1940 and 1944 the cost of living increased roughly 
600 percent, while workers’ wage rose by only 60 percent.”25 Moreover, higher taxes 
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on the peasantry increased migration to the towns. All of these factors caused a 
general discontent with the new turn of events.  
When the British allowed political liberalization and mobilization over the issue of the 
future status of Eritrea in January 1947, several political parties emerged one after 
another. The Moslem League was the first party to be founded formally in January 
1947 in Keren. The Party demanded immediate independence of Eritrea or 
independence preceded by ten years of international trusteeship if the existing 
circumstance did not allow.
26
 The Liberal Progressive Party, founded in February 
1947, advocated for the complete independence of Eritrea.
27
 In March 1947 the 
Unionist Party, that demanded the unconditional union of Eritrea with Ethiopia, was 
officially formed in Asmara.
28
 Generally the political parties can be roughly divided 
between a unionist wing, favouring union with Ethiopia and an independence wing, 
advocating for independence. The Unionists got the support of the majority of the 
Christian population while the Independence wing was essentially composed of both 
Christian and Muslim populations of the country. Of the independence group, the 
Muslim League got the support of almost the entire Muslim population.
29
 The 
commonly shared feeling among the Muslim communities was “the fear of being 
incorporated in the Christian dominated Ethiopia.”30 Although the League had a 
sectarian name, it was not an Islamist organization as we understand it today. But the 
use of such term clearly shows the political schism along religious lines in the 
Eritrean society.
31
   
According to Ellingson, the pro-independence parties were mostly financed by 
membership while the Unionists were “handsomely subsidized by the Ethiopian 
government although, of course this was never publicly admitted.”32 In the years that 
followed, politics in Eritrea was dominated by the struggle between the Unionist Party 
and the two pro-independence parties. In due course, the latter experienced split and 
realignment as shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 1. The Formation of Political Parties in Eritrea
33
 
Source: Redie, 148.
 
 
The Case of Eritrea in the International Forums 
When the Second World War came to an end the disposal of ex-Italian colonies, 
namely Eritrea, Libya, and Somalia, was left to be jointly determined by the Council 
of Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R, U.S., U.K. and France. The first meeting of these 
four victorious Powers was held in London in September 1945. The American 
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, proposed that collective trusteeship under the UN 
would prevent the Italian colonies from becoming of military advantage to anyone. 
Under this scheme Eritrea was to become independent after ten years. The US scheme 
of collective trusteeship was strongly rejected by the USSR and France. The USSR 
argued that the Collective trusteeship formula would not be feasible since it had never 
been put into practice before. France viewed the plan as something that would 
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endanger their presence in the neighbouring French colonies of Chad, Algeria, 
Tunisia, and French Somalia. Hence they favoured Italian trusteeship.
34
  
Britain, on the other hand, rejected the proposal made by both the United States and 
France. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, Britain had the idea to partition 
Eritrea in mind, i.e., dividing Eritrea between Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Ethiopia.
35
 
The plan was in fact initiated way back before the end of the Second World War. In 
1942, for instance, the British Governor of the Sudan visited Eritrea to gather 
information about the western Eritrean region adjacent to the Sudan. By 1943 the 
chief military administrator in Eritrea, Steven Longrigg, proposed three key elements 
that should be taken into consideration when dealing with the future disposal of 
Eritrea: “first, retention of strategic areas and communication lines; second, setting up 
a regime reflecting a ‘permanent ethnographical and economic reality’ to ensure the 
governability of Eritrea; and third, minimization of the cost of administering 
Eritrea.”36 In the same year Britain had already started discussions with the US 
government on how to dismember Eritrea and give Ethiopia access to the Sea.
37
 If 
Ethiopia was provided an outlet to the sea it would then be expected to give up the 
Ogaden region of the southeastern Ethiopia, which was under British occupation. 
British policy towards Somalia was to create a “Greater Somalia” by combining the 
British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the Ogaden if and only if Ethiopia agreed 
to surrender the latter region.
38
 Subsequently Britain was interested in securing its 
geopolitical interests in northeastern Africa; hence it was actively engaged to 
influence the outcome of the decision to be taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers 
comprised of only the victorious powers.  
The case of Eritrea was further complicated as Italy, Ethiopia and Egypt announced 
significant claims over the country. Italy wanted a fair share of administration to be 
assigned to Italian officials. On historical grounds, Egypt demanded for the return of 
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Massawa which was part of Eritrean territory under Egyptian control before the 
advent of Italians in the territory. Meanwhile, Ethiopia claimed that Eritrea was an 
integral part of its wider polity and it argued that it had access to the Red Sea and 
Indian Ocean since 3000 years.
39
   
In February 1947 a Peace Treaty between the four powers and Italy was concluded in 
Paris. Consequently, Italy renounced all its rights to its former territorial possessions 
in Africa. In addition, an agreement was reached between the four powers to ensure 
the disposal of the ex-Italian colonies in Africa within one year. If they were unable to 
reach an agreement within one year of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with 
Italy, the question would be referred to the UN General Assembly.
40
  
In accordance with the treaty a four power commission known as the Commission of 
Inquiry representing the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR arrived in Eritrea 
on 8 November 1947 and left on the 3
rd
 January 1948. The main task of the 
commission was to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the colony and to gather 
data on the prevailing socio-economic and political condition.
41
 On 31
st
 August 1948 
the commission submitted its report to the Council of Foreign Ministers.
42
 The data 
gathered by the UK and US delegates showed that 55.2 percent of the population was 
in favour of independence, or international trusteeship leading to eventual 
independence, whereas 44.8 percent claimed to support unification with Ethiopia. In 
addition the delegation observed that more than 90 percent of the population opposed 
to the return of Italian rule in any form. Alternately the French and Russian delegates 
disputed these figures. According to them 47.83 percent of the Eritrean population 
supported unification with Ethiopia while 52.17 percent favoured independence or 
trusteeship leading to independence.
43
 Yet, both sides seemed to agree that the pro-
independence were the majority.  
By the summer of 1948, the debate among the Council of Foreign Ministers in matters 
regarding Eritrea made no significant progress. They simply restated their respective 
positions. The Soviet Union insisted on Italian trusteeship with a definite and 
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acceptable time frame. Britain, realizing the impracticability of their partition idea, 
proposed the placement of Eritrea under Ethiopian administration. France wanted 
Italian trusteeship while allowing Ethiopia to annex the Danakil Coast, a 300 mile 
long stretch of land along the Red Sea. The United States advocated the enlargement 
of Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea by awarding it the Danakil Coast as well as the 
districts in the highland namely Akkele Guzai and Seraie while postponing the 
decision with regard to the rest of the country.
44
 
The Cold War that had divided the world into two spheres of influences − the socialist 
and capitalist camps, the former led by Moscow and the latter by Washington − had 
also a significant impact on Eritrea and other Italian colonies. Following the end of 
Second World War the strategic location of Eritrea, Libya and Somaliland, on the Red 
Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean respectively, became an area of 
super power competition.  
The United States had begun to use Eritrea as a “supply depot and its ports as a 
passage for American ships” since 1941. The British allowed the United States to use 
and expand its airbase in Gurae and the former Italian naval radio station “Radio 
Marina” in Asmara, Eritrea. 45 The British position on the disposal of Eritrea, 
therefore, was determined by the joint interests of both the United Kingdom and 
United States. Moreover, according to Eyassu, Britain and France, were also 
uncomfortable by the thought of possible uprisings that could emerge in their 
respective colonies in Africa and Asia if they supported the independence of Eritrea.
46
 
After three years of intense debate marked by divergence and convergence of policies 
the Council of Foreign Ministers was unable to come up with a common 
recommendation. Finally the question of Eritrea along with that of other ex-Italian 
colonies was referred to the UN General Assembly on the 15
th
 September 1948.
47
 In 
the following section we will see the political situation in Eritrea and the process 
through which the case of Eritrea was settled at the UN. 
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Political Situation inside Eritrea and the UN Federal Resolution 
The period from 1948 to 1950 was generally characterized by intense campaigns of 
intimidation and assassination by the Unionists against those who led and supported 
the cause of Eritrean independence.
48
 Opponents of the union were threatened with 
pamphlets and letters.
49
 With regard to this, the UN commission for Eritrea reported 
that “[t]errorism had developed in Eritrea to support a [Unionist] policy. Some people 
who were opposed to annexation of the territory to Ethiopia had been subject to 
terrorist attack on their person and property. Others, out of fear, have been compelled 
to follow the party which advocated annexation to Ethiopia.”50 Several sources show 
that the Unionists were considerably subsidized by the Ethiopian government in order 
to conduct organized terrorist activities against opponents of the union.
51
 Furthermore, 
the Orthodox Church was actively engaged in issuing threats. It openly warned 
through the newspaper Ethiopia, that whosoever supported the independence wing 
would be denied of religious services like baptism, communion, marriage, burial and 
absolution.
52
  
In June 1949, several political parties advocating independence formed a coalition 
known as the Independence Bloc.
53
 The coalition was created in response to the 
Bevin-Sforza partition plan that was drafted by foreign minister of Britain and Italy 
respectively.
54
 Due to the ongoing threat, however, many members of the Bloc, who 
feared for their lives and property, were compelled to shift their allegiance to the 
Unionist fold. Consequently, disunity among the members of the independence 
movement surfaced shortly after the arrival of the UN Commission.
55
 The formation 
of the Independence Bloc is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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By September 1949 the General Assembly reached an agreement on the cases of 
Libya and Somalia. It resolved to grant independence to Libya and Somalia while the 
latter was to achieve sovereignty only after ten years of Italian trusteeship. The 
Assembly decided to send to Eritrea a UN Commission entrusted to ascertain the 
wishes of the inhabitants and make proposals for the future of Eritrea accordingly. 
The Commission included delegations of South Africa, Norway, Burma, Pakistan, and 
Guatemala.
56
 
The Commission held private and public meetings, hearings with the political parties 
and other organizations, and also formal consultations with interested governments 
such as UK, France, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia. After completing its investigation, the 
commission came up with a variety of findings and proposals for the future status of 
Eritrea. The Pakistani and Guatemalan delegations proposed independence after ten 
years of direct UN trusteeship. The Norwegian delegate proposed the incorporation of 
Eritrea with Ethiopia, but in case the solution met opposition in the Western province 
of Eritrea the United Kingdom would continue its administration.
57
 The South African 
and Burmese delegations favoured the establishment of a common federal 
government between Eritrea and Ethiopia. While both maintaining internal 
governmental structures, the common federal government was “to posses the 
executive, legislative and judicial organs, and the head of the federation was to be the 
Ethiopian Emperor.”58 Meanwhile, in his statement to the General Assembly in 
November 1950, the leader of the Eritrean Independence Bloc, Ibrahim Sultan, 
asserted that “this indisputable right to independence to which our country is devoted 
cannot be ignored without creating a new area of strife in East Africa…”59  
The United States, after hours of discussion with representatives of Britain, Italian, 
Ethiopian, Brazilian, proposed a formula somewhat similar to the proposal made by 
the delegations of South Africa and Burma. The formula provided for the federation 
of Eritrea with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown. The solution 
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was finally accepted by the western powers including Italy. Ethiopia declared its 
acceptance of it on November 1950.
60
 
On December 2, 1950, the UN passed resolution 390 A (V) which recommended that 
“Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the 
sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown.”61 Accordingly, Eritrea possessed an autonomous 
government with legislative, executive, and judicial powers over domestic affairs. 
Whereas, matters pertaining to defence, foreign affairs, currency and finance and 
interstate trade and communications became under the jurisdiction of Ethiopia. 
Meanwhile, the Independence Bloc and some section of the Unionist Party convened 
a Peace Conference (Gubaie Selam) in Asmara at Cinema Impero on December 31. 
Both sides expressed their commitment “to uphold and protect the autonomous 
Eritrean State.”62 Later on, the Independence Bloc changed its old name to the 
Eritrean Democratic Front – with the intention to create a democratic Eritrean state.63  
One major weakness of the Ethio-Eritrean federation, however, was the absence of a 
distinct federal government in addition to Eritrean and Ethiopian governments. The 
federal government, according to the stipulated framework was the government of 
Ethiopia. Furthermore, the resolution provided no international machinery where 
intervention could be facilitated in case of violation of the terms of the federation. 
With all its ambiguities the Ethio-Eritrean federation was officially and formally set in 
place on 15 September 1952.  
The Federal Period: A Prelude to War 
The period from 1952-62 is commonly known as the Federal period. During that time, 
the Eritrean Government possessed its own parliament, its own constitution, its own 
flag, and adopted two official languages (Tigrinya and Arabic). The constitution 
guaranteed the right to freedom of expression and opinion, and the right to freedom of 
                                                 
60
 Tesfatsion, 17-18. For more information on the discussions between the different States, see 
Okbazghi, 166-167.  
61
 “390 (V). Eritrea: Report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea; Report of the Interim 
Committee of the General Assembly on the Report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea,” 
Resolutions adopted by The General Assembly during Its Fifth Session, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/5/ares5.htm  (accessed February 28, 2014). 
62
 Redie, 170. 
63
 “Hanti Eritrea,” Hanti Eritrea, 3 January 1951.  
29 
 
 
 
demonstration and association.
64
 As Redie, a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, 
notes, “both in its institutional and symbolic sense the Federation inculcated a sense 
of national identity in Eritrean society” and through the established institutions, 
“Eritreans were able to identify with, cherish and endow with a high symbolic 
value.”65 Nevertheless, the new government lacked the necessary power to defend 
these externally imposed institutions.  
Predictably, the federation did not work as it was stipulated in the resolution 390 
A(V) passed by the UN. Ethiopia proceeded quickly to dismantle the pillars of the 
federation that guaranteed Eritrea’s limited autonomy one by one without hesitation. 
Independent newspapers were shut down, editors of newspapers were imprisoned, 
prominent nationalists like Woldeab Woldemariam, Ibrahim Sultan, Idris Mohammed 
Adem etc. were driven into exile, political parties and trade unions were banned, the 
Eritrean flag was replaced by that of Ethiopia, and use of indigenous languages in 
schools and official transactions was forbidden and Amharic was declared to be the 
official language of the territory while Eritrean laws were abandoned and replaced by 
Ethiopian law in 1959.
66
 Following the British example, the Imperial Ethiopian 
Government, engaged in further crippling the Eritrean economy.
67
 Having the upper 
hand in the ‘federal government’ Ethiopia intervened in the domestic affairs of the 
Eritrean Government and imposed fiscal laws under the pretext of ‘balancing’ the 
economic growth of the two countries, which, in the long run, undermined Eritrea’s 
economic activity.
68
 A report addressed by an American Consul to a State Department 
shows that: “Several foreign groups (American and others) were interested in 
investing in cement plant, mining operation, petroleum exploration, minerals 
development and fish meal exports. However, very few of these investments came to 
fruition because the governmental authorities in Addis Ababa refused to grant the 
requisite approval. During the eight years of the federation period only two plants of 
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significance were established in Eritrea: a cotton spinning plant, by an Italian firm and 
a meat packing operation by the Israeli firm INCODE.”69 
 Moreover, authorities refused to renew work permits of Italian managers and 
technicians’ of different businesses, and consequently “many Italian businesses were 
forced to close and thousands of Eritreans were left without jobs, who were then 
forced to migrate to neighbouring countries.”70 Ethiopia therefore employed both 
direct and indirect actions to slow down economic activities in Eritrea. A weak 
Eritrean economy was once more portrayed to the world on the eve of annexation. 
Throughout the federal period, Eritreans protested against Ethiopia’s violations of the 
Eritrean autonomy. Petitions were sent to the UN to guarantee Ethiopia’s respect for 
the federal arrangement,
 71
  but the UN failed to speak against the violations. In 1957, 
students resisted through massive organized demonstrations. Workers conducted a 
general strike that went on for almost a week in 1958. But all these protests and 
demonstrations were quelled by the use of force which claimed the lives of many 
protestors.
72
 By mid-1960 the Eritrean Government was already reduced to the 
“Eritrean Administration” and the Imperial Ethiopian Government Insignia featured 
with a crowned lion carrying a cross was adopted for administrative purposes and the 
Seal of Eritrea was altered to read “Eritrean Administration under Haile Selassie I, 
Emperor of Ethiopia.”73 The outcome of this was aptly summed up by Redie as 
follows: “the prohibition against being educated in one’s own languages, the lack of 
access to newspapers in one’s own mother tongue, the deprivation of the possibility of 
listening to one’s own languages and songs on the radio, etc., fostered a deep national 
resentment. This, in turn, became the midwife of a flourishing Eritrean nationalist 
consciousness.”74  
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Conclusion 
The development of the Eritrean-Ethiopian federation can be better understood when 
it is examined within the context of the then wider geopolitical interest of the different 
international and regional powers in the Red Sea region. As shown in this chapter the 
four major Powers, after wrangling among themselves, gave the Eritrea issue to the 
UN and after engaging in a heated debate, a federal formula was proposed, which 
called a “compromise” solution. It should be noted here that the formula was not a 
“compromise” solution only to the divided Eritrean population but also to the 
prevailing conflicting national interests of countries engaged in crafting the 
association of Eritrea with Ethiopia through the Federal Act. The American Secretary 
of State, John Foster Dulles, made it clear in his speech at the UN Security Council in 
1952: “From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must 
receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interests of the US in the Red Sea 
basin, and considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that the 
country [Eritrea] has to be linked with our ally, Ethiopia.”75 Taking this into 
consideration, the role of different Eritrean social forces in shaping the destiny of the 
country was minimal. Their voice was heard but not listened to. It was the conflicting 
interests of the super powers, and particularly that of Anglo-American interests, that 
dictated the outcome of the final resolution provided by the UN General Assembly 
regarding Eritrea. Be that as it may, even the Federal arrangement, the very plan 
devised by them, failed to exist as genuine as it was stipulated in the resolution of the 
UN. In the end the resort to military solutions to “rectify” a perceived national case 
came after the failure of the international diplomacy. The Eritreans felt betrayed when 
Emperor Haile Selassie I proceeded unilaterally to dismantle the federal arrangement 
in violation of international principles and of the federal scheme mandated by the UN, 
and Eritreans plea for help fell on deaf ears. 
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Chapter Two: Ethiopian Domination and Emergence of the 
Eritrean Liberation Front, 1960-63 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the formative period of the ELF and the beginning of the 
Eritrean armed struggle for independence. It presents an analysis of the process 
through which the ELF was formed, and examines the role that major groups played 
in initiating the war for independence. Moreover, it presents a brief history of Hamid 
Idris Awate, the pioneer in firing the first shots of the Eritrean armed resistance, and 
examines the reasons for his rebellion, and also demonstrates how the rebellion grew 
in number and action and eventually, into a serious concern for the Ethiopian 
government. Finally, the major military engagements and operations carried out 
during the period under discussion are dealt with in this chapter. 
The Eritrean Liberation Movement 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the increasing Ethiopian erosion of Eritrean self-
administration was generating grievances and discontent among the general 
population. Being frustrated with the system many Eritreans formed secret 
organizations where they could discuss ‘what to do’ regarding the Eritrean issue. As it 
became quite difficult to organize and agitate inside Eritrea, the task of organizing a 
movement to promote the Eritrean cause fell on the Diaspora. As a result a new breed 
of Eritrean nationalists founded the underground Eritrean Liberation Movement 
(ELM)
1
 (Arabic: Harakat El Tahrir El Eritrya; Tigrinya: Mahber Shewate), in Port 
Sudan on November 2, 1958. The founders were a group of young Eritrean refugees 
in the Sudan. They took the initiative of organizing political activities, aimed at 
terminating Ethiopian rule through a coup d’état. But before the ELM’s coup could be 
attempted, the Eritrean armed struggle was launched in 1961 under the auspices of the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).
2
 After that the country lapsed into a cycle of 
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political disorder, violent conflict and human suffering in the three decades that 
followed. 
The ELM leaders were highly influenced by the Communist Party of Sudan; and 
Mohammed Said Nawid, the chairman of the ELM, was in fact a member of the party. 
To ensure the security of the people who were involved in the activities of the 
movement, they organized clandestine cells based on groups of seven individuals. 
This cellular organizational method allowed each cell to function independently, 
though each of the cells shared familiar features and purposes with its sister cells. As 
a result of this organizational method the movement came to be known as Mahber 
Shewate (Association of seven) in Tigrinya in the highlands of Eritrea, while in the 
Sudan it was called as Harakat El Tahrir El Eritrea (Eritrean Liberation Movement). 
The ELM was able to spread very fast in the Eritrean towns.
3
 
Key Forces and Their Role in the Formation of the ELF  
There are three groups that played an important role at the initial stage of the Eritrean 
armed struggle for independence spearheaded by the ELF. These groups were found 
among Eritrean students in Cairo, Eritrean members of the Sudanese Army and 
Eritrean political refugees. In the following pages, I examine the role of these 
different groups, their relation to the ELM and the subsequent move towards armed 
resistance.  
The Eritrean Students in Cairo  
The pioneers who took the initiative to establish the Eritrean Liberation Front were 
mostly young Eritrean students of Al-Azhar University and other higher institutions 
of education in Cairo, Egypt. The Students formed the Eritrean Student Association 
(ESA) in 1951. Apart from promoting sport activities, the club was initially dedicated 
to assist Eritreans in finding international scholarships in Egyptian schools and higher 
institutions. This has been captured by Idris Osman Galadewos:    
“At that time students came on their own to Cairo. Some even walked from Wadi 
Halfa, after they had illegally crossed Sudan, to Aswan in order to escape the controls 
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at the border. Some of them died on their way. Only after arriving in Cairo they could 
hope to get a scholarship; there was no organized programme for Eritrean students 
for which they could apply while still being in Eritrea. After the Eritrean Student 
Association was founded it helped new arrivals to secure scholarships.”4 
Although they were young, the students were highly influenced by the contemporary 
Algerian Revolution
5
, and the tripartite invasion (Britain, France, and Israel) of Egypt 
in 1956, which erupted when Gamal Abdel Nasser
6
 announced his intention of 
nationalizing the Suez Canal. At that time Ethiopia took sides with the West and in 
response to this Nasser allowed Eritreans to make radio broadcasts into Eritrea in 
1956. Wolde-Ab Woldemariam, an Eritrean nationalist who was driven into exile in 
1953 as a result of seven assassination attempts from the unionists, was in charge of 
the broadcasts. A few months later, the broadcasting was terminated because Emperor 
Haile Selassie switched his support to the Egyptian side on the dispute over the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal.
7
 
Although the ESA, looking from outside, appeared an association with apolitical 
objectives, its members were rather engaged in the ongoing political activities in 
Eritrea. Since 1957, Mohammed Said Nawd recounts that, the ELM leaders had 
already established contact with some of the Eritreans in Cairo concerning the 
formation of an organization dedicated to the liberation of Eritrea.
8
 Around the end of 
May 1960, the ESA approached one of the ELM leaders, Taher Ibrahim Fedab, and 
requested him to reveal their organizational programme and philosophy before them.
9
 
But the ELM refused to address the queries to the ESA’s satisfaction. Because 
answering such questions were thought to contradict the secretive nature of the 
ELM.
10
 This, in effect, generated discontent and doubts among the ESA members, 
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which eventually compelled them to search for alternative ways to challenge 
Ethiopian rule.
11
 
Eritrean Soldiers in the Sudanese Army 
Eritrean soldiers in the Sudan Defence Force (SDF) also played a significant role in 
the starting of the Eritrean war for independence. Eritreans had been serving in the 
Sudanese Army since the 1940s, when Eritrea was under British mandate. Almost all 
the soldiers were Muslim from the Western lowlands of Eritrea. According to 
Muhammad Saad Adem
12
, there were about 700 enlisted Eritreans. Militarily, they 
were well trained soldiers with a great deal of battlefield experience and knowledge of 
military tactics. Despite their limited educational background, many of them were 
able to achieve certain ranks in the military power structure of the Sudanese Army.
13
  
Inspired by the contemporary struggles against colonial rule in Africa, such as the 
Algerian revolution, on the one hand, and the decolonization of Sudan from Britain on 
the other, the soldiers formed a secret association known as Munazzamat at-Tahrir 
(Liberation Organization) in 1956. The aim of this association was to share ideas on 
how to liberate Eritrea. For them, Sudan was relatively a safe-haven where Eritreans 
in Sudan could agitate. Later on, with the establishment of the ELM, most of the 
soldiers were recruited as clandestine members of the movement.
14
  
According to former Sudanese soldier Mohammed Umer Abdela (also known as 
“Abu Tiyara”), contacts between the Eritrean soldiers and the ELM began around late 
1959 when the latter brought news to the soldiers about the removal of the Eritrean 
flag
15
 and the ELM’s decision to organize and agitate for the Eritrean cause. In 
response, they organized themselves and began to collect contribution for the cause of 
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the ELM.
16
 They were also conducting internal debate regarding the status of Eritrea 
within the federation. Dissatisfied with the progress of the ELM, many of the soldiers 
were of the conviction that the best strategy to terminate Ethiopian rule was to resort 
to violence.
17
 Unfortunately, they lacked proper political organization that could 
enable them to implement this strategy. Under these circumstances, the Cairo-based 
Eritrean students decided to form the first armed resistance movement, in which 
Eritreans in the SDF played a significant role in the starting of the movement inside 
Eritrea. But before doing so, the Cairo-based group sought to secure the support of 
veteran nationalists from Eritrea in the leadership.  
The Students and Search for Leadership 
In the summer of 1957, a group of seven Eritrean students in Cairo gathered and held 
a secret meeting. The meeting was meant to discuss on the possibility of starting an 
armed struggle in Eritrea. As a starting point, they called themselves Humat al-watan 
(Arabic: meaning Protectors of the Homeland). Said Hussein was the leader of the 
group. A student at that time, he was not only well versed with contemporary 
revolutionary struggles in Africa and Asia, but also very experienced compared to his 
compatriots in military terms. In 1956, for instance, he participated in the Arab-Israeli 
war in Sinai as a member of the Egyptian National Brigade.
18
   
 In January 1958, Said Hussein dispatched a letter to Idris Mohammed Adem through 
Mohammed Adem Idris (“Gezir”), who was one of the members of the secret group. 
The letter basically requested Idris Mohammed Adem to leave Eritrea and join the 
Cairo-based group. Idris Mohammed Adem was one of the leading figures in the early 
nationalist movements. Born into a Beni Amer family in 1921 in Agordat and 
educated at Arabic secondary school in Gedaref, Sudan, Idris was among the few 
educated in Arabic script. He was the editor of the Eritrean Weekly News during the 
BMA. In 1952 he was elected to the newly established Eritrean Parliament and 
became the President of the Eritrean Legislative Assembly in 1955. Being a 
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nationalist militant leader who increasingly advocated for an independent electoral 
commission, he was demoted from his office. In 1957, he was finally put under house 
arrest in his home town of Agordat after he openly appealed for the intervention of the 
U.N. in Eritrea.
19
  
Under these circumstances, Idris Mohammed Adem received a letter from the 
students in Cairo in which he was called upon to join the Cairo-based group. 
Coincidentally, one of the towering veteran politicians in the early nationalist, Sheikh 
Ibrahim Sultan, was also under house arrest since 1956. As shown in the preceding 
chapter he was the founder of the Muslim League and greatly known for championing 
the eradication of serfdom among the Muslim tribes in the early 1940s. Both of them 
accepted the call and in March 1959 they left Eritrea by crossing the Eritrean 
Sudanese border and fled to Cairo.
20
  
At an international conference organized by Nahda Afrikyya (African Renaissance) in 
Cairo on 15 April 1959, Idris gave a speech on behalf of the Eritrean people and 
condemned Ethiopia for its violation of the U.N resolution.
21
 Idris sought armed 
struggle as the only strategy to achieve Eritrea’s independence. He recounts that 
“when we got out from Eritrea, we put it to our mind that it should be solved by 
armed struggle. We came to the point that [the Eritrean] problem cannot be solved 
peacefully.”22  
The Birth of the ELF 
By mid-1960, the Eritrean nationalists were already divided into two camps: those 
who sought armed resistance as a strategy to terminate Ethiopian rule versus those 
who preferred non-violent means. The first strategy was favoured by those Eritreans 
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based in Cairo and in the Sudanese army, while the latter strategy was pursued by 
members of the ELM.   
Convinced by the ELM’s lack of strategy for armed resistance and its slow progress, 
the Cairo-based group took the initiative to form an alternative organization that 
believed in armed struggle as the only means to gain independence. The first 
constituent meeting took place on the 10
th
 of July 1960 in a place called Hadiqet Al 
Asmak (meaning, ‘Garden of Fish’) in Cairo.23 The founding members, who came 
mainly from Muslim backgrounds, were Idris Mohamed Adem, Idris Osman 
Galadewos, Said Hussein, Mohamed Saleh Humed, Taha Mohammed Nur, Said 
Ahmed Hashim, Adem Mohammed Ali Akete, Mohammed Said Umer Anteta and a 
few others.
24
 They established a Central Committee of eleven members chaired by 
Idris Mohammed Adem. As a starting point, they prepared a charter on 17
th
 of July 
1960 that defined the name of their organization, their goals and means to achieve 
their goals. A few months later, the formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 
was officially announced.  
The formation of the ELF coincided with the decolonization of many African 
countries. In 1960 alone, seventeen African territories namely, in order of 
independence, Cameroon, Togo, Mali, Madagascar, DR Congo, Somalia, Benin, 
Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Central African Republic, Republic of the 
Congo, Gabon, Senegal, Nigeria, and Mauritania gained independence from their 
respective European colonial rules. This massive change that swept across most parts 
of the continent inspired many young Eritreans in Cairo to seek their independence.
25
 
Determined to wage a war against Ethiopian troops in Eritrea, the ELF leaders started 
the necessary preparation for the armed struggle. Two interesting developments 
happened here. First, many Eritrean members in the Sudanese Army cancelled their 
membership in the ELM and switched their allegiance to the ELF. The chairman met 
them personally in Kassala, Sudan, and was able to win the support of these soldiers 
to side with the ELF. The Kassala-based group together with the chairman drafted a 
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plan of action. The soldiers agreed to take responsibility of certain tasks inside 
Eritrea. Among these were recruiting members, collecting ammunitions and 
undertaking reconnaissance in preparation for the armed struggle in Eritrea.
26
 While 
doing so, they agreed to terminate their service in the Sudanese Army peacefully so as 
to avoid any problem with Sudan arising from deserting with their arms.
27
  
The second important development was the task of publicizing the Eritrean cause 
outside Eritrea. Idris Mohammed Adem, the chairman of the ELF, was chosen to 
carry out this tedious diplomatic task since he had a passport (later on a Somali 
diplomatic passport) through which he could travel around freely. According to 
Mohammed Adem Idris (also known as “Gezir”), this was “something [that] the 
[Cairo-based] students could not do, as most of them did not have a passport.”28  
Idris Mohammed Adem accompanied by Sheikh Ibrahim Sultan, an Eritrean veteran 
politician, set out their initial diplomatic activity to Saudi Arabia in December 1960. 
In Saudi Arabia they met King Saud bin Abdulaziz and the Crown Prince Faisal. But 
the Saudis told them to appeal to the UN for support. On this point, there emerged 
disagreement between the Eritrean delegates. Idris Mohammed Adem says: “Ibrahim 
Sultan thought we were … [there] to solve our problem by peaceful ways but I 
supported the idea of armed struggle.”29 Unable to reach a common understanding on 
this matter, both of them made their way back to Cairo.  
Idris Mohammed Adem made a second visit to Saudi Arabia alone. There, he met 
Osman Saleh Sabbe, who later on played an important role in developing external 
support, both financial and material, for the cause of the Eritrean war of 
independence.
30
 Sabbe was an Eritrean born into a Saho family in 1932 in Hirgigo, 
about 5kms southwest of Massawa near the Red Sea. In the early 1950s he attended 
the Teacher Training College in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. While he was in Addis 
Ababa, he established contacts with many Ethiopian Muslims who were unhappy with 
their situation in Ethiopia. During his stay he strived to establish a Muslim student 
association. After the completion of his studies, he returned to Hirgigo, where he 
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worked as a teacher in the School of Kekiya from 1953-58. Sabbe was believed to 
have been an influential person in shaping the political consciousness of his students 
among whom some became leading revolutionary figures in the subsequent decades 
to come.
31
  
Idris Mohammed Adem recalls that Sabbe had an organization called Al Urwa Al 
Wutqa (The Firm Bond) in Massawa, dedicated to the improvement of the Muslims 
living in Ethiopia and Eritrea. After having discussion with Sabbe, the latter agreed to 
work with the ELF. Together they proceeded to Somalia in late the 1960.
32
  
In Mogadishu, on the 20
th
 December 1960, Idris Mohammed Adem submitted a 
memorandum which comprised of complaints from the Eritrean people against the 
Emperor of Ethiopia to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Somalia, Abdirashid Ali 
Shermarke.
33
 He submitted six important requests to the government of Somalia as 
summarized below. Idris Mohammed Adem, on behalf of the Eritrean people, pleaded 
with the concerned authority to allow as well as enable them:   
1. To open an Eritrean political office in Mogadishu through which… [they] 
can exercise… [their] political activities and serve the demand of the 
Eritrean problem, such as organizing communications… 
2. To adopt the complaint of the Eritrean people against the Ethiopian 
Government [in world’s conferences and the General Assembly of the U.N.] 
3. To direct through Somalia’s broadcasting station… [their] addresses to [the 
Eritrean] people in Arabic and Tigrinya even in secrecy [so as to challenge 
Ethiopia’s propaganda and lift up the morale of the people] 
4. To organize… efforts [of the Eritreans] with that of …the Somali people so 
that… [both of them] can face …[Ethiopia] as a united power when… 
[Eritreans] start active resistance (i.e. the use of force…). 
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5. To grant some of the Eritrean students… Somali passports to get advantage 
of the educational chances granted. 
6. To admit some of Eritrean youth in Somali military force and build up an 
Eritrean division to be trained side by side with their Somali brothers so that 
they can be ready for the struggle in Eritrea at the proper time.
 34
 
After a lapse of one month, Idris Mohammed Adem was granted the permission to 
open the first cover association in Somalia under the name Eritro-Somalia Friendship 
Association. Besides, the government of Somalia allowed Eritreans to hold Somali 
diplomatic passports for many years.
35
 With the rest of the requests, no credible 
source of information is available. 
The Eritro-Somalia Friendship Association (ESFS) was set up on the 1
st
 of February 
1961. The association comprised of seven members with Idris Mohammed Adem and 
Osman Saleh Sabbe as Chairman and as Vice-chairman respectively. The main task of 
the society was to publicize the Eritrean cause all over the world by preparing and 
distributing memorandums and journals.
36
  
The diplomatic work in the 1960 did not end in Somalia. Having appointed Sabbe as 
Liaison Officer of the ELF in Somalia, Idris Mohammed Adem continued his visit to 
the countries of the Middle East, such as, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Syria. 
Although the first three countries, they claim, were found to be sympathetic to 
Eritrean problem, Syria officially announced over its media that it would give its full 
support to Eritrea and also agreed to provide military training in the Syrian soil, as we 
shall see in the next chapter.
37
   
Preparation for the Armed Struggle 
In preparation for the contemplated armed struggle, the Kassala-based group sought to 
meet the renowned Hamid Idris Awate and Syedna Mohammed Ibn Dawd, a revered 
Beni Amer religious scholar. For that purpose, Taher Salem and Mohammed Adem 
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Idris “Gezir” took charge of establishing contact with the latter and went to Agordat, 
Eritrea, from Kassala. After presenting their case to Syedna Mohammed through his 
deputy they agreed to arrange a meeting to discuss the matter adequately.
38
 
Accordingly, a secret meeting was held in July 1960 in Felasab, near Ashier, situated 
in southwestern part of Eritrea. The meeting was attended by eight people mostly 
from Kassala.
39
 Resentful of Ethiopia for abolishing the use of Arabic language in the 
Eritrean schools, Syedna Mohammed agreed to collaborate with the ELF in setting up 
a network of ELF cells within Eritrea. Syedna Mohamed started to travel to different 
places in the Gash-Barka region urging the people to accommodate ‘guests’. By 
guests, he was referring to the people who would be involved in the armed struggle. 
Furthermore, he created a network of communication cells by appointing several 
individuals in every sub-district. After laying the groundwork for the ELF, Syedna 
Mohammed arranged a large gathering in his village near Agordat, in which Hamid 
Idris Awate was present. The meeting was held under the cover of a religious 
congregation. According to Adem Mohammed Hamid “Gendifel”, the religious leader 
urged Awate “to declare a Jihad because the abolition of Arabic was also an attack on 
Islam and that the Muslims should fight for the divine right of the Muslims and 
Islam.”40 Apparently Awate did not take this up. When he was continuing his fighting, 
he did not phrase the struggle in terms of Jihad.  
Ethiopian authorities later on became aware of the meeting. Sydena Mohammed was 
put under house arrest in Agordat immediately after he had returned from the meeting. 
Since then he was subjected to continual Ethiopian harassment. Nevertheless, he 
continued to support the ELF through private means until he fled to Sudan.
41
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Hamid Idris Awate and the Beginning of the Eritrean War of 
Independence 
Although there is no complete account of the life of Hamid Idris Awate, it is 
imperative in this context to provide a brief biography. Hamid Idris Awate, popularly 
known by his surname Awate, was born into a Hafera clan of Tigre-speaking 
agriculturalists in Habereda, near Agordat in 1911.
42
 His mother, Hawa Shibul, was 
from the Nara ethno-linguistic group. In the early 1930s Awate joined the Italian 
colonial army as an Ascari at a time Italy was making extensive preparation for the 
invasion of Ethiopia. He took part in several battles, got wounded, and finally 
abandoned the Italian Army in the early 1941.
43
 Hamid Idris Awate was a polyglot 
who mastered seven languages, namely Nara, Tigre, Tigrinya, Kunama, Hidareb, 
Arabic, Amharic and Italian.
44
 
After 1941, the relative peace and stability secured during Italian colonization in 
Eritrea suddenly shattered. Banditism became increasingly problematic.
45
 At this 
stage, Awate joined a shifta band of Ali Muntaz. These shifta bands were like local 
militias who operated mostly in their own region. Because of the frequent lawlessness 
in the region they were engaged in border warfare mostly against the shifta bands of 
Wolqaiti of Tigray in northern Ethiopia and the Sudanese Hadendwa. Awate’s prime 
concern was to protect the property and livestock of the Nara and the Beni Amer, with 
whom he was politically linked through his father’s prior well-established relations.46 
Jordan describes Hamid Idris Awate and his band as “a ‘poor people’s army’ with no 
external source of funds.”47 In a bid to secure arms, for instance, he ambushed a BMA 
police patrol, in 1948, in Haicota where he seized three rifles and 600 rounds of 
ammunition.
48
 Awate and his band are also bitterly remembered by certain groups of 
the Kunama for looting and attacking Kunama villages. Among many other raids, in 
June 1948, for instance, Awate and his fellow shiftas brutally attacked a village called 
                                                 
42
 Connell and Killion, 288. 
43
 Haile Selassie Weldu, “Hatsir Tarikh Hamid Idris Awate” [Short History of Hamid Idris Awate] 
(Unpublished Manuscript, Voice of the Masses, December 10, 1989), 06993, RDC, 1-2. 
44
 Haile Selassie, 1. 
45
 Alexander Naty, “Environment, Society and the State in South-western Eritrea,” Bergen: Chr. 
Michelson Institute, (Working Paper 12), 2-3, http://www.ehrea.org/WP2000.pdf  (accessed 29 July 
2014). 
46
 Jordan, 156-157; See also Haile Selassie. 
47
 Jordan, 157. 
48
 Ibid. 
45 
 
 
 
Tanina in which four people were killed, while virtually the entire village was burned 
to ashes, and about 70 cattle were looted.
49
 Such brutality in fact makes Awate a 
highly rejected and deeply controversial figure among the Kunama.
50
 
Towards the end of 1940s shifta attacks in general were in full bloom. The incidences 
rose to an average of 130 per month.
51
 The number of shifta gangs operating by 1950 
was also estimated to about 2000.
52
 With the increasing number of bandits the British 
Administration established an anti-shifta police unit but to little avail.
53
 Finally, on 
16
th
 of June 1951, the British Administration declared a general amnesty to surrender 
shifta. In effect, more than 1300 shifta surrendered. Hamid Idris Awate, however, 
refused to accept the proclaimed shifta amnesty and the story was announced in the 
headline of the Eritrean Weekly News issued on 16
th
 of August. The repudiation of 
Awate was not taken lightly by the authorities of the BMA. Colonel Cracknell, Chief 
of Police, approached Awate in person in the western lowlands in order to negotiate 
his surrender. After ten days of intensive negotiations, Awate, agreed to surrender 
along with some of his followers.
54
 The British-sponsored shifta amnesty seemed to 
have brought an end to the large-scale banditism in Eritrea.  
According to police reports, Hamid Idris Awate was thereafter given six rifles, 
probably following his request to the Chief of Police, to guard his region against 
banditism. With a corresponding increase in unemployment and frustration with 
Ethiopian political policies, banditism recurred once again in the mid-1950s. Alarmed 
by this, Awate, on the 1
st
 of March 1956, submitted a petition to the Department of 
Interior in Asmara with a proposal to recruit a volunteer guard of armed peasants to 
be under his command.
55
 The Senior Divisional Officer (S.D.O.) of the Agordat 
Division, Ali Mohammed Nur Mehri, made an inquiry on the views of the Divisional 
Officers (D.O.) of Tesseney and Barentu on the case in point.  
On 28
th
 of March 1956, the D.O. of Tesseney, Hedad Kerar, responded with the 
following comment:  
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Hamid Idris Awate is an ex-bandit who surrendered in 1951; he was given six 
rifles… that he would guard the area he lives at against banditism. Unfortunately, 
nothing is recorded in his credit so far. 
He is a type [of person] who lives in past glory, the glory of banditism and the killing 
of unarmed peaceful peasants. He looks at himself as unparalleled hero and likes to 
show off and flattering.  
His good proposal for the recruitment of volunteer armed peasant to suppress 
banditism is a matter which I believe is under study by the S.D.O. and if adopted 
would be great factor in lessening bandit activities.  
Regarding his request to be on the head of the contemplated anti-bandit recruits, I do 
not recommend him for the simple justification that during his shifta career he was 
the patron of Baria [sic Nara] and dead merciless enemy of Cunama the fact that he 
developed an indelible lifelong enmity between these two [ethno-linguistic groups]. 
I suggest that Hamid Idris Awate be reminded that the rifles now in his charge are 
given to him for the sole purpose of chasing bandits and not as honorary merit.
56
  
On the other hand, the D.O. of Barentu, Abdu Ahmed, endorsed the petition by Awate 
and approvingly stated that the region was threatened by “armed Christian bandits 
who frequently came from the Ethiopian border.”57 Nevertheless, for unclear reasons, 
Awate’s petition was not granted. 
After half a decade, the case of Hamid Idris Awate was reopened in July 1961. 
Following rumour regarding Hamid Idris Awate’s intention to resume ‘banditry’, the 
S.D.O. of Agordat passed an order to bring Awate from Firsit.
58
 At first, Awate, 
fearing arrest, refused to comply with the police orders. It should be noted that this 
event came about shortly after the crucial meeting conducted by Syedna Mohammed 
Ibn Dawd in his village near Agordat, where he urged Awate to wage a Jihad against 
Ethiopia. In a document labelled “secret” written on 8th of September 1961, the D.O. 
of Tesseney gave some useful information regarding the situation of Awate just 
before he resorted to take up arms and launch an insurrection against the government. 
The D.O. of Tesseney noted that:  
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I have been requested by Supt. [sic Superintendent] of Police Agordat to approach 
Hamid Idris Awate and to inform him that Compol [i.e., Commissioner Police] 
wishes to see him and to discuss about his previous applications. A message was sent 
to Hamid to fix a date and place to meet me but Hamid refused alleging that he was 
busy on ploughing and did not want to abandon his cultivation. Again Sheikh Khat 
Gullui was sent to him in order to convince Hamid that the meeting was for his own 
benefit and he then agreed and fixed to meet me at Gherset Police post on 31
st
 July 
1961. 
On the fixed date I have proceeded to Gherset Police p. [sic post] and met Hamid and 
explained to him of what the Supt. said i.e., that his previous petitions to the 
Government were taken into consideration and therefore they wants [sic want] to 
discuss with him in detail about new organizations and their implementations which 
are all in his favour, but Hamid did not believe of what I have explained to him and 
was in a very fearful condition, though I have tried to convince him that nothing was 
against him, but he spoke continually of the Nazirs in terms of contempt and also he 
said that he knows the police are against him and they are intending to arrest him and 
I then requested him to wait me in Gherset for 3 days in order to refer this to the 
S.D.O. and Supt. of Police and I did so. 
He was frightened as it was framed in his mind that the police might arrest him for 
Nazirs reasons and expressed that he has nothing to do with the bandits and nor he 
has intention to join them.  
On 2/8/61 [i.e., 2
nd
 of August 1961] the S.D.O. arrived Tessenei and we proceeded to 
Gherset where the S.D.O. interviewed Hamid and discussed with him alone.
59
 
The D.O. Officers “explained to him [i.e., Awate] that the government holds no 
grudges against him, and urged him to try his best and help with the capture of the 
gang which was acting in the vicinity of the town.”60 Indeed, during this time there 
were numerous shifta operating around the Gash Barka region. In order to forestall 
banditism, the Government even proclaimed an anti-bandit decree on August 10, 
1961, in which anyone suspected of banditry, would be subjected to imprisonment 
and confiscation of properties owned by him and his relatives.
61
 However, the request 
of the D.O. Officers was based on the assumption that Awate must have induced the 
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activities of those shifta roaming around Tesseney.
62
 Thus, the daily movement of 
Awate became under strict and regular surveillance of government security agents.   
On 18
th
 of August 1961, Hamid Idris Awate wrote a letter to an anonymous person 
which was later discovered by police forces in the village of Faddin, near Cheru. 
When this became known to Ethiopian authorities lots of people in the vicinity of 
Cheru were arrested. Being perhaps the only available document ever acquired from 
Hamid Idris Awate, the letter gives insightful information as to when and why Awate 
decided to take the field. The report, from which the letter shown below was obtained, 
provides no addressee but considering the importance of it, it is here presented it in its 
entirety.   
…We are in good health, and hope the same for you. I wish to inform you that our 
country Eritrea is oppressed. Our flag was lowered and the Ethiopian flag was 
hoisted instead. Our lands were granted to foreigners, while the population of the 
country was left poor. Moreover, our mosques were ruined while new churches have 
been built. I made up my mind together with the whole population of Eritrea to unite 
and demand our rights. Please, if possible transfer my complaint to Mr. Ali and 
Jamal. I belong to the Khatmia faith. 
      Hamid Awate 
       7 Rabii El Awal 1381 (18.8.1961)
63
 
Being so suspicious of police intentions towards him and conditioned by the 
contemporary political upheaval, Awate eventually made up his mind to take up arms 
and initiate armed struggle, leaving his families and possessions behind and going to 
the mountains. Carrying a few old rifles, he set up a unit consisting of sixteen people 
including himself and his nephew under his command.
64
 On September 1, they 
attacked an isolated police station in Mount Adal, between Agordat and Tesseney. 
The initial battle lasted for nearly seven hours, despite the fact that Awate and his 
band were barely armed.
65
 On September 3, the news about Awate’s rebellion was 
reported to the authorities, after Awate and his followers attacked a shop at 
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Hadamdame area. The shop belonged to Sheikh Adem Suleiman Dighe, a member of 
the Eritrean Assembly and close friend of Hamed Faraj, the President of the Eritrean 
Assembly, whom Awate regarded as pro-unionists and “traitors”.66 According to 
police records, their number was estimated at 28 persons who were barely armed with 
old and obsolete Mannlicher-Carcano and Albini-Braendlin type of infantry rifles.
67
  
The news about Awate was not made public until 26
th
 of September 1961, i.e. until a 
headline story on the government newspaper Zemen announced that Hamid Idris 
Awate resumed his bandit career.
68
 This was perhaps the first time for Hamid Idris 
Awate to appear in newspapers after a decade of silence since the British-sponsored 
shifta amnesty of 1951. But this time Awate rebelled for a special political reason, 
i.e., to liberate Eritrea. As the news spread over the country, Awate’s popularity 
among the inhabitants of the region increased considerably in quite short period of 
time. In this regard, an Ethiopian Intelligence report noted that “[g]enerally speaking, 
the Moslem population of Eritrea has wholeheartedly welcomed the ‘shifta’ activity, 
in their belief that such an activity will bring back to them their ‘dignity and rights’ 
overlooked by the present rulers of the country.”69  
Alarmed by this news, government authorities proceeded to pursue the following 
official measures. Firstly, they increased the security measures in the vicinity of 
Tesseney. Secondly, relatives and close friends of Awate and his followers, including 
people who were suspected of extending assistance to Awate were imprisoned by 
local Police forces. Thirdly, small villages
70
 as well as shop owners living in remote 
areas were ordered to move on to places controlled by the Police forces, so as to 
forestall people from accommodating and helping Awate and his men.
71
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Figure 2. Hamid Idris Awate 
  Source: Eritrean Liberation Front /14/100, RDC. 
Hamid Idris Awate, nevertheless, went ahead in fighting for the implementation of 
two crucial conditions: the reinstatement of the Eritrean flag and the restitution of the 
lands to their rightful owners.
72
 To demonstrate this, for instance, on September 10, 
1961, Awate along with some eleven armed men compelled an Italian named Avesan 
Silvio, a tenant of a farm and owner of the Savoya Hotel in Agordat, to leave the 
concession in the Gurguji area, Barentu District. The farm belonged to Melake-Selam 
Dimetros, Vice-President of the Eritrean Assembly. Awate demanded that Silvio 
should abandon his farm within three days. Silvio insisted on paying money so as to 
remain in the farm, but Awate refused stating that their intention was not to rob 
money but to bring back the Eritrean flag and nullify the vast concession given to 
foreigners. He added that his group was known as ‘the Secret National Army of 
Liberation’ whose mission was to liberate Eritrea. Silvio then begged for a fortnight 
delay, which was granted by Awate. The latter ordered Silvio to tell all foreigners 
who owned land in the Gash and Barka area to leave immediately, or to expect bloody 
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reprisals. Returning to his home without being hurt, Silvio contacted Omer 
Mohammed Hassano, the Secretary of Law and Justice to the Eritrean Government, 
informing him of the aforementioned facts. The Secretary of Justice promised Silvio 
to come to Agordat in order to meet Awate and talk with the latter.
73
 
Preoccupied by these spontaneous but serious developments, Omer Mohammed 
Hassano was entrusted, following his own request, with a mission to approach Awate 
individually and reach an agreement. In fact, the appointment of Omer Mohammed 
Hassano as conciliator was not appreciated by some Assembly members and 
traditional leaders of the Beni Amer since he did not belong to them. As a result he 
had to face a wide-spread hostility and ill-will as many wished for his failure.
74
 
Nevertheless, he set out on his mission first by going to Agordat and then to Barentu 
on September 12, 1961. Finally, the Secretary of Law and Justice managed to hold a 
private meeting with Awate on the 20
th
 of September at a mountain called Koteib, but 
to no avail.
75
 Following this, the Eritrean Chief Executive
76
, again attempted to 
entrust with the same mission to Sheikh Hamed Faraj, the President of the Eritrean 
Assembly. Nevertheless, the latter refused to carry out the mission, alleging that such 
an undertaking would endanger his life.
77
   
Ethiopian authorities viewed the rebels as “Shifta” or “gang of highway robbers”, 
whereas Awate and his followers labelled themselves as The Army of Liberation. 
They were often moving from place to place, flying the old Eritrean flag. One month 
after the start of the rebellion, Awate’s reputation among the general population grew 
remarkably. One official report witnesses that: “Awate wants to be considered by 
Eritreans not as a mere ‘Shifta’, but as the ‘Liberator of the Homeland’. In fact Awate 
has grown to be considered as a national hero, who has sacrificed everything to fight 
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for the freedom of his people, i.e., Eritrea.”78 It was also reported that Awate was 
urging all Eritreans, Moslems as well as Christians, to join him in the national 
movement aimed at the liberation of Eritrea.
79
  
In the face of growing popularity of Awate, on September 24, 1961 the Secretary of 
Interior to the Eritrean Government urged all government officials in charge of the 
Western districts to put an end to the activities of this violent nascent nationalist 
movement, and threatening them should they fail to act accordingly. Prominent 
personalities such as the President of the Eritrean Assembly, the Secretary of Law and 
Justice to the Eritrean Government, the District Officer, as well as the District 
Commander were present.
80
 
A military conflict ensued. On September 26, 1961, the newspaper Zemen announced 
that Hamid Idris Awate clashed with police forces, in which one of his followers 
named Bereg Norai was captured and an Italian rifle with 14 cartridges and two 
swords were also seized by the police.
 
After being interrogated, Bereg Norai claimed 
that they were fighting “for the sake of the Eritrean flag and for their homeland.” 81 
Among the early followers of Awate, Bereg Norai was the first to be taken captive by 
Ethiopian forces. The following battle, which was the third occurrence, happened 
almost after a lapse of one month. On October 24, 1961 the police forces clashed with 
Awate’s band somewhere around Cheru and consequently one of Awate’s relatives, 
Abdu Mohammed Faid, was captured and died of his injuries while on the way to 
Cheru. Thus, Abdu Mohammed Faid happens to be the first casualty among the 
nationalists since the armed struggle was launched.
82
 
On the morning of 29 October 1961, around 4:45 a.m. in Asmara a group of five 
people armed with firearms and explosive lethal weapons attempted to assassinate 
Melake-Selam Dimetros Ghebremariam, Vice-President of the Eritrean Assembly. 
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During the course of the commission two hand grenades were exploded.
83
 Dimetros 
survived the incident somehow unscathed.
 
One of the assailants, Gebremedhin Hailu, 
died from wounds inflicted by the bodyguards of Dimetros. Nevertheless, such act 
was seriously taken and it was thought to have been perpetrated, according to 
Ethiopian Intelligence reports, to achieve “the complete and final elimination, from 
the local political spheres, of one of the fiercest leaders of the Unionist Party, i.e. 
Dimetros,” and this one was regarded as “nothing but the ‘inaugural act’ of the total 
elimination of the Unionist leaders.”84 The report pointed out that the general feeling 
of the Muslim population and some Christians was one of disappointment by the 
failure of the mission, although they were greatly impressed by the attempt.
85
  
On Sunday, 3 December 1961, Hamid Idris Awate accompanied by some twenty-five 
persons attacked and destroyed a farm in the Gurguji area, Barentu District, which 
belonged to a Greek tenant named Autimio. They cut down the banana trees and also 
ordered the labourers to do so. They burned a tractor, water pumps and several huts, 
an action that took them about an hour.
86
 The original concessioner of the farm was in 
fact Melake-Selam Dimetros. Afterwards, Awate gathered the labourers in the farm, 
and by “pointing to the Eritrean flag, he told them that he and his people will give 
their lives in order to defend the flag. He added in the near future, more severe 
measures will be taken.”87 A police force arrived on the spot and clashed with 
Awate’s group. As a result one policeman died and four injured, while one from 
Awate’s band called Mohammed Era Mussa, a Beni Amir from Adi Ibrahim village, 
was put under arrest along with his Albini-Braendlin rifle and 45 rounds of 
ammunition.
88
 Mohammed Era Mussa was convicted and sentenced to death. In the 
final verdict of his court case passed on September 21, 1962, Mohammed Era Mussa 
gave a statement that Hamid Idris Awate proceeded to take action against the farm 
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owner after the latter failed to comply with the ultimatum given by Awate to abandon 
the farm to its rightful owners three months ago.
89
  
On December 15 and 22, 1961 Awate and his groups cut the telephone line in Haicota 
and Cheru respectively. One of his early followers, Adem Mohammed Hamid 
“Gendifel”, recalls to have taken the wires to Kassala in order to sell in return for 
ammunition.
90
 The Police later on discovered a slip of paper near the telephone poles, 
which reads as follows: 
Down with Imperialism 
Down with Hamid Faraj [i.e. the then President of the Eritrean Assembly] 
Long Live … the Liberation Front 
Life or Death.
91
 
In the succeeding two encounters, however, the guerrillas suffered heavy casualties. 
On 24 December 1961, a bunch of fighters clashed with the police who were chasing 
them in a place called Shllul in the Agordat district. As a result, one of the Awate’s 
followers, Omer Hamid, Ali Karay, who was reportedly leading a platoon comprising 
7-12 people, was captured after suffering severe wounds. The police seized one 
Mannlicher-Carcano rifle with 38 rounds of ammo.
92
 The next one, which was the 
fifth in line, happened on the 9
th
 of January 1962. Police forces from the capital 
accompanied by the commander of the police in Agordat encountered the guerrilla 
group led by Awate in Awha Al-Gedam in the Cheru district. The police killed one 
and captured three while they lost the commander of Agordat police station. Awate 
too had suffered various injuries although he managed to escape along with the rest of 
the group.
93
 During the succeeding couple of months Awate stayed away from combat 
against the police. This was probably the result of the wounds he had before and 
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partly because of the month of Ramadan which was observed between February 6
th
 
and March 8
th
, 1962.
94
  
At this time, Awate’s guerrilla movement reached a point where they could no longer 
be crushed by the Police. Awate managed to win considerable popularity among the 
population of the region.
95
 Confronted with this unpleasant reality, Police authorities 
resorted to arrest inhabitants of the region for no other reason than family ties and 
relationships. The anti-banditry Act promulgated in August 1961 was applied in order 
to realize these intentions. Accordingly, close relatives of Hamid Idris Awate and his 
followers were subjected to at least six months of incarceration. Moreover, following 
an order issued by the Tesseney District Court Awate’s cattle was confiscated.96  
Furthermore, from 9-14 April 1962, an extensive public awareness campaign against 
the activities of Hamid Idris Awate was carried out by Government authorities such as 
the S.D.O of Agordat, Ahmed Hassano, Superintendent of Police, Major Goitom 
Ghebrezghi, and the D.O. of Tesseney by gathering hundreds of people in Haicota, 
Barentu, Cheru, and Awhe. The authorities warned the people that anyone found 
rendering assistance to Awate, be it materially or morally, or withholding information 
concerning his movement, would be subjected to imprisonment for six months.
97
 
Hamid Idris Awate had established connections with the Eritrean members in the 
SDF. He demanded that this group should participate in the armed struggle, bringing 
rifles and ammunitions from Sudan. As they were aware of the developments inside 
Eritrea they finally resigned from the SDF in order to join Awate. On February 1962, 
a group of fourteen people led by Adem Mohammed Hamid “Gendifel” united with 
Awate’s band, marking the first group to join Hamid Idris Awate from the SDF. This 
was followed by another wave of participants headed by Seid Hussein, one of the 
founding members of the ELF in Cairo.
98
 The participation of these former SDF 
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soldiers, who had, for quite a long time, military experience and discipline, was an 
important asset that contributed so much to the sustainability of the armed struggle. 
Their presence added not only numerical change but also brought qualitative 
transformation to the group. They brought with them their uniforms and some 
supplies. Elated by their commitment, Awate urged them to “try to become an 
undying flame of the revolution and if that flame dies it would not be easy to reignite 
it in a short period of time.”99 
In April 4, 1962 Police forces for the seventh time encountered Awate’s bands in 
Bitama in the district of Tesseney. As a result one police man and two members from 
Awate’s group were killed. Awate was seen carrying a radio set leading the group 
which numbered about 35 men; all clad in military uniform and some carrying first 
aid kits.
100
  
According to Ethiopian Intelligence reports, Awate followed a stratagem of 
“scattering his men whenever the police force was on the verge of taking any drastic 
steps.”101 For the sake of organizational convenience, he split up the band into three 
different small elusive groups who would circulate around the major towns such as 
Haicota, Agordat and Keren and whose aim was to smuggle the required arms and 
ammunitions as well as to conduct subversive activities. Hamid Idris Awate did not 
live long after the battle of Bitama. He fell ill and died a natural death in April 18, 
1962.
102
 He was considered to have died prematurely by those who were committed to 
pursuing his footsteps. Realizing the potential negative effects of Awate’s death on 
the nascent Eritrean armed struggle, his followers swore on the Koran to keep the 
matter secret and agreed to inform people, if they insisted on knowing his 
whereabouts, that Awate was abroad for political activities.
103
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Subversive activities gained momentum in 1962 when on the 29
th
 of April a group of 
five men (2 Moslems and 3 Christians)
104
 conducted an armed attack on guards who 
were posted at the cashier’s office of the Keren Administration. The assailants 
managed to escape, though they were later caught. On the next day, while searching 
for the perpetrators, police forces found out that the old Eritrean flag had been hoisted 
over the school building.
105
 The Keren incident caused a great deal of sensation 
among people in the governmental circles because the incident proved that subversive 
activities were already underway in the cities.
106
 Ethiopian intelligence report showed 
that toward the end of 1962, the size of the Eritrean fighters was “steadily increasing.” 
The guerrillas were moving around: 
“the region of Agordat, Keren, and the Coast. They appear[ed] in small groups, in 
order not to draw the attention of the police…[they were] carrying the Eritrean flag. 
They [were] all fully armed and equipped with radio transmitters, watches, field 
binoculars and tinned food. 
The police forces seem to be practically unable to check the shifta [the Awate-led 
movement]. In an exchange of fire between the police … [and the rebels] who laid an 
ambush in Blue Maria region, four policemen were killed and a fifth seriously 
injured.”107 
The Agordat Operation 
In July 1962, higher government officials led by Emperor Haile Selassie’s personal 
representative in Eritrea, Lieutenant-General Abiye Abebe, as well as the Chief 
Executive of the Eritrean Government, Asfaha Weldemichael, and other Government 
authorities set out an extensive tour of the western lowlands of Eritrea. During their 
visit to Agordat on July 12, 1962, a meeting, which was attended by hundreds of 
people, was disrupted by a bomb explosion perpetrated by the insurgents.   
According to the official government reports and newspaper, two hand grenades were 
thrown although only one blew up. The explosion killed eight people including Omer 
Mohammed Hassano, the Secretary of Law and Justice to the Eritrean Government 
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and Sheikh Saleh Mustofa, a religious scholar in the Barka region. About ninety-two 
people including some officials, namely Hamid Faraj (the President of the Eritrean 
Assembly), Qumlachew Belete (Assistant to the Imperial representative in Eritrea), 
Melake-Selam Dimetros, Vice-President of the Eritrean Assembly and both Chief 
Administrators of Keren and Agordat towns were also wounded. The perpetrators, 
nevertheless, were later on caught by the police and one of them was found to be the 
nephew of the victimized Secretary of Law and Justice to the Eritrean Government.
 108
 
The incident was covered in international newspapers such as The Times.
109
 
The weapons used in this incident were acquired by Adem Melekin, one of the ELM 
members in Asmara who favoured armed resistance as the solution to the Eritrean 
problem even when the very organization he belonged failed to do so. During the 
months of May and June 1962, Adem Melekin travelled to Ethiopia and contacted 
associates to acquire weapons. He finally took the daring step of transporting two 
firearms, 25 hand grenades, 1000 rounds of ammo, and other equipment from Addis 
Ababa to Asmara. He managed to deliver all of it to the members of the ELF 
clandestine cells in Keren where it was used for a subversive operation carried out in 
Agordat. When this became known to Ethiopian security officials Adem Melekin was 
arrested in June 22, 1962. He stayed in prison for several months until the court set 
him free on lack of evidence in 1963. Thereafter he fled to Cairo where he lived for 
the next three decades.
110
  
The Abrogation of the Federation and Its Aftermath 
As it was described in the preceding chapter the Ethiopian Government was gradually 
dismantling the elements of the Federal Act one after another in spite of the fact that 
the Federation was supposed to remain intact in accordance with the UN resolution. 
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Anze Matienzo, the then UN Commissioner for Eritrea clearly stated that it was only 
the General Assembly of the UN that was responsible for making any alterations in 
the Federal Act. However, if violated, he quoted, “the General Assembly could be 
seized of the matter.”111 But with the removal of some symbols of a distinct Eritrean 
political identity – the official flag, insignia, languages etc – through the 1960 the 
federation continued to exist in name only for the next couple of years. On November 
14, 1962 the building of the Eritrean Administration was surrounded by a 
considerable number of Ethiopian troops and the Eritrean Assembly members were 
made to convene under duress. Before this fateful day, four sessions, due to lack of 
quorum, were postponed. Some Assembly members, who were aware of Ethiopia’s 
plan to terminate Eritrea’s federal status, preferred to stay at home. But this time 
Assembly members gathered for the November 14 session after many of them were 
dragged from their homes.
112
 Under these circumstances, the Chief Executive read a 
written document in Amharic that said: “The statement that I am going to read to you 
is the final issue of the Eritrean case, and there is nothing you can do other than 
accepting it as it is. We have rendered the Federation null and void. We are 
henceforth completely united with our motherland.”113 It was announced in the Zemen 
newspaper that the Assembly members “voted unanimously” to abolish the 
federation.
114
 But the truth is that Assembly members were not given the opportunity 
to exercise actual vote to determine whether or not the Federal status of Eritrea should 
be terminated.
115
 The decision to dissolve the federation was prepared from above 
with maximum secrecy, and it was implemented under a macabre military show of 
force by the Ethiopian forces in Asmara, the capital. One of the young Ethiopian 
military officers in Asmara at the time, Dawit Wolde Giorghis, gives an eye witness 
account of the massive military show of force exercised by his unit and others during 
the week the Assembly was scheduled to convene. Dawit recounts:    
One week before the vote my battalion, the 34
th
, was ordered to march though the 
city and to camp outside until four days after the vote. I co-commanded one of the 
companies that ringed Asmara during that time. It was clear from our orders that we 
were there in case of any trouble from the Assembly or the people. In addition to our 
battalion, the entire police force, the air force and a detachment of infantry from 
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another part of Ethiopia were all on hand, making their presence felt by marching 
through the streets and gradually being as visible as possible.
116
 
In this manner, the federal status of Eritrea was terminated and Eritrea became a 
province of Ethiopia. The reaction of the inhabitants particularly the politically 
conscious Eritrean population was generally a feeling of dismay and anger.
117
 The 
UN, the supposedly guarantor of the provisions of the Federal Act, chose not to 
object. The US was aware of such violation of UN Resolution 390 A (V), but for the 
sake of their own strategic interest in Ethiopia they preferred to remain passive.
118
 On 
21 November 1962, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in his telegram to the US 
embassy in Ethiopia stated that although the US realized that there were “factors 
relating nation’s security which bear on Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea” the decision 
pursued by the Ethiopian Government to dissolve the federation had “placed the US 
in [a] difficult position. While USG [United States Government] wishes [to] give full 
support measures designed [to] increase security of Ethiopia, Eritrean federation was 
action supported by US in UN, action which, at [that] time, was considered favourable 
to Ethiopia.”119 Rusk instructed the US ambassador to inform Haile Selassie that the 
United States found it inappropriate to officially “commend Ethiopia on [the] 
dissolution of federation or participate in formal observances of event, in view [of the] 
history [of the] federation and [the] general interest [of the] international 
community...”120  
The United States-Ethiopian strategic relationship was entrenched through the 
establishment of the U.S. Army communications station “Radio Marina” in Asmara, 
which was used as a communication centre for the Indian Ocean. As it was indicated 
in the previous chapter, the US took over this military base, which had formerly 
served as Italian naval radio station, as early as the 1940s. It survived during the war 
years and its strategic importance in the late 1940s became a decisive factor in the 
growth of US assistance for Ethiopia.
121
 Earlier on May 22, 1953, both countries 
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signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement which gave the US the right to 
maintain this important military base for a period of twenty-five years. Through its 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) established in the same year, the US, in 
turn, provided military hardware and training to Ethiopian Forces on a vast scale. 
According to the US National Security Council Report, the US Government granted a 
program of $5-6 million per year assistance for the Ethiopian Army, whereby the 
country received the cumulative total of grant $38 million from 1952 to 1960.
122
  
Even after 1960, millions of US dollars went into maintaining Ethiopian military 
forces. This enabled the country to sustain, according to Markakis, “the largest 
military establishment in Sub-Saharan Africa at that time.” In the mid-1960 Ethiopia 
had an army that “exceeded 40,000”123 effective combat troops, plus supporting 
forces, modern artillery and small but efficient Air Force equipped with American jet 
fighters and fighter bombers.  
Against such military strength of Ethiopia, the early ELF guerrillas adopted a hit-and-
run style of unconventional warfare as a means to guarantee the supply of arms and 
continuation of the armed struggle. The guerrillas operated in much the same way as 
the Viet Cong in Vietnam, although on a far smaller scale. They hit isolated police 
posts in the countryside, seized weapons and then withdrew into the rugged hills that 
were outside the control of Ethiopian security apparatus. As noted above, about seven 
engagements occurred under the leadership of Awate. All of them were conducted in 
the form of hit-and-run guerrilla warfare. With limited resources, those who joined 
Awate also had to follow the same tactics. Thus, in 1963 alone several engagements 
occurred in HalHal, Anseba, Telaay, Jengeren, and Haicota.
124
 For instance, on 
September 1963, the fighters in broad day light attacked by surprise a police station in 
Haicota. Sabbe recounts: “A bus with Sudanese tourists came from Asmara. They 
stopped it outside Haicota, left the passengers there, took their clothes and turbans and 
went with the bus inside. They were fifteen led by Adem Mohammed Hamid 
“Gendifel”. The bus stopped in front of police station. All of a sudden jumped out and 
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captured the two guards. Then in fifteen minutes they captured the whole station and 
took about fifty guns including two Bren machine guns.”125 
Police posts between Keren and the western lowlands bordering Sudan became the 
domain of the liberation army. “Between late 1963 and early 1964, ELA units 
ambushed a large police convoy, killing 17 police officers (all Eritreans by origin) and 
capturing about 40 machine guns.”126  
Within the next couple of years the size of the liberation army grew from tens to 
hundreds of people who came from diverse backgrounds. However, the need to secure 
the supply of arms and ammunitions, and establish effective organizational structures 
remained the major challenges in the next chapter of ELF’s history, as we shall see it 
in the succeeding pages. 
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Chapter Three: Broadening the War: Organizational and 
Political Developments, 1964-1969 
Introduction 
This chapter covers the period from 1964 to 1969, during which the ELF grew 
tremendously from tens to thousands of guerrilla fighters. It examines the role of the 
ELF’s leadership abroad, foreign assistance, and the course of its expansion and 
organization of the army during the first decade of its history. The impact of the 
organizational structures that the ELF established to administer the increasingly 
diverse fighters will be analyzed in this chapter. Furthermore, the chapter will address 
ELF’s internal disputes over strategy and tactics that eventually led to the emergence 
of a reformist movement from within the liberation movement. Last but not least, 
major clandestine commando operations undertaken in 1969 will also be addressed.    
The Role of the Leadership Abroad 
As shown in the preceding chapter, the Cairo-based leadership of the ELF after its 
inception focused mainly on the field of diplomacy. They strived hard to promote the 
cause of the Eritrean people in the international arena in order to win financial and 
material support and sympathy from different countries, particularly in the Middle 
East. But the rebellion led by Hamid Idris Awate broke out before the leadership was 
ready to wage a war. Osman Saleh Sabbe has written:  
Though the contacts between him [Awate] and Idris Mohammed Adem – due to 
previous personal acquaintance and to tribal and regional relations – continued in the 
form of messages exchanged through the Eritrean groups in the Sudanese army in 
Kassala, the border city, yet the announcement of armed rebellion was not 
preconceived. The idea that Awate should lead the armed struggle was there, being 
expert in guerrilla warfare which he experienced during the British occupation in 
addition to his experience as a sergeant in the Italian army. But he did not have 
enough weapons. He had his licensed 303 English gun and a few old Italian guns of 
his friends.
1
 
Idris Mohammed Adem, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the ELF, also 
recounts: “When we were outside we received a message that Awate had gone to the 
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mountains. I send [sic sent] a message to Kassala asking: Why did Awate go out 
although we had not yet sent weapons inside? We learned that he had to go because 
the Ethiopians were coming after him.”2 Hence, when Hamid Idris Awate, in 
November 1961, dispatched one of his early followers, Adem Mohammed, to Cairo 
requesting them for urgent assistance with weapons, the people in the leadership had 
nothing to offer. The leadership immediately sought to raise financial contributions 
from the Eritrean community in Saudi Arabia and endeavoured to collect as much 
money as possible in order to rescue the revolution with weapons which could be 
bought easily in the black market in Sudan.
3
  As a result of financial assistance made 
by Eritreans, Idris managed to deliver five rifles and over one thousand ammunitions 
to his compatriots in Sudan in mid May 1962.
4
 
Much of the diplomatic efforts of the ELF during the early period were carried out by 
Idris Mohammed Adem and Osman Saleh Sabbe. Through their branches in Cairo and 
Mogadishu they distributed memorandums to many African countries, liberation 
movements in Asia and Africa, and the different academicians like lawyers. This was 
intended to publicize the Eritrean case in order to draw the attention of the 
international community. The memos and publications issued by the ELF’s branch in 
Somalia, known as the ESFA, in the early 1960s, however, hardly expound a unified 
and consistent line of argument in regard to the Eritrean question. Whenever they 
sought support from Muslim countries, for instance, the Eritrean case was rather 
portrayed as a religious problem, specifically that of a problem of the Muslims living 
in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Many of the letters and memoranda were titled as “Appeal of 
the Muslims of Ethiopia and Eritrea” and asked authorities of different countries, such 
as Somalia, to support them, either financially and/or materially, in the name of Islam. 
At the same time letters were written on the same subject but with a different tone and 
argument − like representing the Eritrean case as a struggle against colonialism – 
when addressed to the socialist countries, such as the Peoples Republic of China, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the USSR, the German Democratic Republic, and 
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the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously, the US was also asked for 
some material contributions.
5
  
Thus, the ELF, at this stage of its thinking, seemed to have adopted a pragmatic 
approach in its foreign relations. The tendency to use religion to appeal for political 
support emanated from Sabbe’s background. The ESFA branch in Somalia was run by 
Osman Saleh Sabbe, who was previously known for his endeavour to promote the 
cause of Muslims in both Eritrea and Ethiopia through his own organization called Al 
Urwa Al Wutqa (The Firm Bond). Idris Mohammed Adem, the Chairman of the ELF, 
had a different perspective. He stated that when he went to Saudi Arabia in 1960 to 
visit the Eritrean Community in order to mobilize support for the contemplated 
organized violent opposition against Ethiopia, he encountered Sabbe for the first time. 
Sabbe asked if Idris Mohammed Adem would be interested to be part of the Al Urwa 
Al Wutqa Organization, and Idris recalled how he reacted: “I refused to be part of it 
because the matter of the Ethiopian Muslims concerns only them. I knew that the 
Muslims inside Ethiopia suffered a bad treatment but we did not want to mix this 
issue with the Eritrean question. The Eritrean question [was]…an international [case] 
whereas the question of the Ethiopian Muslims was a matter internal to Ethiopia. To 
combine or mix these issues could only have been detrimental for our cause.”6 
The ELF, having one of its offices in Mogadishu and the other in Cairo, endeavoured 
to guarantee the continuation of the fighting that was already going on in Eritrea. The 
ESFA was important in organizing and mobilizing Eritrean community in Somalia, 
Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf States and collected contributions 
which were used to cover its publication costs as well as other demands from the 
field. The leadership in Cairo produced pamphlets which were distributed in the major 
cities and towns of Eritrea through clandestine network of ELF cells. The pamphlets 
were published in four languages: Tigrinya, Arabic, Italian and English. Pamphlets 
often recalled the history of the federal period and the policy of domination that 
Ethiopia had followed during that time and it called upon Eritreans to participate 
actively in the armed struggle for the liberation of Eritrea. Some of the pamphlets 
were directed to specific social groups, such as the police forces, while other leaflets 
reflected the general spirit of discontent against the local administration, mainly  
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Figure 3. One of the earliest ELF's pamphlets, June 1961. 
Source: Ethiopian Military Intelligence /36/01, RDC. 
against the Assembly. Death threats against the Chief Executive and the Vice 
President were often issued through the leaflets.
7
 Such threats were also sent through 
private letters. For instance, Melake Selam Dimetros, who escaped an assassination 
attempt in October 1961, received a threat that he would not be able to get a second 
chance to save his life.
8
 On May 26, 1962, Dimetros proceeded to Shambko in order 
to attend an important religious ceremony. The police being alarmed after receiving 
an anonymous letter of threat, forced Dimetros and his group to go back by mules 
through another route while the cars used previously returned empty using the regular 
road.
9
 In addition to pamphlets, anti Ethiopian propaganda published by a periodical 
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called EL Thawra (The Revolution) in Cairo was also circulating among local 
inhabitants.
10
  
In mid-1962, Sabbe joined Idris Mohammed Adem and Idris Osman Galadewos in 
Egypt after having run the ESFA in Somalia for almost a year. The congregation of 
these three leading figures in Cairo was important in determining the nature of 
leadership and organizational structure that ELF had developed in the subsequent 
years. Markakis noted:  
This trio was to dominate the Eritrean nationalist movement for the next decade 
though not in concord. In fact, the struggle for personal power commenced 
immediately after Sabbe’s arrival. An astute politician, he demanded the dissolution 
of the Executive Committee that was dominated by the other two, arguing plausibly 
that a liberation movement could not be led by students, and proposed an elaborate 
organizational structure to be established by a popular congress. Though this never 
materialized, Sabbe succeeded in setting aside the Executive Committee, leaving the 
nascent nationalist movement in the hands of the three leading figures who could 
operate without organizational restraint.
11
 
Therefore, in place of the initial Central Committee of the ELF formed in Cairo, a 
highest executive body made up of three self-appointed figures was established. These 
important figures that provided the early leadership for the organization came from 
different background. Idris Mohammed Adem was a former President of the Eritrean 
Assembly, Idris Osman Galadewos a lawyer by training, and Osman Saleh Sabbe a 
former school master. They established the highest executive body of the organization 
among themselves and called it as the Mejlis Al AElla, meaning Supreme Council, of 
the ELF organization. While Idris Mohammed Adem took the chairmanship, Osman 
Saleh Sabbe and Idris Osman Galadewos were assigned to take charge of foreign 
relations and military affairs respectively. In Michael’s rendering of things: 
The Cairo triumvirate was an interesting, if somewhat odd grouping of Eritrean 
dissidents. As his position as former President of the Eritrean Assembly suggests, 
Adem was the political heavyweight of the three, and had garnered popular appeal in 
the lowlands for his early opposition to Haile Selassie’s subversion of the Federation. 
Galadewos, somewhat younger than his two associates, operated as the military 
brains behind Jebha’s [or ELF’s] early operations while Sabbe – the smooth talking, 
urbane scholar who would publish several Arabic texts on Eritrea – served as the 
intellectual and ideological force behind the movement, as well as its chief 
interlocutor in foreign capitals. More important than these differences in background 
and disposition was that while Adem, Galadewos, and Sabbe were all lowland 
Muslims, they represented very different ethnic constituencies: Adem was a Tigre, 
Beni Amir from Barka, Galadewos a Bilen from the Keren area, and Sabbe an ethnic 
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Saho from the coastal area of Massawa-Hirgigo. Thus, from its earliest days, Jebha 
represented a coalition of Eritrea’s Muslim tribes.12 
The existence of this Supreme Council in the ELF was, however, critical in providing 
“the warriors in the armed wing with the image and legitimacy of an organized armed 
liberation movement and established external contacts to friendly countries to provide 
arms, funds and military training.”13  
After the death of Hamid Idris Awate the succession question of the military 
command in the field was problematic. Mohammed Idris Haj who was appointed by 
Awate as a vice-commander died a natural death in 1963. The leadership was then 
transferred to Taher Salem, former leader of the secret association of Eritreans serving 
in the Sudanese forces.
14
 One of the pressing problems of the ELF as an organization 
at this point in time was the absence of well coordinated and structured 
communication networks between the leadership in Cairo and the army in Eritrea. 
Communication between these two components of the organization was not easy. 
Most of the time, the communication process was carried out through messengers. 
The process could take weeks, sometimes even months, to get to the destination. 
Generally, the communication structure during the first couple of years was neither 
efficient nor workable for the ELF to sustain itself as an effective organization. 
Having realized this, the Supreme Council decided to set up a working organizational 
structure that could eliminate the hurdles encountered. Osman Saleh Sabbe was 
assigned to complete this mission.   
The first meeting between the armed wing of the ELF called Eritrean Liberation 
Army (ELA) and the Cairo-based leadership, the Supreme Council, took place in 
December 1962 in a place called Bergeshish in the Gash area.
15
 The Supreme 
Council, represented by Osman Saleh Sabbe met the ELA members, whose number 
was only forty-four. Among them only eighteen people were armed with rifles while 
the rest of the group carried swords. The participants agreed on two things: (1) to 
establish a military leadership in command of the field, comprising five people, and 
(2) to set up a Revolutionary Command (RC) based in Kassala, Sudan, which was 
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intended to serve as a bridge between the Cairo-based leadership and the military 
commanders in Eritrea.
16
 The RC commenced its activity in January 1963 with six 
members.
17
 However, due to the hostile policy of the then Sudanese military 
government led by General Ibrahim Abboud, they had to conduct their activities and 
meetings secretly at night in private homes. When the existence of the RC became 
known to the Sudanese police, the ELF members were unable to carry out their 
activities smoothly in Kassala until General Abboud relinquished his power in favour 
of a civilian Cabinet in October 1964. Thereafter a regular office was opened.
18
 
 
Figure 4. Bergeshish Meeting, 1962. 
L-R: Mohammed Umer Abdela “Abu Tiyara”, Mohammed Kisha, Kubub Hajaj, Osman Saleh Sabbe, 
Atahir Idris, Osman Mohammed Idris (Abu Sheneb). Source: Research and Documentation Centre, 
Eritrea. 
After the death of Hamid Idris Awate in 1962, the size of the liberation army grew 
steadily. Generally, the bulk of recruits came from the rural areas of the western 
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lowlands of Eritrea. But there were also young students and workers from the Eritrean 
plateau and from urban centres in Sudan and Egypt.
19
 According to the information 
obtained from ELF former fighters, the early participation of Christian highlanders, as 
combatants started in early 1963 when a group of seven people led by Ghebrehiwot, 
whose full name unknown to the author, joined the ELF.
20
 
The ELF during this time received the sympathy and support from different Arab 
countries. Sudan provided a safe haven for many Eritrean political refugees although 
the “Sudanese aid was limited and inconsistent as it depended on internal political 
developments and was influenced by the fact that the Ethiopians could retaliate by 
supporting the Southern Sudan rebels. Nevertheless, the Sudan provided the ELF with 
essential facilities such as staging bases, supply depots for smuggled arms, and shelter 
from the Ethiopian army.”21 The ELF was actively supported by the Syrian regime 
since 1963. Syria regarded the ELF as an “Arab liberation movement fighting a 
reactionary pro-Israeli regime.”22 Although the ELF was, in essence, not an “Arab 
liberation movement”, it had benefited immensely from Syrian funds, arms, and 
training for over the next fifteen years. Twenty ELF fighters got military training in 
Syria as early as 1963. Having finished training in 1964, they flew to Saudi Arabia 
using diplomatic passports and managed to smuggle the first twenty Soviet AK-47 
automatic rifles, before they ferried across the Red Sea to Suakin, in north-eastern 
seaboard of Sudan. In 1960s alone, about 350 fighters were trained in Syria, Iraq, 
China, and Cuba.
23
  
In 1965, Syrian military aid for the ELF became obvious when the Sudanese 
government discovered at Khartoum Airport over 60 tons of arms: an assortment of 
Kalashnikov automatic rifles, rocket launchers, mortars, explosives and thousands of 
rounds of ammunitions. The arms were transported in two DC-6 aircraft from Syria. 
The ELF leaders attempted to smuggle the arms after they made a secret agreement 
with some high officials of the government of Sudan. However, the mission was 
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intercepted and some of the arms were confiscated.
24
 The Prime Minister of Sudan 
and other officials were arrested by the Sudanese police, and Sabbe was expelled from 
Sudan and banned from re-entering the country until 1975. Thereafter, Saudi Arabia, 
South Yemen, and Somalia provided the ELF the right of free passage through their 
territorial waters. Thus, with the help of funds from Saudi Arabia, ELF bought a small 
boat, through which they were able to transport arms to the Eritrean coast. ELF also 
received aid from Libya, Iraq, and China.
25
 
Expansion and Organization of the Army  
Until 1965, the leadership in the field carried out three important military conferences 
that deserve mention in this context. These meetings were held with the intention of 
reorganizing the growing number of recruits in the army. In the first meeting held in 
Kurr in September 1963, the ELA was reorganized into four different platoons. Each 
platoon had about 40-50 members led by a chief commander and his deputy, as shown 
in the table below. 
Table 2. Organization of the Eritrean Liberation Army, ELF, 1964 
Platoon Chief Commander Vice Commander 
1.  Omer Ezaz  Adem Mohammed Hamed “Gendefel” 
2.  Omer Nasser Shum Ahmed Welolo 
3.  Mahmud Dinai Kubub Hajaj 
4.  Osman Mohammed Idris (Abu 
Sheneb) 
Mohammed Ali Kisha 
Source: Umer Damer, et al., Group interview,… 26 March 1989. 
By mid-1964 the Eritrean Liberation Army had about 250 members. In September 
1964, a year after the initial convention, another meeting was carried out in Kurr and 
reorganized the army again into seven platoons led by the following commanders. 
                                                 
24
 According to Osman Denden, about 18 tons of total arms supplied by Syria were confiscated by the 
Sudanese government. Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
72 
 
 
 
Table 3. Organization of the Eritrean Liberation Army, ELF, 1964 
Platoon Chief Commander Vice Commander 
1.  Omer Ezaz  Hamed Sherif 
2.  Mahmud Dinai Omar Kelifa 
3.  Osman Mohammed Idris (Abu Sheneb) Mohammed Ali Kisha 
4.  Abdelkerim Ahmed Osman Adem 
5.  Mohammed Said Shamsi Said Nur 
6.  Kubub Hajaj Dengus Arey 
7.  Ibrahim Mohammed Ali Ibrahim Mohammed Hassan 
Source: Umer Damer, et al., Group interview, …26 March 1989. 
In 1965 more people, mostly young educated men and Eritrean workers from the 
neighbouring countries, joined the struggle. The size of the army, which was stationed 
at that time only in the western lowlands of the country, increased to about one 
thousand and as it became heterogeneous it created contradictions between the former 
fighters and the new recruits. This “had created a serious problem of organization and 
strategy”26 which compelled the Supreme Council to look for other alternatives of 
organizational structure which could meet the logistical requirements of the growing 
number of combatants.  
From 8-20 June 1965, the Supreme Council held a meeting with the commanders of 
the platoons in Kassala and decided to territorially organize the army of liberation 
based on the Algerian model of dividing the country into various zones of operation.
27
 
During the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962), Algeria was divided into six military 
zones, called wilayas, following the Ottoman-era administrative boundaries, where 
each wilaya was led by colonels of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). The 8-
year old guerrilla struggle eventually came to an end with a victory of Algerians that 
enabled them to gain independence from France.
28
 The Algerian experience, for the 
ELF leaders, served as a contemporary tested revolutionary model that they could 
borrow from and implement according to the Eritrean conditions. Concerning this 
issue, Idris Osman Galadewos opines: “When we thought about spreading all over 
Eritrea, in front of us, there was the experience of Algeria, and of course at that time 
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[we preferred to adopt] experience [of others] and for us the Algerian [Revolution] 
…was a very great experience even though the negative sides of this experience was 
not fully studied by us. So we were [simply] copying …the idea of zonal system.”29   
By applying this model the liberation army was divided initially into four military 
zones and later into five. The purpose of this organizational strategy was to achieve 
the following three objectives, namely: (1) to realize the expansion and consolidation 
of the armed struggle throughout the country, (2) to ensure wider public support, and 
(3) to weaken Ethiopian forces by stretching its military capacity all over Eritrea.
30
 
Hence, the initial four military zones which covered the then administrative regions of 
Eritrea (Western Province, Sahel, Senhit, Akele Guzai, Seae, Semhar, Dankalia and 
Hamassien) were as follows:    
a) Zone One: Operated in the Western Province (also commonly referred to as 
Barka), comprising the Gash and Barka area bordering Sudan; populated mainly 
by Muslim communities. The Beni Amer made up the bulk of the agro-pastoralist 
population, along with smaller groups of Nara, Hidareb, and Kunama. It was led 
by Mahmoud Dinai who was born to a Beni Amer, and former member of the 
Sudanese forces, who joined the struggle in 1962.
31
  
b) Zone Two: Represented the former provinces of Sahel and Senhit in the Northern 
Highlands of Eritrea; populated mainly by Muslim nomads and settled 
agriculturalists. The commander of this zone was Omer Hamed Ezaz. He was born 
into a Muslim Bilen Bet Tawqe family in Hal-Hal.  He was formerly serving in 
the Sudanese forces and was among those early guerrillas that joined the forces of 
Hamid Idris Awate.
32
  
c) Zone Three: Encompassed in the Central Plateau, namely the former provinces of 
Akele Guzai and Serae; inhabited predominantly by Tigrinya-speaking Christian 
settled farmers, Muslim Saho pastoralists, and the trader and weaver Muslim 
minority known as Jaberti. The commander was Abdelkerim Ahmed, a Saho by 
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birth, who studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, where he was actively 
involved in the Eritrean Student Association. He organized ELF cells in the 
highlands and undertook military training with the first group of fighters who 
went to Syria in 1963.
33
 
d) Zone Four: Active in the central and southern parts of the coastal plains, largely 
known as Semhar and Dankalia provinces respectively; aside from the two ports, 
Massawa and Assab, the region was inhabited predominantly by sparsely 
populated Muslim nomads. The commander of the zone was Mohammed Ali 
Omero, a Tigre-speaking from Hirgigo, who went to Cairo for further education 
after initially attending the Kekiya School in Hirgigo which had been run by 
Osman Saleh Sabbe. He was actively involved in the activities of the Eritrean 
Students Association and in 1961 he attacked the Ethiopian Embassy in Cairo and 
attempted to burn it together with other students, including Abdelkerim Ahmed, 
the commander of Zone 3. He was one of the earliest members of the ELF and 
was sent to Syria for military training with the first group.
34
  
Each zone had its own commander, his deputy, a political commissioner, and officers 
assigned to deal with security, logistics, and medical care. The commander was 
chosen from the cadres of the local area.
35
 Most of the armed combatants of the zones 
were also recruited from their respective regions the zone operated in. This was 
intended to avoid any instances of resentment from the local people towards the 
combatants. According to Idris Osman Galadewos, the leadership abroad thought that 
local people would be relatively more cooperative and supportive to the ELF if a 
leader of a given zone and his armies were assigned to the region where they were 
hailed from. Additionally, the new military strategy was intended to facilitate the 
recruitment of fighters from the local area and also strengthen the combat capacity of 
the liberation army.
36
 
The new military strategy accorded each military zone a wide range of responsibility 
and considerable autonomy in performing its activities related to military operations, 
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administrative and economic affairs. To support itself, each zone engaged in 
collecting taxes, revenues, and donations from the local population as well as private 
businesses in the zone.
37
 The Kessala-based Revolutionary Command (RC), after 
being restructured, was left to continue its function as an intermediary between the 
Supreme Council and the Zone Commands (ZC). Osman Idris Galadewos was in 
charge of the RC.
38
 
Figure 5. The Structure of the ELF 
 
Source: Redie, 198. 
The newly introduced Algerian model of zonal division was subject to review after 
six months. Accordingly, the first conference of assessment was carried out between 
the RC and ZC from 15-27 December 1965. The conference was chaired by the Chief 
of the RC and it was attended only by twelve people − all Muslims. These comprised 
seven RC members, four Zone Commanders, and an officer from the military school. 
The major limitations among other things reported by the ZC were lack of military 
provisions and adequate training, lack of political education to commissioners who 
were entrusted to play an important role in raising political awareness of the armies in 
the zones, lack of regular communication between the RC and the Zones. Last but not 
least of the problems encountered by the zone commands was the transfer of 
combatants from one Zone to another without the knowledge of their immediate boss. 
The RC was sometimes transferring fighters from their original units to other Zones 
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without notifying the Zone Commanders. Such interference on the part of the RC was 
creating discontent and Zone Commanders were complaining about it.
39
  
The presence of the ELF was gradually felt almost all over the country. Its steady 
military growth gave the leadership of the ELF “the belief that they had the sole 
mandate of representing the Eritrean people.”40 They were intolerant of any 
independent movement such as the ELM on the Eritrean soil. Although some 
initiatives aimed at uniting the two movements were conducted in 1964-65 by 
members of the two organizations in Sudan, the discordance dominated their 
relationship. The disagreement which was accompanied by a war of words since 1960 
had alerted Ethiopia to tighten its security in the major cities and towns. Numerous 
surveillance operations were put in place by the Ethiopian security and intelligence 
agencies. In 1965, the ELM decided to launch an armed struggle, after it had realized 
the difficulty of carrying out its underground operations within the domain of 
Ethiopian strong security apparatus. According to Ruth, “the ELM leadership notified 
the ELF of its plans and received an ultimatum from ELF spokesman, Osman S. 
Sabbe, who pointed out that a liberation front already existed and told Nawud [i.e. 
leader of the ELM] that his organization should… [join the ELF] or face 
elimination.”41 Nevertheless, the ELM proceeded with its plans and dispatched its 
forces to the northern hills of Eritrea. The ELF resorted to resolve the discordance 
through coercive means. In May 1965, the ELM fighters faced attack from the ELF at 
Ela Tza’ada.42 Although there are conflicting reports on the number of casualties, the 
ELM nonetheless suffered heavy casualties.
43
 This marked the total obliteration of the 
ELM as a viable political organization in Eritrea. As Markakis puts it, this was indeed 
“the first bloodshed in a long history of internecine violence that was to mark the 
course of the Eritrean revolution.”44  
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As the liberation army spread all over the country, the encounter of the ELA with the 
Ethiopian troops increased. In 1965, between September and October, several battles 
at different places were recorded. On the 15
th
 of September, a battle took place at 
Mihlab (Senhit Province), which lasted about seven hours. Both sides faced heavy 
casualties. According to the ELF reports, Ethiopian forces suffered over eighty dead 
and many wounded. The ELF lost about twenty-one fighters and four wounded. The 
corpses of the dead fighters were later hung in Keren market square. Gallows with 
about seventeen fighters hung were also witnessed by Swedish journalists at about the 
same time in Ghindae area. Nevertheless, the battles or ambushes undertaken by the 
ELA continued in Barentu, Debuk,  Serae (three police posts at one time), Debre Sala 
(around Agordat), Areza and Siam (Serae Province), and Gerset. A train carrying 
Ethiopian troops from Agordat to Anfotota was destroyed after a detachment of the 
ELA ambushed it.
45
 Before the battles mentioned above occurred, in June 16 of the 
same year, the liberation army attacked a vehicle that carried three officials. One of 
those officials who happened to be the superintendent of the police forces perished 
immediately while the rest suffered wounds. According to the ELF, individuals who 
were working for the Ethiopian authorities were also targeted for assassinations, 
particularly in Agordat and Keren regions.
46
  
On October 9-12, 1966, a second conference with the purpose of reviewing the 
military strategy between the RC and ZC took place. The meeting was attended by 
nineteen people, all of whom were Muslims with the exception of one. While the 
problems reported from the previous meeting were still prevailing, new problems 
emerged and the situation got worse. Due to the recurrent drought the zones were 
unable to collect taxes or donations from the local population. For instance, Zone 
Four reported that the total amount of money collected throughout the year was only 
500 of local currency. As a result, all Zones, perhaps of varying degrees, faced 
shortage of food, clothing as well as medical supplies. For particular zones, like those 
of Zone Three and Zone Four the geographical location in which they operated also 
contributed a lot to their problems. Consequently, the RC had difficulty in 
maintaining regular contact with those distant zones and eventually resulted to 
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logistical disparity experienced by the different military Zones.
47
 Awet in this regard 
notes that “Zones One and Two are easier to reach from Sudan while Zones Three (in 
the southern highlands), Four (in the western [sic. eastern]/coastal lowlands) and later 
Five (in the central highlands) were farther from the Revolutionary Command’s reach 
and under stronger control of the Ethiopian security apparatus... this physical 
difficulty did not dispel the distrust between the bulk of the fighters, on the one hand, 
and their leaders, on the other, as well as among the fighters themselves.”48 
In addition to logistical problems, the proceedings of the meeting also highlighted that 
the different zones were engaged in intense rivalry and competition for the control of 
resources and territory. Boundary squabbles became an incessant problem, especially 
between Zone One and Zone Two. The Zones, instead of working jointly, amicably 
with the spirit of promoting coexistence and coordinating their forces for the common 
goal, fell apart. The Zones refrained from helping one another in time of difficulty 
against their common enemy. Zone Four reported that when it was under common 
enemy attack they requested the neighbouring Zones for assistance, but surprisingly 
they failed to help Zone Four.
49
 This had a detrimental impact on the unity of the 
Eritrean liberation forces.  
The report also shows that there was lack of frequent and effective communication 
between the ZC and the RC. The absence of such important element allowed the ZC 
to conduct their activities autonomously and the RC which was supposed to serve as 
an intermediary organ between the SC and the field in Eritrea failed to effectively 
follow up the activities of the Zones inside Eritrea. Zone Commanders took drastic 
measures without the consent of the upper hierarchy of the organization. Zonal 
Commanders were “accused of oppressing the population and committing serious 
atrocities. In short, they were accused of engaging in all types of arbitrary measures 
that generated disharmony between them and the people under their control.”50  
Some Zonal Commanders even further aggravated the social tensions and relations 
between the different ethno-linguistic groups. For instance, when the Ethiopian 
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government recruited some Kunama militia, in 1965, against the independence 
struggle, Galadewos recounts, the militia attacked some villages in Jemal Hamed, and 
the Commander of Zone One, a Beni Amer, took the problem as a question of tribal 
dignity and attacked some of the Kunama villages and burned down houses. Such 
kind of activities, coupled with historical ethnic-based feuds, intensified the 
relationship among the society in the area.
51
 Meanwhile, the Commander of Zone 
Three, who was a Saho by origin, was appointing people who hailed only from the 
Saho ethno-linguistic group to key positions. The Christians inhabitants of this region 
were systematically alienated and the zone exclusively became Saho-dominated. 
Again when the long standing land dispute between the Tora, Saho pastoralists, and 
Tsenaidegele, Christian peasants, erupted in the region, the leadership of the zone 
sided with the Tora. The RC was aware of this situation, but it lacked the power to put 
an end to it. In short, the Zonal Commanders consolidated their power using all 
possible means at their disposal and within 2-3 years they became stronger than the 
RC.
52
 As Redie noted one of the major factors contributing to this kind of behaviour 
was “the absence of effective control from the leadership above. In practice, the zone 
division became a base for sub-national configurations, that is, they became the base 
for ethno-linguistic gathering. As a result, clan and tribal conflicts beset the liberation 
army, which, in turn, diluted the nationalist character of the national liberation 
movement.”53 
When dealing with internal problems experienced by the different zones, differences 
of opinion emerged among the members of the SC. While Idris Mohammed Adem 
defended the Beni Amer-dominated Zone One, Osman Saleh Sabbe became the 
patron of Zone Four and Idris Osman Galadewos of Zone Two. However, Zone Three 
remained without a patron from the political leaders abroad. Each one accused the 
other of defending the zone of one’s affiliation. As a result, the trios instead of 
creating effective collective leadership rather became divided along ethnic and 
regional lines. In a bid to safeguard their own position in the leadership, the SC 
members established personal links with the Zonal Commanders on the ground of 
their ethno-linguistic affiliation. This was fostered by providing the necessary 
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logistics, weaponry, information, training abroad and other opportunities that were 
available.
54
 
           
Osman Saleh Sabbe      Idris Mohammed Adem      Osman Idris Galadewos 
Figure 6. Members of the Supreme Council. 
Source: Research and Documentation Centre, Eritrea.  
The leadership of the front, therefore, failed to create a disciplined organization. They 
justified this by stating that they were more concerned with fund raising and securing 
arms to the liberation struggle. As Osman Saleh Sabbe, a leading fund raiser of the 
ELF in the Arab world, wrote straightforwardly, “the leadership of the front – myself 
one of them – committed a serious mistake by giving priority to the gun instead of the 
organization.”55 Scholars have also pointed out that in addition to the absence of 
effective political leadership, lack of ideological unity and a clearly defined and 
elaborate political programme was among the major problems that beset the 
organization.
56
 
The sectarian nature of the ELF served Ethiopia as a means to enlist Eritrean support 
against the nationalist movement. Some Christian highland villages and some 
Kunama who were fed up with the atrocious treatment of the ELF fighters sought 
protection from Ethiopia. As a result, a special force known as Commando 101, 
comprising entirely of recruits from the Eritrean Christian community, was 
established. A training centre staffed by Israeli paramilitary and counter-insurgency 
trainers was set up in Dekemhare town, 40 km southeast of Asmara.
57
 The first round 
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of a six-months trained Commandos, numbering 300, graduated on September 3, 
1964.
58
 The training continued in consecutive rounds. With time the Commandos 
became a formidable fighting force dedicated to wiping out the Eritrean liberation 
army from Eritrean soil. To bolster their commitment the government made extensive 
campaign to install a belief that the ELF fighters were fighting to create ‘an Islamic 
state’ by stating that “...the nationalist movement was spawned in Arab circles, and its 
objective was to annex Eritrea to one of the Arab states in the region. ‘The foreign 
countries which are inciting these outlaws covet the natural resources of Ethiopia,’ 
was how Haile Selassie put it in a rare public mention of the subject.”59  
After the October 1966 meeting, the leadership of the front decided to focus more on 
clandestine subversive operations using assassination squads with greater emphasis on 
cities and major towns in Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was thought that clandestine 
operations had an advantage over battles or guerrilla warfare; because militarily the 
former requires fewer arms, ammunition, and human power compared to the latter. 
Using few lethal weapons, therefore, the covert military operations, according to the 
ELF, were thought to achieve a three-fold purpose: (1) to create a widespread terror 
among the government circles; (2) to draw international attention and recognition; and 
(3) to eliminate key figures in the government circles. As a result, they outlined the 
tasks to be done by each Zone and instructions were given regarding where to conduct 
the operations. For the second half of the 1960s, each zone was assigned the following 
tasks: (a) to conduct ambushes on military centres in different towns; (b) to destroy 
power installations, government buildings, bridges (between Assab and Desse), roads, 
railway lines (such as Asmara-Masswa), telephone lines, public transportation buses 
on the Asmara and Addis Ababa highway; (c) to attack Addis Mercato, a large open-
air marketplace in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and (d) to assassinate Asrate Kassa, the 
then Governor-General of Eritrea.
60
  
With the growing number of highlanders, Galadewos took the initiative to establish a 
fifth zone in 1966, which was dominated by Christian community from the highland. 
Zone Five (referred to as the “Christian Zone”) represented Hamassien, the 
northernmost province of the central highland, where Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, is 
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situated. Weldai Kahsai, a Christian highlander, was named its commander, and 
Hishal Osman became deputy commander.
61
 The Hamassien province to this day has 
been the most densely populated region and comprises the most modern economic 
capacity of the country. Thus in accordance with the logic of the zones, the fifth zone 
was supposed to collect revenue from the local population in Asmara. However, the 
RC deprived it from enjoying such a lucrative source of income. Instead, the RC took 
over the Capital, and assigned assassination squad (also known as fedayin) units to 
collect contributions and run other activities as per instructions provided by the RC. 
Consequently the fifth zone remained financially weak and dependent on the means of 
other zones.
62
 
Preoccupied by the formation of the “Christian Zone” and earlier military successes 
scored by the ELF military units, the Ethiopian government launched a full-fledged 
military offensive in March 1967. Dawit states that “[i]n1964-1965 the death rate 
among [Ethiopian] soldiers was as low as 100 per year.”63 But since 1965 the number 
of casualties on the Ethiopian side increased dramatically. Thus in 1967 Ethiopia was 
determined to wipe out the ELF insurgents. The offensive involved thousands of 
Ethiopian troops accompanied by aerial and heavy armour bombardment. The 
decentralization and poor coordination between the different ELF’s zones of operation 
now paid off handsomely for the Ethiopian government.
64
 The ELF failed to 
coordinate their forces to exert a meaningful resistance. Ethiopian troops first 
dispersed the weak army in the “Christian zone” and then moved to west from the 
highlands sweeping through Gash Barka region of Zone One to the Senhit region 
from where the Second Zone operated. Unable to bear the brunt of coordinated 
bombing, the guerrillas were dispersed and retreated back far north. The death toll 
among the civilian Muslim inhabitants was heavy. In a bid to terrorize the local 
population, Ethiopian troops burned villages and massacred civilians, causing 
devastation and an exodus of more than 20,000 civilian refugees to the Sudan, 
marking the first of the many waves of refugees to flee to Sudan during the course of 
the next two decades of the armed conflict in Eritrea.
65
 An Israeli who was an advisor 
to the Eritrea-based Second Division of the Ethiopian armed forces gives an eye 
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witness account in mid-1967 by saying: “The 2nd Division is very efficient in killing 
innocent people. They are alienating the Eritreans and deepening the hatred that 
already exists. Their commander took his senior aides to a spot near the Sudanese 
border and ordered them; ‘From here to the north—clean the area.’ Many innocent 
people were massacred and nothing of substance was achieved. There is simply no 
way the Ethiopian army will ever win the struggle over Eritrea by pursuing this 
line.”66 
In March 11, 1967, Ethiopia signed an extradition agreement with Sudan in order to 
end cross-border sanctuary for insurgents.
67
 To make matters worse, Ethiopia’s 
military offensive coincided with the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, causing the 
closure of the shipping lane in the Red Sea by the Israeli. “As Arab support 
temporarily dried up” the ELF faced an acute shortage of arms and ammunitions. As a 
result, “there was a notable loss of ELF momentum.”68 Indeed, as the ELF Newsletter 
described it, “[t]he very continuation of the revolution was in danger…the leadership 
of the ELF… could not bring about any changes …, [f]ighters in the field, who had 
little food and arms supplies, were being overwhelmed by desperation.”69 
The result of this was a string of defections, including some high level from the ELF 
to the Ethiopian Government. In mid May 1967, the commander of the ELF military 
training centre, Tsegai Gebremedhin, surrendered to Ethiopia.
70
 Tsegai was an ex-
soldier in the Sudanese forces. He joined the ELF in 1965 and became one of the few 
Christians who held some positions of authority.
71
 Prompted by this and other 
possible reasons, Asrate Kassa, the Governor-General of Eritrea, called for a public 
gathering which was attended by more than 3000 religious dignitaries and elderly 
people from all corners of the country.
72
 He announced a general amnesty to the 
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insurgents and “commenced a programme stepped-up propaganda and mass appeals 
designed to foster the loyalty of the Eritrean people.”73  
Another important high level defection came in November 1967. The Commander of 
Zone Five, Welday Kahsai, and a contingent of nineteen Christian fighters from the 
fifth zone defected to the Ethiopian Embassy in Khartoum. The reason provided by 
Welday Kahsai was as follows. In September 6, 1967 while he was in Khartoum for 
medical treatment, a group of twenty one fighters defected to Ethiopia. Angered by 
this action, the deputy Commander of Zone Five, Osman Hishel, allegedly accused 
the rest of the unit of being responsible for the defection. Without the knowledge of 
the Commander of Zone Five, Osman Hishel summarily executed twenty five 
Christians, and thirteen Muslims. Shocked by the news, the Commander and others 
resorted to give themselves up to Ethiopia, through its Embassy in Khartoum.
74
 In a 
bid to avoid public anger, the RC eventually suspended Osman Hishel from duty and 
the fifth Zone remained without Zone Commander.
75
 
Rectification Movement 
As the ELF leadership became increasingly repressive and the negative effects of the 
Zonal divisions were already felt strongly by the fighters, conscious militants began to 
engage in internal debate. Consequently, several groups who aimed at “rectifying the 
problems” facing the ELF began to pop up. One of these movements was the 
Committee of Fighters. This group denounced the rampant actions of the zonal 
commanders and argued for a comprehensive national conference to be held in the 
field. Meanwhile, another Kassala-based reformist movement commonly known in 
Arabic as Eslah, meaning rectification, emerged.
76
 This movement came into being at 
a time when internal debate among the fighters for concrete reform was already 
underway. Their purpose, as expressed in their communiqué, was to convene a 
national conference in order to debate and rectify the mistakes of the liberation 
struggle. They intended to bring fundamental structural changes to the organization. 
When the external leadership and its supporters in the field learnt that the Eslah 
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movement had already drafted a political programme and internal regulations, they 
considered it a coup attempt and devised a strategy to hamper its progress. 
Consequently, the Eslah movement did not succeed to achieve its mission.
77
  
Furthermore, there was another movement known as the Keser, or the “oppressed 
tribes” in Zone One, comprising seven ethnic and tribal groups, namely, the Kunama, 
Nara, Algeden, Sebdrat, Bisha, Bitama, and Hafara. The Keser group resisted the 
domination of the Beni Amer in Zone One, and consequently an established 
committee representing all these seven groups denounced the discriminatory policy 
followed by the commander of Zone One. They raised the demands to either establish 
their own zone that would exclusively represent them, or abolish the zonal system and 
reunite the armies in the different zones.
78
  
All these rectification efforts, as Redie summed up, “triggered a struggle between two 
political forces and trends. These were the old/new, conservative/radical, 
traditional/modern set of political trends. The old generation embodied in the SC 
represented the first element of this dichotomy, while the young generation espousing 
the ideals and strategies of the new political movement represented the second 
element of the dichotomy.”79  
Despite the political polarization between the leadership abroad and the young 
reformists in the field, endeavours to unify the army continued. Such efforts to 
achieve the complete unity of all zones were carried out by field-based fighters 
without involving the leadership abroad. Thus several meetings were convened. The 
first of these rectification meetings was held from 16-19 June 1968 in a place known 
as Aredaib, Eritrea. The meeting was attended by all zonal commanders and their 
respective political commissars. Since representatives from the military training 
centre and supporting units were absent, they agreed to postpone the meeting to 30 
July 1968 in order to discuss further on the prevailing problems and possible 
solutions. Administration of the meetings was given to Commander of Zone Two. 
Among other things, the meeting attendees also agreed on the following issues: (a) 
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Zone One, Two, and Four which were better off than the rest of the zones agreed to 
support financially the weaker units like Zone Three, Five, as well as other supporting 
units; and (b) fearing possible interference from the SC, they agreed to do their best to 
refrain from having any contact with members of the SC before the scheduled 
meeting.
80
 
When the news became known to the members of the SC, the leadership attempted to 
prevent the next meeting from being held. The meeting attendees gathered as per the 
plan but the commanders of Zone One and Two were absent for unclear reasons. 
Thus, for lack of a quorum they postponed the meeting again to September 1, 1968 
and requested Zone One and Two to provide the reasons for their absence. Except the 
commanders of Zone One and Two, all representatives appeared on the agreed date of 
meeting. However, the meeting attendees again postponed the session for one more 
time to September 10 in order to give a third chance to the absentees. Besides, to 
avoid further disruption of the meeting, they agreed again to refrain from conducting 
any military engagements during the interval days.
81
 
The third attempt for a collective meeting also failed. The commanders of Zone One 
and Two did not appear in the planned meeting. The plot against these rectification 
meetings by the higher leadership became clear. The commander of Zone One sent a 
message stating that he received instructions from the RC to receive members of the 
SC in Sawa, a place in the far western part of Eritrea near the border with Sudan.
82
 
Meanwhile, Zone Two, a few days before the planned meeting, engaged in a military 
offensive against police commandos in Hal Hal, in the northwestern Eritrea. The 
battle, which went for about twelve hours, claimed the life of 54 fighters, including 
the commander of the Zone, Omer Mohammed Ezaz, who was initially entrusted to 
organize the rectification meetings.
83
  
The absence of the first two zones was considered a conspiracy to disrupt the planned 
meetings for unity. After experiencing procrastination for three months, 
representatives of Zone Three, Four, and Five as well as other smaller units convened 
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in Anseba, Eritrea. Held from 11-17 September, the Anseba conference stipulated the 
following five points: (1) to abolish zonal divisions and establish a unified army; (2) 
to establish a provisional leadership inside Eritrea; (3) to form a committee entrusted 
to collect the properties of the ELF, both inside and abroad; (4) to set up a 
commission of inquiry responsible to conduct a study regarding past experiences and 
crimes committed by different elements and finally to present its findings to the future 
permanent leadership for further resolutions; and (5) to issue a declaration regarding 
all the understandings reached at the Anseba Conference.
84
 
The Anseba Conference marked the unification of three of the five zonal commanders 
and soon began to carry out their activities under the newly established provisional 
leadership. On 25 November 1968, the provisional leadership dispatched three
85
 of its 
members to meet the RC in Kassala, Sudan. They met Osman Idris Galadewos, one of 
the SC members, and explained their objectives, programmes of the Tripartite Unity 
and their intention to campaign among the Eritrean community in Sudan. The reaction 
of Galadewos was obvious. He informed them that the SC was preparing for a 
congress, and urged them to remain patient. But the delegates responded that they 
were not entitled to act on behalf of the leadership and their responsibility was to raise 
awareness among Eritreans regarding the developments in the field. According to 
their plan, they visited cities and towns in Sudan.
86
    
In Sudan, there were about 17 ELF branch offices in different cities and towns that 
were affected by the winds of change. On 20 February 1969 a meeting between the 
different branches was held in Halfa, Sudan. The aim was to discuss political 
developments in the field. Failing to reach a common understanding, the meeting 
attendees were basically divided between those who favoured the continuation of the 
old organizational structure and those who defended the rectification movement. This 
was followed by another important conference on March 1969 in Gedaref, Sudan. An 
agreement was reached to dissolve the RC and establish a Central Committee 
responsible for administering all ELF branches in Sudan. Furthermore, the Central 
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Committee also became responsible to make sure that fighters, who were referred 
from the field to Sudan for further medication, got equal treatment regardless of the 
military unit they belonged to. Thus it was basically entrusted to play its part in 
diminishing the widening gap between the zonal commanders.
87
  
The newly established Central Committee had thirteen members. It proceeded to 
approach Galadewos, the only available SC member in Khartoum at that time, and 
briefed him all the agreements reached at the Gedaref Conference, and eventually 
requested him to pass an order to the members of the old RC to cede their authority to 
the new Central Committee. After discussions, ups and downs, Galadewos agreed to 
comply with their demand. Thus the Central Committee took the position and 
authority of the RC and this was made public through a communiqué issued on 16 
March 1969.
88
 
In mid-1969, Zone One and Zone Two in the field decided to join the Tripartite Unity. 
The step taken by these two zones seemed to have been influenced by the 
developments witnessed among the ELF branches in the Sudan. Anyhow, the unity of 
the two zones with the Tripartite Unity was important in creating a unified command 
in the field, and this was materialized through a meeting held in Adobha, Eritrea, from 
10-25 August 1969. The Adobha Conference was attended by 102 delegates. Among 
other things, the conference called for: (1) the establishment of a provisional General 
Command to replace the old command based abroad; (2) the convening of a national 
congress within one year and formation of a Preparatory Committee for that purpose; 
(3) the formation of a commission of inquiry into past crimes of the ELF on the 
people and the fighters; (4) the formation of a committee to take charge of the 
properties of the organization; and (5) a declaration of the resolutions passed in the 
conference.
89
  
The General Command, also known as Al-Qiyadah Al-‘Ama, had 38 members: 18 
from the Tripartite Unity and 20 from the Zone One and Two. In terms of zonal 
representation on the General Command, the Tripartite Unity held fewer seats than 
the rest of the Zones. This was believed to have facilitated its domination by the 
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conservative supporters of Idris Mohammed Adem.
90
 In any case, the 38-man interim 
leadership was entrusted to supervise and lead the overall activities of the front inside 
Eritrea until a permanent body was elected at the anticipated national congress. A 
delegation from the field was sent to the ELF’s branches in Sudan, and conducted 
meetings with the Central Committee that assumed the position of the old RC after the 
Gedaref meeting. They informed them about the positive outcomes of the Adobha 
Conference and requested them to turn over their authority and property to the 
General Command. They also called them to join the united armies in the field. The 
Central Committee accepted their request and almost all members headed to the 
field.
91
 It was at this point of time that the RC was officially disbanded from the 
organizational structure of the ELF.  
With regard to the Supreme Council abroad, the highest organ of the ELF, the General 
Command decided to sustain the SC in power and its political activities abroad until 
the convention of the national congress. This was primarily intended to maintain the 
flow of financial and military aid from foreign countries. A finance organ entrusted 
with collecting and running funds obtained by the SC was established in the field.
92
 In 
October 1969 the General Command invited the SC to have a meeting within three 
months time. On this issue, the SC was divided into two: Sabbe refused while Idris 
Mohammed Adem and Galadewos agreed to comply with the General Command’s 
request. According to Sabbe, his refusal was motivated because he wanted to consult 
the others first.
93
 To assess the ongoing developments and activities of the ELF, 
Sabbe organized a meeting on November 15-18, 1969 in a PLO camp in Amman, 
Jordan, with different members of the ELF foreign branch offices.
94
 The meeting was 
carried out at the time when the protracted fight among the trios of the SC for the 
control of the organization had reached its climax. As a manifestation of this, Idris 
Mohammed Adem and Galadewos did not take part in the meeting. In their absence, 
Sabbe, in a bid to secure his own power base, reorganized the supreme leadership 
abroad and formed his own General Secretariat. With Sabbe as its Secretary General, 
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he excluded the two key members of the old SC and other deputies who were loyal to 
them. This raised a strong opposition from the Chairman of the SC, Idris Mohammed 
Adem, Galadewos, and others. Idris Mohammed Adem, in order to avoid such threat 
to his power, chose to stand on the side of the General Command and declared that he 
would accept its authority. By making reference to the understandings reached in the 
Adobha Conference, he and Galadewos together with other two deputies issued a 
statement arguing that the SC had no political power to amend or re-establish itself 
before the anticipated national conference was held. Thus, they labelled the newly 
established General Secretariat by Sabbe as void and illegal.
95
   
In the field, a committee primarily in charge of blending the armies in the different 
zones was set up. Since December 1969, the process was carried out first in Orota, 
then in Tahran, and finally in Kokolay, Eritrea, and it continued for the next three 
months. All in all, there were about 3000 ELF guerrillas fighters. About 23 
companies, with 133 fighters each, were established.
96
 The committee in charge of 
merging the guerrilla forces, however, encountered serious obstacles during the 
implementation process. Some members of the General Command from the Zone 
Four were not happy with the way the blending process was carried out. As a result, 
they resorted to maintain their old distinct zonal identity and autonomy, and began to 
communicate with Sabbe. The conservative majority of the General Command, after 
learning about these developments, incarcerated six of its members, all of them 
belonging to the fourth zone. People who objected to the decision faced 
imprisonment. Many others who were perceived as a threat to the General Command 
were also subjected to physical elimination.
97
 The General Command officially 
suspended the SC from its activities abroad after it failed to come to the field as 
requested. This was a big blow to the SC members, who were highly respected as 
founders of the ELF. Thus they were determined to do everything to ensure the 
continuity of their power. Sabbe considered it a ‘coup’ and resorted to express his 
opposition openly. He cut off the flow of funds from abroad and set up an office in 
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Khartoum where it welcomed and recruited dissidents who fled from the field.
98
 
Therefore, the political developments both in the field and abroad were generally 
favourable to bring the divisive trend in the organization to a climax.  
In the end, the modest outcomes that were achieved through the Adobha Conference 
appeared to have satisfied no one. The fragile unity of the different zone armies was 
short-lived. At the beginning of the second decade, therefore, a serious fracture 
emerged. This split, as we shall see it in the next chapter, had a lasting impact on the 
history of the organization.  
Clandestine Operations 
While the ELF was engulfed in factional strife at the turn of the first decade, its forces 
managed to conduct spectacular clandestine subversive operations which enabled 
them to win international publicity. The ELF guerrilla attacks were concentrated on 
Ethiopian economic and military installations. William Hall, the American 
Ambassador to Ethiopia, reported that in mid-1969 the ELF had “demonstrated its 
ability to strike selected targets using sophisticated guerrilla tactics more impressive 
than any used before.”99 As Araia noted the strength of the insurgents towards the end 
of the 1960s was strongly felt by the Ethiopian authorities in Eritrea. “Many of the 
communication facilities, especially, the roads, railways, and telecommunication 
lines, were no longer safe for uninterrupted commercial use. Some areas, especially 
the northern and western border areas of Eritrea were not under the control of the 
Ethiopian authorities. Some economic programmes and trade in this area were greatly 
slowed down for the affairs of the Ethiopian government to function at all.”100 
In a bid to draw some international publicity, the ELF also resorted to the field of 
hijacking and destroying Ethiopian civil aircraft. On March 11, 1969, an explosion 
ripped through an Ethiopian commercial plane Boeing 707 jet parked at Frankfurt, 
Germany, injuring several German workers who were cleaning the plane at the time 
of the explosion. Two days later, the ELF claimed responsibility for the damage on 
the Ethiopian plane. The statement said: “the ELF placed the explosives in the plane 
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as an act of revenge from the Ethiopian Airlines which participates in transporting 
Ethiopian soldiers into Eritrea where they have used to wage savage war of 
extermination against Eritrean innocent villages as reprisal for the defeats they suffer 
at the hands of the Eritrean Liberation Army…”101 The statement added that the ELF 
commandos activities on Ethiopian planes was not going to cease so long as the 
planes continue to transport Ethiopian soldiers to Eritrea. 
On 18 June 1969, another Ethiopian Airline Commercial jet Boeing 707 was attacked 
at Karachi, Pakistan. Three ELF commandos, armed with guns and lethal weapons 
infiltrated the premises of Karachi airport and damaged the plane badly. The three 
perpetrators were captured and imprisoned for eleven months after claiming that they 
had done it to achieve international publicity to the Eritrean cause.
102
 In addition to 
this, upon the anticipated visit of Emperor Haile Selassie to Italy in June, a plan to 
attack the Ethiopian Embassy in Italy was halted prematurely. The planned assailant 
was an Eritrean student in Cairo, who was recruited for the commando mission. On 
the 18
th
 of June, he blew himself up while he was preparing explosives in his room in 
Rome.
103
 On 13 September, another Ethiopian Airlines DC-6, which was bound to fly 
from Addis Ababa to Djibouti through Dire Dawa, was hijacked by three armed men 
from the ELF and forcibly taken to Aden. On landing, one of the three was shot by 
Ethiopian security guards on the aircraft and the rest were captured by the police. The 
last in these series of events was carried out on December 12 on another Ethiopian 
Boeing 707 in Madrid, Spain, by two armed members of the ELF. Shortly after the 
plane took off, the two men, in an unsuccessful bid of hijacking, were shot by a 
plainclothes Ethiopian security guard on the aircraft. A third suspect who was  
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A destroyed road leading into Massawa, 
between Nefasit and Embatkala. 
Damaged railroad leading to Agordat, 
between Hagaz and Dae’rotay. 
Figure 7. Some of the destroyed roads and railroads in the late 1960s. 
Source: Eritrean Popular Police Force, “YAertra Ras Gez Hzbawi Police Tarik…,” 52. 
 
  
  
 
Figure 8. A scene of a derailed train in Ashadira on its way to Agordat, 1970. 
Source: Research and Documentation Centre, Eritrea. An ELF fighter who participated in the operation 
recounts that the fighters first loosened the railroad spikes the night before the event. As the train 
headed towards the bridge, they stopped it first and discharged all its passengers and train driver only 
to let the train be derailed as shown in the pictures. The story was drawn from: Tesfay Tekle, interview 
by Zemhret Yohannes, ND, NP, audiocassette, RDC. 
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believed to have been connected with the above-mentioned attempts was arrested by 
the Spanish police at Madrid airport with explosives.
104
  
All the above-mentioned military operations contributed a lot in gaining wider 
international publicity. Nevertheless, the internal factional strife was the stumbling 
block for ELF’s political progress. The next chapter of its history is the history of 
fragmentation and internecine warfare. 
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Chapter Four: Fragmentation and Civil War: 1970-1974  
Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have seen the process through which the ELF emerged 
and expanded country-wide. By introducing a new military strategy that divided 
Eritrea into five zones of operation, the ELF was able to grow and spread itself widely 
through the first decade. However, the social landscape of Eritrea, which was then 
divided along ethnic, religious, and regional lines, on the one hand, and the failure of 
the leadership to properly manage the strategy, and create an all-embracing, 
disciplined, accountable and effectively centralized organization, on the other, 
affected the implementation of the strategy negatively. As a result, Zonal commanders 
became more powerful than their superiors and often reacted with brutality to 
perceived threats. Ethnic and religious sectarianism and intense rivalry developed 
within and between the different zones, which even led to zone commanders failing to 
help each other during time of war, thereby weakening the organization severely. 
Consequently, ELF failed to consolidate its gains. The growing discontent and 
grievances among the increasingly diverse fighters, however, gave rise to the 
emergence of rebellious forces who sought to reform the organization from within. 
Their effort succeeded in bringing the armies under a single interim leadership called 
the General Command. The unity of the armies in the field, however, did not succeed 
in bringing unity at the top. Members of the old Supreme Council became divided and 
suspicious of each other. Thus, the unity of the armies gained at the Adobha 
Conference only achieved limited and temporary success. What happened in the 
beginning of the subsequent decade was a serious disintegration that reduced the size 
of the ELF’s army considerably.  
This chapter examines the proliferation of different independent politico-military 
organizations from the ‘mother organization’ and how the ELF reacted and 
legitimated its measures through resolutions passed during its first organizational 
congress. Furthermore, the subsequent civil war that went on for over two years and 
the underlying reasons that brought it to a halt shall be briefly addressed.  
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Disintegration and Reorganization 
When Sabbe officially abolished the old Supreme Council and in its place formed a 
General Secretariat in Amman, Jordan, the rest of the members of SC and their 
associates aligned to stand against Sabbe’s coalition. Thus the former SC was split 
into two. This is to say: Idris Mohammed Adem and Galadewos versus Sabbe.
1
    
Inside the field, the interim General Command lost control of the critical internal 
political situation. It became increasingly brutal and intolerant to any sort of 
opposition or perceived threats. Many dreadful incidents happened that eventually 
exacerbated the political situation and accelerated the pace of the fragmentation in the 
ELF. Mentioning two incidents suffice to show the notoriety of the General 
Command. The first example concerns the incident that happened over the newly 
arrived Christian fighters who joined in hundreds from Addis Ababa and other parts 
of Ethiopia in the late 1960s. The ELF dubbed their unit in Arabic as Seryet Addis 
(‘Forces of Addis’), to signify their place of origin. The ELF detained the group 
apparently on suspicion of being agents of Ethiopia’s secret police and security 
services. Many of them experienced brutal interrogation, and considerable of them 
were killed in early 1970.
2
 As a result, it was reported that between September 1969 
and August 1970, about two hundred and eighty-one guerrilla fighters surrendered to 
the Ethiopian government.
3
 Moreover, on the orders of the General Command, two 
prominent ELF Christian cadres in Sudan called Kidane Kiflu and Welday Gidey, 
who were known for their radical and reformist ideas, were knifed to death in Kassala, 
Sudan, by ELF officials after failing to kidnap them forcibly across the border into 
Eritrea.
4
  
The impact of these events was generally disastrous. The brutality and persecution 
instilled fear and panic among fighters and became too much to bear. For many 
Christian fighters the viciousness of the General Command became evidence that the 
General Command was not in a position to welcome the participation of the Christian 
fighters in any significant degree. In other words, the fighters had come to the point 
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where they could no longer stay in the organization. The breakdown of the fragile 
unity, therefore, was an inevitable fact. Fighters from ex-Zone Four, including their 
Commander, defected en masse from ELF ranks and fled to Sudan. Many other 
fighters also went to Sudan through excuses of sickness, leave, mission, etc and 
regrouped there.
5
 Others, who were earlier campaigning for the formation of a united 
army and structure, and for convening of the congress at Adobha, left the organization 
in a bid for self preservation and moved to places out of the reach of the General 
Command. As a result, three different splinter groups emerged in the Eritrean political 
arena. 
In early 1970, one splinter group, predominantly composed of Muslims from the 
Massawa-Hirgigo area, gathered in the Sudanese border town of Kassala. Over 300 of 
these fighters were flown from Sudan to Aden, Yemen, using charter Air. The 
transportation was carried out in successive flights. From Aden, they were ferried to 
the coastal area of Southern Dankalia, where they were joined by several hundred 
other fighters from the Semhar region led by Mohammed Ali Omaro, former 
Commander of Zone Four, and Romedan Mohammed Nur.
6
 The master mind behind 
all this coordination and organization was Osman Saleh Sabbe who had already been 
preparing for such an eventuality by forming his own Beirut-based General 
Secretariat in opposition to the General Command.
7
 From 24 June to 3 July 1970, they 
convened a founding conference at a place called Sedho-Ela, Southern Dankalia, and 
formed the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF-I). The meeting elected a nine-man 
leadership with Mohammed Ali Omaro as a chairman, Mesfin Hagos, Mohammed 
Umer Abdela “Abu Tiyara”, Alamin Mohammed Seid, and few other members. The 
leadership, however, failed to reach a consensus regarding the place where the 
principal base area should be. Consequently, the majority remained in South Dankalia 
while a smaller group set off for the northern Sahel. Nevertheless, the split was soon 
rectified through a joint meeting held in Embahra in July 1970 and unification of the 
two sub-factions took place. The leadership formed earlier in Sedho-Ela was replaced 
by a new five-man
8
 command, led by Romedan Mohammed Nur, who was sent to  the 
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People’s Republic of China, in 1967, for a guerrilla warfare training, along with Isaias 
Afwerki and three others.
9
  
In March 1970, another faction, primarily composed of Christian highlanders, split off 
and set out for the Ala area in the eastern part of the highlands of Eritrea. They 
established the Eritrean Freedom Party (Selfi Natsinet Ertra) through a conference 
carried out in Tekhli between 13 to15 August 1971. The meeting elected a five-man
10
 
leadership led by Isaias Afwerki, the former political commissar of Zone Five and 
member of the General Command. The name of the splinter group was later changed 
into the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF-II). Due to the prevailing ethnic, religious 
and regional schism, some Tigrinya-speaking Christian fighters, such as Mesfin 
Hagos who received military training in Syria in 1967-68, abandoned PLF-I and 
joined the Christian dominated PLF-II.
11
 
Meanwhile, in November 1970, another Beni Amer faction from the Barka region 
split off from the ELF and held its first meeting that gave rise to a third splinter group 
known as the Obel. The name of this opposition group was derived from the seasonal 
stream in the northern Barka, where the founding meeting was held. The Obel group 
was led by four members of the General Command, mainly Beni Amer.
12
 They 
announced that they would no longer be bound by the General Command and released 
the six members of the General Command who had been in prison for more than a 
year.
13
 They were prompted by “a complex mix of personal ambitions and tribalist 
sentiment”14 which, according to Sabbe, resulted from their dissatisfaction with the 
domination of the second region (specifically the Bilen) and of Saho group. Thus, 
“they thought of themselves as being the main force of the front but losing ground.”15 
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Unlike the other two splinter groups, the Obel attempted to engage in dialogue and 
attended successive military conference with the General Command of the ELF. The 
official announcement of the Obel’s secession from the ELF was published at the end 
of December 1971.
16
  
Fighters from the ELF were not only defecting to join the splinter groups, but also 
deserting to the enemy. As mentioned earlier about two hundred and eighty-one 
guerrillas had surrendered to the Ethiopian government from September 1969 to 
August 1970.
17
 A majority of the ELF fighters, however, remained loyal to the old 
organization and continued to operate under the leadership of the General Command. 
By the end of 1971, therefore, the Eritrean nationalist political arena contained four 
independent political groups: PLF-I, PLF-2, the Obel, and the ELF proper presided by 
the interim General Command. Each splinter group attempted to portray itself as 
democratic and progressive group, offering an alternative viable organization to the 
ELF.
18
 
The national congress which was supposed to be held no later than September 1970 
was suspended for more than two years. Realizing the repercussion of the ongoing 
fragmentation and depletion of its forces, ELF’s General Command attempted to 
rectify the problem by calling a general meeting to prepare the necessary ground for 
the implementation of the national congress. Invitations were sent only to the PLF-I 
and PLF-II since the Obelites did not officially pronounce their breakaway at this 
particular time. But none of them accepted the invitation. The meeting, which became 
known as the Awate Camp Military Conference, was held from 26 February to 13 
March, 1971. About 300 fighters representing different sectors attended the meeting. 
According to the ELF, the Conference was undertaken “to take practical steps to 
narrow the schism and end division through the long awaited national congress.”19 
The conference decided (1) to enlarge the size of the Preparatory Committee for the 
forthcoming national congress; and (2) to keep the General Command in power until 
the anticipated conference was held. In a bid to solve the problem with the splinter 
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groups through dialogue, a contact committee was formed and approached the 
‘dissidents’, but to no avail.20  
In spite of the tense political situation, the ELF managed to conduct its first Congress 
from October 14 to November 12, 1971 at Arr in northern Eritrea. The Congress was 
attended by over 500 delegates representing the fighters in the field, the former 
Supreme Council, the Eritrean refugees in Sudan, friendly States as well as journalists 
from abroad. The splinter groups refused to attend the conference on the ground that 
they had no guarantee for their security so long as the very members of the General 
Command that put its critics behind bars were still in power.
21
 
 
Figure 9. The First Congress of the ELF, Arr, Novemeber1971. A Syrian journalist is shown holding a 
camera. 
Source: Research and Documentation Centre, Eritrea. 
The Congress adopted a new political and military programme intended to serve the 
ELF as guiding principle to achieve its national objectives. It proclaimed that the 
Eritrean Revolution was a national democratic revolution and clearly defined the aims 
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and objectives of the Eritrean independence struggle under the auspices of the ELF.
22
 
The Congress replaced the provisional General Command with a thirteen-man 
Revolutionary Council led by Idris Mohammed Adem, former chairman of the 
revoked SC. While Herui Tedla, the only Christian of the thirteen, assumed the 
position of vice-chairman and head of political affairs, Abdella Idris and Azen Yassin 
took charge of military affairs and foreign relations respectively. Additionally, the 
Congress elected an eighteen-man executive body and Ibrahim Idris Totil was named 
chairman.
23
 
 The Congress condemned the schism and lines of division pursued by splinter 
groups. The first statement of the resolution affirmed that “the experience of the 
Eritrean revolution demonstrates that the Eritrean field cannot accommodate more 
than one organization and leadership.”24 The Congress thus called on the ‘dissident’ 
fighters, particularly from the PLF-I and the Obelites: (1) to abide by the political and 
military programmes adopted by the congress; and (2) to return to their respective 
units in the liberation army within a specific time frame. The Congress further warned 
the dissidents, saying, “If they fail to do so, the ELF had the right to solve the disunity 
by applying the necessary military means.”25 With regard to the PLF-II (the Ala 
group), taking into consideration its social constituency and sensitivity, the congress 
decided to handle the issue with extra caution and decided to solve it through 
dialogue. Pool pointed out that “sensitive to the legacy of the killing of the Christian 
fighters, the Ala group was not initially a target.”26 Thus, apart from the others, a 
special appeal was sent to the PLF-II. But they refused and moved to the more 
inaccessible hills of Ala.
27
 The resolution passed by the Congress was a serious 
ultimatum, implying a declaration of war on the breakaway factions. Indeed it set the 
stage for the civil war that followed. 
Programmatically, the ELF recognized the equality of all ethno-linguistic groups, and 
adopted Tigrinya and Arabic as the official languages in conducting all activities in 
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the ELF. It should be noted that Tigrinya and Arabic had been Eritrea’s two official 
languages when the UN-sponsored Federation was implemented in 1952. In order to 
enhance the popular base of the struggle, the congress decided to form mass 
organizations for workers, peasants, students, and women with the right to establish 
their independent programmes through congresses.
28
   
In November 1971, the PLF-II (the Ala group), issued its first manifesto that clearly 
elaborated the reasons for their breakaway and stated their objectives and 
programmes. The manifesto denounced the sectarian nature of the ELF and its Islamic 
orientation and misrepresentation of the Eritrean armed struggle as an ‘Arab’ cause 
fought by ‘Muslims’ against a ‘Christian country’, Ethiopia. The ELF was criticized 
for having rallied “in the name of Islam rather than in the name of the Eritrean 
people.”29 The document further defined its status by stating that: 
We are freedom fighters and not prophets of Christianity…our conviction is that… 
when Eritrean Muslims are oppressed, it is the oppression of the Eritrean people; and 
when Eritrean Christians are oppressed, it is also the oppression of the Eritrean 
people. We do not recognize that oppression discriminates on the basis of religion… 
We reiterate that we are fighting against oppression and for the unity of our people, 
without any recourse to religion…[Thus] we are Eritreans not Arabs!... When we line 
up with the struggle with our Arab comrades, it is only because of our revolutionary 
conviction and dictates of our strategic relationship, and not because we are Arabs or 
Muslims.
30
 
The manifesto illustrated the determination of the PLF-II to eradicate all forms of 
social, economic and gender-based inequalities alongside the struggle to achieve 
political independence.
31
  
Sabbe and his group, who denounced the ELF’s first Congress, were determined to 
challenge the leadership of the ELF. He began to coordinate the activities of the 
splinter groups. Unlike the PLF-II who enjoyed the patronage from Sabbe, the act of 
breaking away presented the rest of the splinter groups with serious logistical 
challenges. It should be recalled that, at the outset, they did not have an external 
patron who could provide them with the necessary arms and other supplies. Above all, 
ELF’s ultimatum and threat of extermination posed the greatest danger to their 
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survival. In the face of such a critical challenge, they sought to resolve their 
commonly shared problem through the formation of a united front. Shumet Sishagne, 
an Ethiopian scholar, describes the symbiotic relationship that existed between the 
three splinter groups as follows: “Each of these groups had something to offer to the 
other. Sabby’s group [PLF-I], although depleted in numbers, was well funded by 
sympathetic Arab countries. Issayas’ group [PLF-II], although poorly equipped, could 
boast of a potential recruiting ground in the highlands and the urban centres. The Obel 
faction, although few in numbers, was the only force which could claim support in 
western Eritrea and as such was potentially important for any future expansion 
towards this area.”32 
After preliminary meetings carried out in 1971, Sabbe sponsored the alliance of the 
three factions through an agreement signed in Beirut in February 1972. Among other 
things, they agreed: (1) first to consider their difference as secondary issue, since it 
could be solved through a broader meeting in the field; (2) to divide all external 
supplies equally among the three groups; (3) to retain their organizational 
independence until a united conference was held no later than a year; and (4) that 
Sabbe to take charge of the Foreign Mission through his General Secretariat.
33
  
Accordingly, in October 1972, a meeting of the three splinter groups was held at 
Gehteb, on the Sudanese border. They formed an interim transitional joint military 
administration, whereby they were put under a centralized leadership while 
simultaneously retaining their organizational names.
34
 
The alliance of the splinter groups was viewed as a serious threat to the ‘mother 
organization’, the ELF. The Revolutionary Council of the ELF (hereafter referred to 
as ELF-RC), on 22 February 1972, three months from its first Congress, passed a 
resolution that approved a war of liquidation on the splinter groups, especially the 
PLF-I (Sabbe’s group) and Obel group. With regard to the PLF-I, as mentioned 
earlier, their case was treated as special case, owing to regional and sectarian 
sensitivities. When the war began the ELF attempted to persuade PLF-II to remain 
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neutral since the military operation was not directed against them. But the “PLF-II 
was not convinced, rather, it interpreted the appeal as the ELF’s tactic to liquidate the 
different factions one by one.”35  
The initial civil war began in February 1972 with an attack on the Obel forces. Some 
twenty Obelites, including leaders, were encircled and placed under the control of the 
ELF in a place called Bisha, west of Agordat. The rest of Obel forces who were 
stationed in the upper Barka region surrendered without any trouble. The ELF fighters 
then proceeded to eliminate the PLF-I and between March 3 and May 11, 1972 alone, 
they conducted about sixteen engagements at different places of the Sahel region, the 
principal base of the PLF-I. Within those ten weeks time alone, an estimated death toll 
of over 190 and over 270 casualties on both sides was claimed by the PLF-I. 
According to the PLF Foreign Mission, the Eritrean armed struggle had never 
experienced such human catastrophe when fighting against Ethiopian troops over the 
past two years.
36
  
The ELF’s declaration of war, nonetheless, accelerated the unification of PLF-I and 
PLF-II. In August 1973, a complete merger was enacted which formed the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Forces (EPLF). Whereas some Obel members who remained 
behind joined the EPLF, others opted to flee to the Sudan.
37
 In the first half of 1970s, 
the ELF was pretty much occupied with ensuring that the political adversaries were 
liquidated or at least driven out of Eritrea.  
The civil war came to an end in December 1974. There are several explanations 
concerning the factors that contributed to the end of the civil war. Prominent among 
these was the pressure exerted by the civilian Eritrean population to bring it to a halt. 
This popular initiative for cessation of hostilities between the organizations came 
about when the war escalated in the highlands. While the ELF had little influence in 
the highlands, the EPLF had already established a base at Solomuna in Sahel, directly 
below Zagher village, on the slope of the Eritrean plateau. In August 1974, two twin 
villages, Woki and Zagher became the site of a series of pitched battles between the 
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ELF based in Zagher and the EPLF in Woki. In the following month, the local 
population from the environs intervened, and pleaded to fighters to negotiate a cease-
fire. The efforts of the villagers for a peaceful settlement attracted other people from 
the highlands anxious to put more pressure for the civil war to be brought to a halt. In 
October, about 30,000 civilians, mostly from the capital, marched to the Zagher 
village, urging both liberation movements to initiate negotiation and put an end to the 
civil war. On October 13, 1974, a formal ELF-EPLF cease-fire was signed, marking 
the end of the first civil war between these two organizations.
38
   
A second contributing factor to the end of the civil war was the strategy adopted by 
the EPLF and its ability to counteract the offensive from the ELF. The EPLF during 
the war employed “a defensive posture and refused to attack, but at the same time 
proved to be militarily and politically a formidable opponent.”39 The ELF, for its part, 
realized that “it could not conclude the civil war to its benefit.”40  
In connection to this, the internal political situation and the revolution in Ethiopia was 
a stimulating factor for the case in point. From 1972-73, a series of developments led 
to the fall of the regime of Haile Selassie, Ethiopia’s last emperor. Although structural 
problems and inequalities, such as unequal landholding systems, form the major root 
causes, the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution was sparked by a number of conjectural 
factors. Chief among these were: “military inability to quash the Eritrean guerrillas; 
corrupt officers profiteering from war; low salaries; the lack of adequate food and 
water supplies exacerbated by the drought of 1972-1973; and the ineptness of the 
aging emperor.”41 Through a “creeping coup” a committee made up of middle and 
lower ranking officers, the Dergue, assumed power in Ethiopia on 12 September 
1974. The deposed Emperor was arrested and the Dergue declared the transfer of 
government power to a Provisional Military Advisory Committee, the PMAC. In 
November, the Chairman of the Dergue, General Aman Andom, himself of Eritrean 
origin, took initiatives to bring about a negotiated political settlement to the war in 
Eritrea. He conducted mass meetings in Asmara and Keren while calling for 
Ethiopian unity. Aman basically proposed the introduction of administrative reforms, 
the provision of general amnesty to fighters, and most importantly, in October, he 
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came up with the idea of a federal solution to Eritrea. Both liberation movements 
rejected his proposal and reaffirmed their commitment to full independence.
42
 
However, the fall of Haile Selassie and the Dergue’s policy towards the Eritrean 
question demanded the urgent end of the war between the opposing and rival 
liberation movements.
43
 
As we shall see in the next chapter, it is important to underline the fact that the end of 
the civil war and the official truce negotiated in Woki-Zagher enabled both liberation 
movements to concentrate and deploy their forces fully against their common enemy 
without being distracted in internecine warfare. This was clear in early 1975 when 
they embarked a joint offensive on Asmara in an attempt to seize the city. The 
forthcoming chapter will address the political and military development of the ELF 
between 1975 and 1981. 
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Chapter Five: The ELF: From Territorial Expansion to 
Historical Expulsion, 1975-1981 
Introduction 
In this final chapter an attempt is made to trace important historical developments that 
shaped the course of ELF history from 1975 to 1981. These developments include 
both military and political aspects that characterized the internal and external 
dynamics of the movement. In examining these issues, special attention will be given 
to finding answers as to why the ELF could not forge the set of aims of unity and 
efficiency as a movement, and why and how it finally collapsed. 
Military and Political Developments, 1975-1978 
Three outstanding developments distinguish the period under examination, 1975-78. 
These are: (1) the ability of the Eritrean nationalists to capture most of the Eritrean 
territory towards the end of 1977, (2) the mobilization and massive participation of 
youth by the ELF, and (3) the complex efforts undertaken to unify the various 
factions.
1
 On 31 January 1975, after the end of the internecine war between ELF and 
EPLF, both movements, taking the opportunity offered by the enemy’s weakness (the 
Ethiopian state forces), launched an offensive on Asmara in an attempt to control the 
city. A couple of weeks later, the ELF freed over one thousand political prisoners 
from Asmara and Adi Quala prisons.
2
 After a few weeks of fighting the Eritrean 
forces were repelled from the city. The Dergue concluded that the offensive was made 
possible because of the collaboration of the local people. The security and military 
forces directly took measures to retaliate on the residents of the capital and the 
surrounding villages. This was perhaps the first time that the Eritrean plateau was 
attacked at large. The situation of the youth in particular became increasingly 
difficult. Dawit Wolde Giorgis, an Ethiopian official who served as Deputy Chief of 
Relief and Rehabilitation and later as Deputy Foreign Minister, wrote that in Asmara, 
“…civilians, young and old, were indiscriminately massacred, either in the crossfire 
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during the battle or as suspected rebel collaborators. The army’s excesses drove 
thousands to the guerrillas, and those that were left behind seriously questioned their 
allegiance to the Ethiopian Revolution. Henceforth, many highland Eritreans, 
particularly young people, either went out in the field to join the guerrillas or became 
clandestinely involved in the movements.”3  
The flow of young educated Eritreans, men and women, to the field altered the ELF 
both in terms of quantitative and qualitative aspect. The EPLF, too, experienced a 
dramatic growth in the number of new recruits in the armed struggle. Before mid-
1974, the number of active fighters in both rebel camps was estimated at 2000-2500; 
but in early 1975, the estimates increased to 6000-15,000 and by the middle of 1976, 
the number of insurgents reached around 30,000-45,000.
4
 The figures appear inflated, 
though; it included barely trained militia forces and frontline combatants. For the first 
time, the ELF army was organized at battalion and brigade levels.
5
  
The numerical change also brought about a qualitative change in the ELF’s 
organizational composition. Most of the new recruits were composed of urban, 
educated – secondary-school graduates and University students – and former 
members of Ethiopian Police and Commandos. They also brought important 
technically skilled people, such as clerks, mechanics, drivers, accountants, doctors 
etc.
6
 Moreover, a considerable proportion of the ELF rank-and-file came to be 
composed of Christians.
7
 All this contributed to bring about profound ideological, 
organizational, and political changes.  
In May 1975, the ELF held its Second National Congress and confirmed the ceasefire 
with the EPLF through a resolution that called for “a democratic dialogue for ending 
secondary contradictions.”8 The Congress removed Idris Mohammed Adem from the 
chairmanship of the Revolutionary Council and replaced him with Ahmed 
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Mohammed Nasser, a young man who was trained in Syria and Ibrahim Totil was 
elected for the post of Vice Chairman.
9
 
In the following months, the ELF-RC, through its Chairman, Ahmed Mohammed 
Nasser, opened negotiation with Osman Saleh Sabbe, who was in charge of the 
EPLF’s Foreign Mission. Sabbe went forward to try and realize the ‘unity’ of the two 
fronts without consulting the forces in the field. The negotiations were conducted in 
July and August of 1975 in Beirut and Baghdad. On 8 September, a unity agreement 
was finally concluded in Khartoum, by which a unifying congress was to be held 
within a short period of time. As a manifestation of a major step in the effort to unify 
the two liberation movements, a joint delegation led by Ahmed Mohammed Nasser 
and Osman Saleh Sabbe, visited their Arab supporters in the Middle East − an 
experience happening for the first time in the history of the Eritrean armed struggle.
10
 
However, the understanding reached in Sudan angered the field-based EPLF forces, 
and they immediately held a meeting in North Bahri district. The meeting was a large 
affair attended by nearly a hundred delegates. The EPLF stated that Sabbe: 
“…illegally and in an unprincipled manner and without authorization or warrant, and 
because of external pressure, held several meetings with the leadership of the ELF and 
adopted several joint resolutions with it…The Foreign Mission considered itself the 
sole lawful agent to represent the EPLF in Khartoum meeting without having a power 
of attorney from the EPLF. Therefore, …[EPLF’s] position on the resolutions and 
recommendations of Khartoum meeting… [was] point-blank rejection.”11 
The ELF sought the formation of a “national democratic front” by merging all 
nationalist organizations through a congress. Whereas, the EPLF argued that 
unification of the two organizations “should come gradually and by stages and by 
means of numerous programs of action, [that would eventually lead] to the emergence 
of one democratic and revolutionary organization.”12  
Since late 1974, the relation between the Foreign Mission abroad and the EPLF field-
based leadership was continuously deteriorating. The question of the distribution of 
funds belonging to the movement was a major source of disagreement, despite the fact 
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that they nominally had created a clear functional division of power. Sabbe’s prime 
job was to collect funds from abroad, while the leadership in the field took charge of 
leading the fighters.
13
 But this time, Sabbe, by signing an agreement with the ELF-RC 
on behalf of the EPLF, singlehandedly, generated a further organizational split. 
Consequently, the EPLF repudiated the agreement reached in Khartoum and broke off 
their relations with the Foreign Mission in March 1976.
14
 
By mobilizing some fighters, Sabbe resorted to establishing his own organization 
known as the Eritrean Liberation Front−People’s Liberation Forces, the ELF-PLF. 
Delighted with this new turn of events, the ELF-RC recognized the ELF-PLF as an 
independent third organization in the Eritrean political arena. They also allowed 
Sabbe to set up a camp in the northwestern part of Eritrea where he managed to 
mobilize some two thousand fighters by early 1977.
15
 The movement, however, never 
became a major competing force. For tactical reasons, it was thought that the ELF 
kept Sabbe as a factor to be manipulated in the contest with the EPLF.
16
 But the 
relations of ELF-RC with Sabbe generated a lot of controversy among the rank-and-
file of the ELF, as we shall see later in a separate section. 
While negotiations for unity proceeded, the ELF and EPLF also stepped up their war 
efforts against the Dergue. In response, the Dergue launched an operation code-
named “Raza”, in which more than 100,000 peasants from Shoa, Gojjam, Tigray, and 
Gondar were recruited to serve as a militia to supplement the weary soldiers of the 
regular army fighting at the Eritrean front.
17
 Tens of thousands of these peasants were 
ordered to march into Eritrea. The rationale behind such a plan was by intimidation of 
numbers to threaten the nationalist movements, deter their activities and send a 
message that the entire population of Ethiopia was determined to defeat them. But 
these peasants were barely trained and ill-equipped with virtually no logistical 
support. They set out the march in crowds, singing war songs, like in the old days. 
The result was disastrous. Before reaching Eritrea, heavy damages were inflicted on 
the peasant militia by the ELF, EPLF, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF). Founded in 1975, the TPLF was an ethno-nationalist movement in Ethiopia 
                                                 
13
 Erlich, 88.  
14
 Ibid., 89. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Markakis, National and Class..., 140. 
17
 Dawit, 89. 
111 
 
 
 
that revolted against the Dergue regime, demanding self-rule for the province of 
Tigray (bordering Eritrea) within the wider Ethiopian state.
18
 As a result of this 
combined attack, the peasants suffered a horrifying carnage, in which more than 
25,000 of them were killed,
19
 about 700 were captured by the ELF and the rest 
dispersed haphazardly to save their lives.
20
 
After the fiasco of the peasant march, the Dergue announced a nine-point peace plan. 
Accordingly, the plan “affirmed that the right of self-determination of nationalities 
can be guaranteed through regional autonomy which takes due account of objective 
realities prevailing in Ethiopia…”21 However, the plan was rejected straightforward 
by the ELF and the EPLF, and both movements continued their military operations 
throughout 1976.  
In January 1977, the EPLF held its First Organizational Congress in Sahel. The 
Congress adopted an 11-point political program that envisaged the establishment of 
an independent, secular, and egalitarian state in Eritrea. The Congress elected a 43-
member Central Committee and an executive body known as the Political Bureau, 
made up of 13 top members of the Central Committee. The Congress reinstated 
Romedan Mohammed Nur and Issaias Afwerki as Secretary-general and deputy 
respectively.
22
 The Congress adopted a new insignia and passed a resolution to 
rename the EPLF from Force to Front. Although the EPLF started to reorganize in 
1973, it had never referred to itself as a “front” until its first congress. The change of 
name seemed to indicate EPLF’s intention to portray itself as the ‘true and only 
representative of the Eritrean people’: a concept argued by the ELF before the end of 
the civil war in late 1974.
23
  
Meanwhile, the ELF and EPLF launched a joint offensive on the city of Asmara and 
other parts of Eritrea starting from the second half of 1976. The seizure of towns and 
villages proceeded at an unprecedented pace. ELF managed to capture a string of 
towns in the western lowlands such as Tesseney, Aligeder, Geluj, and Omhajer. An 
                                                 
18
 See Erlich, 73-74, 76.  
19
 Dawit, 88-90. 
20
 Ahferom Tewolde, interview by Michael Weldeghiorghis, Asmara, Eritrea, 28-29 January 2014. 
21
 Ibid., 90. 
22
 Both of them had been comrades since their trip to China for training in 1967. 
23
 Erlich, 91; Markakis, National and Class..., 142-144; Ruth, 116. 
112 
 
 
 
offensive to capture Barentu was launched, but was repelled.
24
 In conjunction with 
this, on July 13, 1977, an all-out war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia over 
the disputed region of Ogaden, an arid region in southeastern Ethiopia.
25
 As a result of 
Somali invasion, a significant proportion of Ethiopian troops were relocated to face 
the Somali forces. The reduced size of government troops helped the nationalist 
momentum in Eritrea.
26
 As a result, between August and September 1977, the ELF 
took control of Mendefera, Adi Quala and Agordat. As the war continued, ELF also 
captured the small coastal town of Beilul and other fishing villages, such as Berasole 
and Edi on the southeastern seaboard of Eritrea. The EPLF, on the other hand, 
occupied towns on the northern slopes (in the Sahel and Keren provinces) and jointly 
with the ELF moved their forces into the central highlands. By the end of the year, 
about ninety percent of the total landmass of Eritrea fell under the control of the 
nationalist movements. Only Asmara, Adi-Qeyeh, Barentu and the port cities of 
Massawa and Assab remained in the Ethiopian government’s control.27  
When victory of the Eritrean nationalists seemed within grasp, a series of negotiations 
for unity resumed between the ELF and EPLF. On October 20, 1977, through the 
mediation of Sudanese President, Jaafar Nimeiry, the two rival fronts signed an 
agreement in Khartoum in order to revitalize the idea of creating a united national 
democratic front. Ahmed Mohammed Nasser, Chairman of the ELF-RC, and Isaias 
Afwerki, representing the EPLF, agreed to establish a joint supreme political 
leadership and joint committees on military, information, economic, social, and 
foreign affairs while both fronts retain their organizational independence until the 
final merger process would culminate in unification.
28
 In this effort, Sabbe’s 
organization was left out and the ELF withdrew its earlier recognition of ELF-PLF as 
an official third independent organization. ELF’s tactical relation with them was 
short-lived. The ELF and EPLF finally called Sabbe’s group to join one of the two 
fronts; but Sabbe, who was determined to regain his own political legitimacy, refused 
to comply with their request and insisted on unity on the basis of equality among the 
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three organizations.
29
 In retrospect, his choices appeared to have been motivated by 
personal and ideological rivalries. The history of Sabbe’s political career shows that 
he was a kind of divisive and enigmatic person. He was always determined to create 
and assure his own power base when ever there was fluid situation in the Eritrean 
political arena. 
The continuous tension between the ELF and EPLF delayed the implementation of the 
understanding reached in Khartoum. It was not until March 1978 that the joint 
supreme political leadership and the five joint committees of a National Democratic 
Front were set up. In May, the joint supreme political leadership convened in Keren 
and decided to resume their military cooperation and to establish a four-man 
preparatory committee responsible for undertaking the necessary preparations for the 
anticipated national congress. The committee was to report its activities to the joint 
supreme political leadership in not later than six months. Moreover, both fronts 
agreed to end recriminations and avoid the use of pejorative adjectives such as 
‘Amma’30 or ‘counter-revolutionary’ in order to refer each other. In this meeting, 
Sabbe’s ELF-PLF was again ostracized by the other two movements and its members 
were asked to join either the ELF or EPLF. Yet Sabbe, despite their repeated calls, 
still refused to disband his organization.
31
  
Internal Dissention in the ELF 
During the second half of 1977, the ELF underwent serious internal dissent and 
turmoil. The problem started among Christian fighters who were dissatisfied with the 
leadership. Its origins were in fact thought to be found in the removal of Herui Tedla 
from the Revolutionary Council in 1975. Herui was the only Christian of the thirteen 
members of the ELF-RC from 1971-74. During this period, ELF rank-and-file was 
surging with new recruits and a significant proportion of them were Christians. Before 
the second congress was convened, new recruits in ELF demanded equal 
representation, but the leadership refused to grant them voting rights equal to those of 
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old members, who were mostly Muslims.
32
 Instead, they were provided with only a 
quarter of the posts in that congress.
33
 As a result of the limited votes, the outcome of 
the elections at the congress was affected considerably. For instance, of the forty-one 
members elected in the ELF-RC in 1975, only twelve were Christians, despite the fact 
that they were the majority within the ELF. Due to this, Herui was voted out of the 
front’s leadership. In response, he refused to accept the results of the elections. 
Consequently, he resorted to mobilize support from the rank-and-file fighters by 
accusing the leadership of deliberately suppressing Christian aspirations. Together 
with some Christian members of the ELF-RC, Herui formed a clandestine Marxist or 
Marxist-oriented group known in Tigrinya as Ma Gu.
34
 Thus, the ELF leadership was 
once again confronted with a reformist group, mostly Christian radicals or rather 
rebels. 
In 1976, the Christian members began to criticize the organization “for its practice of 
patronage politics, corrupt leadership, lack of ideological clarity and its undermining 
of the EPLF [by making divisive agreement with Sabbe].”35 Their initial demands did 
not appear to seek secession from the ELF; rather seemed to democratize the 
organization from within. They called for organizational reforms and also demanded 
for a fresh congress to be held in order to debate on a broad range of policy issues. 
Chief among these was the relationship between ELF and EPLF and the question of 
uniting the fronts. Meanwhile, fighters were secretly mobilized through the 
distribution and circulation of pamphlets.
36
 
The open insubordination began in the second half of 1976, when ELF-RC officially 
recognized the Foreign Mission (ELF-PLF) as a third organization within the Eritrean 
nationalist fold. This recognition generated opposition among many sectors of the 
organization, which eventually led to the repudiation of the decision to recognize the 
ELF-PLF. They argued that the Foreign Mission was part of the EPLF organization, 
and Sabbe was nothing more than an individual who took charge of foreign affairs. 
Hence, to recognize Sabbe as a separate organization and conducting a unity 
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agreement with him was unacceptable to many ELF fighters. They urged the ELF-RC 
to withdraw the resolution and declare unity only with the EPLF fighters in the field.
37
 
The ELF-RC, however, refused to do so. Dissatisfied with the leadership and 
uncertain of its genuine desire to resolve the unity with the EPLF, they decided to 
split from the ELF and declared themselves the ‘Democratic Movement’.38 On the 
contrary, the leadership of the ELF responded by dubbing them pejoratively as Falul, 
a Tigrinya word for anarchist. The Falul were about 2000 in number.
39
 
By the summer of 1977, the disunity was aggravated and splits occurred widely 
among the different ELF military units that operated in Barka (Brigade 149), Senhit 
(Brigade 262), highlands (Brigade 161), Sahel, and other regions.
40
 Falul elements 
mushroomed everywhere. With few alternatives, the ELF-RC decided to disarm the 
Falul splinter group by launching an attack first on the Falul-dominated Brigade 149, 
inflicting many casualties. In response, the Falul assassinated two members of the 
ELF-RC in an ambuscade carried out in Dankalia − Abdul Kadir Ramadan and Ali 
Mohammed Ibrahim.
41
 
An-all-out war ensued. Being outnumbered, loosely organized and so decentralized, 
Falul members were unable to coordinate any meaningful resistance. Facing complete 
defeat, members of the dissenters (Falul) haphazardly dispersed. Largely out of 
desperation, about twelve hundred of its members joined the EPLF, while some fled 
to Sudan and a few others surrendered to Ethiopia. More than a dozen of senior cadres 
associated with Falul were put behind bars by the ELF-RC. Those who fled to Sudan 
continued their activities referring to themselves as the Eritrean Democratic 
Movement.
42
 
In a similar fashion to Falul, another clandestine movement arose among Muslim 
conservatives in 1978. The group, though had no official name, was labelled by the 
ELF leadership as Yameen, (Arabic for “right”). They were led by Said Hussein, one 
of the founding members of the ELF in Cairo, who had the bad luck of being caught 
by Ethiopian security forces in 1963 and spent more than a decade of his life in 
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prison. He was finally freed in 1975, when the ELF undertook a spectacular operation, 
opening the gates of two prisons in Asmara and Adi Quala, and set free over a 
thousand political prisoners.
43
 Upon his return to ELF ranks, the movement had 
already undergone transformation in many aspects. The removal of the former Cairo 
triumvirate from the ELF’s leadership, the declining tendency of  Pan-Arabism, and 
the domination of the front’s rank-and-file by Christians combined with the 
appearance of the Christian-dominated Falul movement, seem to have urged Said 
Hussein and his associates to form of an Islamist clandestine reformist movement.
44
 
Said Hussein, a Saho by origin, won the support of his ethnic compatriot Osman Saleh 
Sabbe, who was by now in conflict with the ELF and the EPLF.
45
 He began to 
secretly train some fighters somewhere around Amba Soira, the highest mountain in 
the southern section of Eritrea’s central plateau bordering Ethiopia. When the news 
about this training reached the ELF-RC, they were compelled to go to Sudan and flew 
to Yemen. From there they were ferried across the Red Sea and arrived at Dankalia,
46
 
in the same way as the PLF-I did in 1970 (See the previous chapter). According to 
Ahmed Mohammed Nasser, the chairman of the ELF-RC, the operation was not a 
small affair: “The reactionary groups dropped north of Assab and had been in the 
possession of thousands of individual arms, 36 wireless communication sets and 
supplies that would suffice them for months in addition to the great sums of money 
they brought with them in order to bribe the citizens.”47 Being able to infiltrate 
Yameen, the ELF security forces exterminated the latter brutally in mid-1978. The 
chairman of the ELF-RC later on declared unceremoniously, “We foiled the 
reactionary project by resolutely liquidating these elements on May 22, 1978.”48 
The examples of Falul and Yameen are instructive of how ELF-RC was just as 
intolerant of dissidence as the earlier leadership had been. As we may recall, in 1965 
the ELF also resolved the disagreement with the ELM through violence and 
liquidation. In early 1972, in response to secession of the PLF-I, PLF-II, and the Obel, 
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the ELF-RC passed a resolution that announced a ‘war of extermination’, which 
eventually escalated into intense armed conflict between those different nationalist 
folds. After 1975, the ELF-RC adopted a moderate rhetorical approach – ‘democratic 
dialogue’ − to resolve secondary contradictions, in reality violence as a means of 
resolving disunity had never been rescinded by the incumbent leadership. As 
Ahferom, a former ELF fighter, expounds, the resort to violence by the ELF to any 
perceived opponent was due to the failure of the leadership to entertain an alternative 
solutions beforehand.
49
 Furthermore, the ELF-RC’s conviction that “the Eritrean field 
cannot accommodate more than one organization”50 also had its own part to play in 
influencing their actions. Since its emergence, the ELF leadership continued to 
espouse such convictions even up to the period under examination. For instance, in its 
report concerning the unity agreement of October 20, 1977, with the EPLF, the ELF-
RC stated clearly that the above-mentioned conviction was one of the reasons behind 
their unity initiatives undertaken with Sabbe and the EPLF.
51
 With this sort of 
ideological mindset, there was no room at all for adversaries from within. Thus, the 
Falul and Yameen episodes showed the ELF-RC’s perception of violence as a strategy 
to suppress opposition. 
Military Dislodgement and Downfall of the ELF, 1979-1981 
The Ethio-Somali war, which started on July 13, 1977, came to an end with the 
victory of Ethiopia on March 23, 1978. Somali forces were driven out of the Ogaden 
region, thanks to Soviet and Cuban backing for Ethiopia which by now had joined the 
Soviet fold. The Dergue vowed that “our victory in the east shall be repeated in the 
north.”52 Inspired by the Somali defeat, the Dergue hurriedly turned its attention to 
Eritrea and intensified its military preparations to recapture the towns occupied by the 
Eritrean nationalists. By late April 1978, about a 100,000 combat-ready militia and 
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regular troops − equipped with automatic rifles, mortars, antitank guns and RPG-7 
shoulder-launched rockets – were mobilized along the Eritrean border and in the 
besieged Asmara.
53
 
In the face of the Soviet-backed Ethiopian offensive, the rival fronts failed to 
coordinate their counter-attack. Ethiopia’s recapture of Eritrean towns was undertaken 
with dramatic speed and decisiveness. The Dergue struck the ELF first. On July 23, 
1978, Tesseney was the first town to be reoccupied. By August, Segeneyti, Digsa, and 
Agordat were recaptured, and the ELF siege of Barentu was broken. The ELF was 
driven out of urban centres in the highlands and swiftly withdrew to the western 
lowlands, which had been its military base ever since its inception. The EPLF, after 
abandoning its siege of Massawa, meanwhile, declared what it called “strategic 
withdrawal”, meaning to undertake orderly and organized retreat while removing 
useful equipments to sustain it before heading back to the mountainous terrain of 
Sahel, where armoured vehicle and long-range artillery could be neutralized.
54
   
The withdrawal of the ELF coupled with the internal dissention had considerably 
affected the internal stability of the movement. According to Ibrahim Idris Totil, the 
vice chairman of the ELF-RC, the leadership was becoming increasingly divided, and 
gradually irreconcilable differences emerged between key figures − for instance 
between Abdella Idris and Melake Tekle. Disagreement was paramount during 
meetings. In addition, the ELF-RC suffered from the withdrawal of aid from the 
government of Iraq, who was the prime supporter of the movement. Iraq used to 
provide the ELF as much as $ 250,000 every year alongside the provision of military 
training and hardware. But the suppression of the Yameen strained the relations with 
the Iraqi government. In 1979, the latter cut off supplies and demanded the release of 
the Yameen members.
55
 Despite internal instability, however, the ELF leadership 
continued its efforts to revitalize the unification process between the two fronts. But 
these efforts were also hindered by sporadic skirmishes between the ELF and EPLF 
fighters at different places, and each front accused the other of alleged wrongful acts. 
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Because of this, the agenda of many of the supposed unity meetings focused on issues 
related to conflicts. Hence, the unity efforts were not progressing as smoothly as they 
were supposed to be.
56
 
Between 1979 and 1980, the Dergue launched successive offensives in an attempt to 
dislodge the EPLF from the Sahel. The joint military forces of the ELF and EPLF 
managed to stifle all attempts of Ethiopian troops to seize the base area. In order to 
further neutralize the Ethiopian army attacks and strengthen the defences in the 
northern Sahel, the ELF agreed to assign two of their brigades to northern Sahel in the 
EPLF’s base area.57 Accordingly, in mid-1979, the ELF fighters took their position 
alongside with EPLF combatants in the area.
58
 As a result, the Sahel hills proved to be 
an impenetrable shield for the Eritrean nationalists and caused great dismay to 
Ethiopian troops. 
In February 1980 the USSR, concerned about the possible collapse of the Ethiopian 
state, invited the ELF for talks.
59
 The first meeting was in fact held in June 1978. 
Regarding these first talks, declassified documents of the USSR and East Germany on 
Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa demonstrate that: “The objective… [was] to find an 
appropriate solution for Eritrea within the framework of the Ethiopian state... The 
policy of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union was]… aimed at the unity 
of Ethiopia…[and] to convince Ahmed Nasser [Chairman of the ELF-RC] that the 
future development of the Eritrean people can only evolve in a unified Ethiopian 
state.”60 
Friendly countries and liberation movements like Syria and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) were exerting diplomatic pressure on the ELF leadership to 
reconsider the Soviet initiative for dialogue.
61
 Having accepted the second invitation 
from Moscow, the ELF held a confidential meeting with the officials of the Soviet 
Union. Ahmed Mohammed Nasser summarized the core issues discussed as follows: 
“[1] Evaluation of the development in Ethiopia under the Dergue; [2] Prospects of 
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democratic settlement to the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia; [and 3] who would 
represent Eritrea in any negotiation with the Dergue?” He further expounded that 
“[w]ith regard to settling the conflict, we were reiterating the same positions declared 
publicly by the ELF, i.e., that the Eritrean revolution… [was] ready to sit for 
negotiation with Ethiopia with a view to reach a democratic solution that satisfies the 
legitimate rights and aspiration of the Eritrean people for national independence and 
found a base for a good friendly neighbourhood with Ethiopia. Concerning the 
representation in any negotiation, we were keeping firmly to the principle that a 
united delegation that represents all Eritrean political organizations must represent 
Eritrea in any negotiation.”62 In February 1980, in a separate meeting, the East 
Germans also invited the EPLF to Berlin for talks.
63
  
The results of these separate meetings, however, were not encouraging. Rather, it can 
be said that the Moscow-Berlin initiatives served to reinforce the already existing 
mutual suspicion and fuel rumours between the two nationalist fronts. The ELF 
accused its rival of conducting secret talks with the Ethiopian delegation led by 
Berhanu Bayeh and East Germans in Berlin at the expense of their nationalist 
compatriots. On the other hand, the EPLF accused the ELF of accepting regional 
autonomy at the cost of relinquishing national independence, although the ELF 
categorically rejected the claim. Under these circumstances, negotiations for the 
unification of the two fronts were still apparently ongoing. In May 1980, in Aden, the 
ELF agreed to finalize the revitalization of the October 20 agreement with EPLF.
64
 
According to Totil, within the ELF leadership itself there were forces that thought the 
union with the EPLF would only be to the benefit of the latter. These individual 
leaders envisioned themselves as a minority in the anticipated unification of the two 
fronts. They even envisaged it as a dangerous trap that could threaten their very future 
existence.
65
 Despite deep distrust on both sides, preparations for a complete merger of 
forces were already underway. The date of implementation was set to 20 June 1980. 
For the initial stage, they agreed to start the process of amalgamation at the EPLF’s 
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base area, the Sahel, with four brigades: two brigades from each side. The same was 
to take place in the ELF base area. For the initial stage, the ELF designated two 
brigades that were earlier stationed in the northern Sahel. However, before that fateful 
day, a derailing episode occurred in Dankalia.
66
    
On June 6, without the knowledge of ELF’s political leadership,67 the ELF forces 
attacked a military contingent of the EPLF at a place called Ingel in northern 
Dankalia. There is a strong conviction among former ELF members that the attack 
was a sabotage action perpetrated by those forces who opposed unity.
68
 Ingel had 
been a coastal territory disputed by the two fronts and both wanted to hold control 
over it. According to Ibrahim Idris Totil, Ingel, which was claimed as an important 
source of income, was initially under the control the ELF. But in 1978-79 the EPLF 
forcefully occupied it, and the ELF urged them to hand over the area to the units of 
the ELF. But the EPLF refused to give it back. “The case of Ingel was like a non-
healing wound in the ELF,” recalled Totil. The issue was often raised during 
successive meetings of the joint supreme political leadership during 1979-80, but to 
no avail. Finally, the ELF compromised to administer the area jointly with the EPLF. 
But this was never put into practice.
69
     
The attack on Ingel was a big blow to the unification process, especially because it 
happened at the time when final implementation was about to happen. The attack was 
interpreted on the EPLF side as a deliberate action to derail the unity process. Angry 
EPLF leaders resorted to retaliate on the ELF units in Dankalia. The conflict 
continued for several days and the EPLF managed to drive their rival out of Dankalia 
into the Akele Guzai region in a short time. On 27 June, ELF leaders eventually 
ordered their two brigades to withdraw from the joint defence in the northern Sahel. 
According to Ibrahim Idris Totil, the decision was taken to bring the war to a halt. It 
was assumed that the withdrawal of their units from the EPLF base area would 
compel their rival front to relocate its forces from Dankalia into the Sahel in order to 
avoid eviction from their well-entrenched positions by the Ethiopian army.
70
 The 
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outcome of this was, however, a devastating development for the oldest Eritrean 
nationalist organization. On 28 August 1980, the EPLF launched a full-scale offensive 
on the ELF on the pretext that their rival had deserted the joint defence without 
informing the EPLF.
71
 
An all-out ELF-EPLF civil war ensued. The conflict went on for about one year. To 
make certain the total removal of the ELF from the Eritrean field, the EPLF obtained 
the assistance of the TPLF. As mentioned previously, the TPLF was an Ethiopian 
insurgent movement that launched an armed struggle in 1975 against the Dergue 
regime, demanding ‘self-determination’ for the province of Tigray within the wider 
Ethiopian polity. During its initial stage, the movement was assisted, trained and 
armed by the EPLF; and soon became an effective guerrilla force in western Tigray. 
While forging good relations with the EPLF, the TPLF relations since its inception 
with the ELF were “fragile all along, sometimes even turning violent,” as Aregawi 
Berhe, one of the founders of the TPLF recounts.
72
 They had never been in good 
terms; and when a new round in the Eritrean internecine warfare began, the TPLF 
joined its mentor in mid-1981in a full-scale attack against the ELF. 
The ELF, whose strength was already depleted by the reversal in 1978, proved unable 
to overcome its rivals. In August 1981, the remaining ELF fighters were driven over 
the border into Sudan, where they were disarmed and interned by the Sudanese 
army.
73
 About 7000 fighters along with 3000 dependents, 150 vehicles, and nearly 
15000 assortments of weapons, including artillery crossed into Sudan.
74
 The military 
collapse of the ELF gave rise to political disarray that soon ended in disintegration of 
the movement into three major opposing groups: (1) ELF Executive Committee (ELF-
EC) led by Abdella Idris, military commander, which represented increasingly 
sectarian Muslim elements; (2) ELF-RC led by Ahmed Mohammed Nasser and Habte 
Tesfamariam, which was referred as the secular wing of the ELF; and (3) the Saghem, 
that wanted to continue the struggle alongside with the EPLF.
75
 This episode marked 
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the end of the ELF as a unified, military front inside Eritrea, and also set the stage for 
the hegemony of the EPLF in the final decades of the Eritrean war for independence. 
 
Figure 10. Family Tree of the Eritrean Liberation Front and other Political Organizations, 1961-1982 
Source: The author, in collaboration with a former ELF fighter, Kiflom Tesfamariam. 
*Eritrean People’s Liberation Forces 
** Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
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Map  3. ELF Areas of Operation, by District 
   
March 1967 November 1967 January 1974 
   
March 1975 January 1981 March 1982 
Source: Adopted from Michael, 105-130.
  
 
 
Conclusions 
The emergence of the ELF was a direct response to Ethiopia’s failure to respect Eritrea’s 
autonomy under the Federation. The Eritreans felt betrayed when Emperor Haile Selassie I 
proceeded unilaterally to dismantle the federal arrangement, in violation of international 
principles and of the federal scheme mandated by the UN, and Eritreans’ plea for help fell on 
deaf ears. Among the Muslim communities, the fear of being incorporated into the Christian-
dominated Ethiopia was paramount. Such feeling was further strengthened when Ethiopia 
officially prohibited Eritreans the use of Tigrinya and Arabic as official languages in schools 
and business affairs. The ban of such rights was met with serious protests from both 
Christians and Muslims. But for the latter, the prohibition of the right to use Arabic in 
education, especially, was an issue allowing no compromise. The ELM which took a bold 
step to challenge Ethiopia through peaceful means also failed to satisfy the desire of 
Eritreans, particularly those who were of the conviction of using violent strategy as a means 
to terminate Ethiopian domination. The Cairo-based students finally took the initiative to 
form the ELF. The starting of the armed struggle inside Eritrea was, however, a challenging 
issue. In collaboration with Kassala-based Eritreans, they managed to infiltrate into Eritrea to 
lay the groundwork for its implementation. Disgruntled local religious scholars secretly 
campaigned for violent rebellion among the Beni Amer Muslim communities in the western 
lowlands of Eritrea. As a result, Hamid Idris Awate, a veteran outlaw who was known for his 
notoriety in ethnic-based feuds in the region in the 1940s, took the daring step to launch 
armed resistance for the independence of Eritrea in September 1961. It should be noted that 
Awate this time went to the field with a handful of followers for a nationalist political 
agenda. This was clearly phrased in his two important demands: the restitution of the land 
and the flag. While the former was a concrete demand based on local grievances, the latter 
had a symbolic value – national identity. Awate died eight months after the start of the 
rebellion. However, the participation of Eritrean soldiers in the Sudanese Army was 
exceptionally important in sustaining the momentum of the rebellion. They conducted several 
guerrilla activities in different parts of the western lowlands of Eritrea. Higher government 
officials, especially those who were considered ardent supporters of Ethiopia, were subjected 
to continual harassment and assassination attempts by the insurgent movement. When the 
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subversive activities were already underway in cities, the eventual annexation of Eritrea by 
Ethiopia became an inevitable fact. Thus, in 14 November 1962 the federal arrangement was 
abrogated and Eritrea ceased to exist as an autonomous state. 
In the following years, the size of the Eritrean nationalists increased steadily from tens to 
hundreds of people, who came from diverse backgrounds. The need to secure the supply of 
arms and ammunitions and to establish effective organizational structures were the major 
challenges. As a result, the ELF introduced a new military strategy that divided Eritrea into 
five zones of operation and this enabled the movement to grow and spread itself widely 
throughout the first decade. However, the social landscape of Eritrea, which was divided 
along ethnic, religious, and regional lines, on the one hand, and the failure of the leadership to 
properly manage the strategy and create an all-embracing, disciplined, accountable and 
effectively centralized organization, on the other, affected the implementation of the strategy 
of the struggle negatively. Consequently, zonal commanders became more powerful than 
their superiors and often reacted with brutality to perceived threats. Ethnic and religious 
sectarianism and intense rivalry developed within and between the different military zones, 
which even led to failure to help each other during time of war, thereby weakening the 
organization severely. Consequently, the ELF failed to consolidate its gains.  
The growing discontent and grievances among the increasingly diverse fighters gave rise to 
the emergence of rebellious forces who sought to reform the organization from within. Their 
effort succeeded in bringing the armies under a single interim leadership called the General 
Command. The unity of the armies in the field, however, did not succeed in bringing unity at 
the top. Members of the Supreme Council became divided and suspicious of each other. 
Thus, the unity of the armies gained at the 1969 Adobha Conference only achieved limited 
and temporary success. At the turn of its first decade, the ELF encountered a process of 
serious disintegration that reduced the size of its army considerably. Consequently, three 
small organizations emerged and reorganized to become what later on emerged as the EPLF.  
The leadership of the ELF reacted violently to splinter groups. An-all-out fratricidal war 
ensued, which only came to a halt through a ceasefire agreement in late 1974. The cessation 
of hostilities was the result of internal and external factors to the ELF: the former being the 
realization of the ELF that they could not finish their opponents through military means; the 
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latter being the increased popular pressure and the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia that created 
the urgency of unity between Eritrean nationalists. Having subsequently turned their guns 
against the common enemy, both movements by 1977 managed to control a considerable 
proportion of the Eritrean territory. However, the territorial gains made by the nationalists 
were short-lived; primarily due to continuous tensions, rivalry and lack of genuine 
cooperation. In addition, a surge of Ethiopian troops and advanced military hardware in the 
late 1970s changed the balance of power and consequently the Eritrean movements lost their 
military superiority to the Ethiopian troops. Hence, the former were forced to retreat in the 
second half of 1978, in which the ELF’s military strength was sapped. 
The period between the two inter-Eritrean ‘civil wars’, 1975-81, was characterized by 
constant, but ultimately fruitless negotiations for unity. Internally, the ELF was also torn 
apart by dissention and debilitating internecine conflict. Lack of responsible, coherent, and 
cohesive leadership seemed to characterize the movement, ever since the early period of its 
history. Power struggle was a key problem. While the internal problems were simmering, the 
competition between the two biggest rival fronts was re-emerging. The cumulative sum of all 
these internal factors, coupled with the emerging military superiority of the EPLF in the 
second civil war, led to the virtual total defeat of the ELF, with its units pushed into Sudan by 
its rival offspring organization. Thereafter followed the proliferation of different opposing 
fissiparous organizations out of the oldest Eritrean nationalist movement, in which each 
splinter group resorted to advocate for the ‘real’ ELF. The demise of the ELF undoubtedly 
secured the supremacy of the EPLF in the final decade of the Eritrean armed struggle. 
In the final analysis, we can identify a number of major reasons for the eclipse of the ELF by 
the EPLF, something that eventually led to the demise of the former. First, the ELF was a 
movement formed at a time when highland Christian support for the union was still relatively 
strong. The same was not true among lowland Muslims. ELF came to reflect this divide. Not 
only was its leadership dominated by Muslims, but so was its rank-and-file. At a later stage, 
when the independence movement came to take on a wider character, the ELF proved unable 
to move beyond this sectarian divide, although it tried. In addition to its inability to break out 
from being perceived as a Muslim movement, the ELF power had become weakened by 
power struggle, disunity among the leadership, the infighting of the ELF, the rise of the EPLF 
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and the taking over of the mantle of progress and secularity by this organization. Those were 
among the major reasons that worked against the ELF in the long term. 
Finally, it is important to note that the history of the ELF was flooded with splits and 
factionalism; this was the key sociological dynamics of the movement, emerging from 
regional, ethnic and religious diversity coupled with elite, or elitist, behaviour of certain 
individuals and small groups. Research on this leadership and social organizational dynamics 
of the ELF could certainly give us interesting results that would enhance our understanding of 
why the splits were happening the way they did.  
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